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Politicians have long engaged in marketing themselves by employing distinct speaking styles to signal social standing, competence, or a shared background with their audience. What effect does this use of different language appeals have on voter opinion? Utilizing a survey experiment in Thailand, I test a set of hypotheses about the effect of language on respondent opinions. Relying on three distinct treatments, a formal language register, an informal language register, and an ethnic language, I demonstrate the multiple effects of language on political appeal. The use of a formal register has mixed effects, signaling both high education as well as preparation for national office while also creating social distance between the speaker and audience. An informal register and the ethnic tongue both signal kinship ties to listeners, with the ethnic tongue having a much more profound effect. The results also show that an ethnic overture has greater electoral appeal than formal speech. These findings highlight the causal effect language has in shaping political opinions and illustrate the varied impacts of linguistic hierarchies on political appeal. [Data available at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/ZX4HGA]

In contrast to the veneer of a homogenous state-approved Thai ethnicity, Thailand is home to a heterogeneous population. Only about one-third of Thailand's inhabitants speak the national language as their mother tongue; multiple alternate ethnolinguistic groups comprise the remainder of the population, with the Lao in the northeast, often called Isan people, being the largest at 28 percent of the population. Ethnic divisions closely align with areas of political party strength; the Thai Rak Thai Party and its subsequent incarnations enjoy strong support from Isan people and Khammuang speakers in the north while the Democrat Party dominates among the Thai- and Paktay-speaking people of the central plains and the south. Despite this confluence of ethnicity and political party support, we see very little mobilization along ethnic cleavages. Why? I argue that ethnic mobilization remains minimal because of the large-scale public acceptance and embrace of the government-approved Thai identity. Even among the country's most disadvantaged, as are Isan people, support is still strong for "Thai-ness." Most inhabitants of Thailand espouse the mantra that to be Thai is superior to being labelled as an alternate ethnic group. I demonstrate this through the application of large-scale survey data as well as a set of interviews with self-identified Isan people. The findings suggest that the Thai state has successfully inculcated a sense of national identity among the Isan people and that ethnic mobilization is hindered by ardent nationalism. (Pac Aff/GIGA)

Thailand's March 2019 ballot was the first for the country since 2011, and for many it signaled the potential end of the military junta's five-year rule. But was it truly a return to democracy? This essay argues that the election was far from a democratization event. Instead, it was a highly orchestrated exercise to ensure authoritarian longevity. The junta employed techniques of institutional engineering as well as managing the election's outcomes in an effort to extend the premiership of Prayuth Chan-ocha despite increasing pressure for a return to civilian rule. The results of the election suggest that Thai society continues to exhibit deep divisions between those who support and those who oppose military interventions in politics. I further contend that the election should be seen as part of the continuing struggle by conservative forces in society to maintain their dominance in politics despite demands from other segments of the population for equal representation, a contest which is far from over. (Pac Aff/GIGA)

Underneath the veneer of a homogenous state-approved Thai ethnicity,Thailand is home to a heterogeneous population. Only about one-thirdof Thailand's inhabitants speak the national language as their mothertongue; multiple alternate ethnolinguistic groups comprise the remainderof the population, with the Lao in the northeast, often called Isan people,being the largest at 28 percent of the population. Ethnic divisions closelyalign with areas of political party strength: the Thai Rak Thai Party and itssubsequent incarnations have enjoyed strong support from Isan people andKhammuang speakers in the north while the Democrat Party dominatesamong the Thai- and Paktay-speaking people of the central plains and thesouth. Despite this confluence of ethnicity and political party support, wesee very little mobilization along ethnic cleavages. Why? I argue that ethnicmobilization remains minimal because of the large-scale public acceptanceand embrace of the government-approved Thai identity. Even among thecountry's most disadvantaged, such as Isan people, support is still strongfor "Thai-ness." Most inhabitants of Thailand espouse the mantra that tobe Thai is superior to being labelled as part of an alternate ethnic group. Idemonstrate this through the application of large-scale survey data as wellas a set of interviews with self-identified Isan people. The findings suggestthat the Thai state has successfully inculcated a sense of national identityamong the Isan people and that ethnic mobilization is hindered by ardentnationalism.

Policy reforms are difficult for developing states, especially when they are meant to improve cooperation and collaboration between private citizens and state officials, such as in the case of education, health care provision, business‐state relations, and policing. A large part of this challenge is that the policy reforms required for coproduction of services necessitate development of state capacity in new directions. Using the substantive issue of irrigation reforms, especially those aimed at improving service provision and farmer participation, I identify three lessons for reformers regarding the implementation of policy for the coproduction of services. Drawing on extensive fieldwork in Thailand and Indonesia, as well as the experience of the National Irrigation Administration in the Philippines, I emphasize the importance of street‐level bureaucrats. The lessons drawn from irrigation policy are comparable to other practice‐intensive state activities.

ABSTRACTWhy does a state build institutional capacity in certain sectors rather than others? Despite having gained leverage explaining the emergence of institutions in the developmental states of East Asia, we have comparatively weak accounts for sub‐national variation in institutional strength, a much more common phenomenon. Investigating the surprising achievements of the Philippines' National Irrigation Administration, this article advances a theory of sectoral success in the face of a generally poor developmental record. The author demonstrates that executives will only construct institutional capacity when facing strong political pressure combined with resource scarcity. Such vulnerability permits politicians to exercise discretion in choosing which policies to pursue, allowing them to avoid upsetting their coalitions. Once a politician achieves some degree of policy success, he or she is then able to avoid engaging in similar reforms in other fields. Thus we see pockets of institutional capacity in states that otherwise struggle with developmental tasks.

Why does a state build institutional capacity in certain sectors rather than others? Despite having gained leverage explaining the emergence of institutions in the developmental states of East Asia, we have comparatively weak accounts for sub‐national variation in institutional strength, a much more common phenomenon. Investigating the surprising achievements of the Philippines' National Irrigation Administration, this article advances a theory of sectoral success in the face of a generally poor developmental record. The author demonstrates that executives will only construct institutional capacity when facing strong political pressure combined with resource scarcity. Such vulnerability permits politicians to exercise discretion in choosing which policies to pursue, allowing them to avoid upsetting their coalitions. Once a politician achieves some degree of policy success, he or she is then able to avoid engaging in similar reforms in other fields. Thus we see pockets of institutional capacity in states that otherwise struggle with developmental tasks.