Suchergebnisse

"Are the limitations imposed on World Trade Organization (WTO) members' right to regulate efficient? This is a question that is only scarcely, if ever, analysed in existing literature. Boris Rigod aims to provide an answer to this fundamental concern. Using the tools of economic analysis and in particular the concept of economic efficiency as a benchmark, the author states that domestic regulatory measures should only be subject to scrutiny by WTO bodies when they cause negative international externalities through terms of trade manipulations. He then suggests that WTO law, applied by the WTO judiciary can prevent WTO members from attaining optimal levels of regulation. By applying a law and economics methodology, Rigod provides an innovative solution to the problem of how to reconcile members' regulatory autonomy and WTO rules as well as offering a novel analytical framework for assessing domestic regulations in the light of WTO law"--

"Are the limitations imposed on World Trade Organization (WTO) members' right to regulate efficient? This is a question that is only scarcely, if ever, analysed in existing literature. Boris Rigod aims to provide an answer to this fundamental concern. Using the tools of economic analysis and in particular the concept of economic efficiency as a benchmark, the author states that domestic regulatory measures should only be subject to scrutiny by WTO bodies when they cause negative international externalities through terms of trade manipulations. He then suggests that WTO law, applied by the WTO judiciary can prevent WTO members from attaining optimal levels of regulation. By applying a law and economics methodology, Rigod provides an innovative solution to the problem of how to reconcile members' regulatory autonomy and WTO rules as well as offering a novel analytical framework for assessing domestic regulations in the light of WTO law"--

Are the limitations imposed on World Trade Organization (WTO) members' right to regulate efficient? This is a question that is only scarcely, if ever, analysed in existing literature. Boris Rigod aims to provide an answer to this fundamental concern. Using the tools of economic analysis and in particular the concept of economic efficiency as a benchmark, the author states that domestic regulatory measures should only be subject to scrutiny by WTO bodies when they cause negative international externalities through terms of trade manipulations. He then suggests that WTO law, applied by the WTO judiciary can prevent WTO members from attaining optimal levels of regulation. By applying a law and economics methodology, Rigod provides an innovative solution to the problem of how to reconcile members' regulatory autonomy and WTO rules as well as offering a novel analytical framework for assessing domestic regulations in the light of WTO law

The subject of this article is the technical barriers to trade (TBT) provisions in preferential trade agreements (PTAs). More precisely, it inquires into TBT provisions in PTAs that go beyond the scope of the rules enshrined in the World Trade Organization's (WTO) TBT Agreement. To this end, it aims to answer three questions. First, what kind of new TBT rules do modern PTAs contain? Second, what explains their existence, given that PTAs usually already incorporate or resemble WTO rules on domestic regulatory measures, such as Article III of the GATT 1994 or the TBT Agreement, which address technical barriers to a certain extent? And, finally, are such rules consistent with the requirements set forth by WTO law? For purposes of illustration, the recently concluded free trade agreement (FTA) between the European Union (EU) and Korea is used as a case study.

This paper analyzes the dispute Indonesia – Measures concerning the importation of chicken meat and chicken products from a legal-economic perspective. We evaluate alternative explanations for the motive behind Indonesia´s import restrictions and conclude that they can be linked to protectionist political-economic motives and are most likely due to a self-sufficiency objective and the legal requirements attached to it. Economically, the import restrictions on chicken and other food products have led to substantial price volatility, and they impose costs on Indonesian consumers and small farmers who are net buyers of food, firms that import certain raw materials, as well as foreign exporters. Therefore, by making food more expensive and less accessible, they could reduce food security. We also argue that an additional issue with the goal of self-sufficiency in Indonesia is lack of comparative advantage in some food items, including chicken meat and chicken products. Legally, although the Panel highlighted that self-sufficiency is a legitimate policy objective that as such does not lead to a violation of WTO law, the Indonesia - Chicken case leads to the question of whether, in practice, it is feasible to implement a self-sufficiency target resorting only to WTO-compliant policies. Finally, we discuss potential alternative economic policies and examine whether Indonesia could have attained its food self-sufficiency objective in a WTO-consistent manner.

In October 2014, the European Union requested consultations with Russia under the WTO's dispute settlement system regarding Russia's tariff treatment of various agricultural and manufacturing products. Although most of the measures challenged by the EU were individual tariff lines, the final measure in its complaint was a "more general measure" referred to as the systematic duty variation. A WTO dispute panel eventually ruled that the EU failed to establish the systematic nature of the duty treatment afforded by Russia to certain products. In this paper, we explore the dispute panel's ruling, as well as how claims of systematic non-compliance are treated in other legal settings. We conclude by exploring whether future WTO panels should instead consider statistical evidence of systematic treatment to promote compliance.