KANT'S VIEW OF FEDERALISM IS EXAMINED IN THIS ARTICLE. THE AUTHOR DESCRIBED KANT'S ARGUMENT THAT WITHOUT A UNIVERSAL 'PACIFIC FEDERATION' OF 'REPUBLICS' THERE IS NO SECURITY FOR PUBLIC LEGAL JUSTICE. FOR KANT, FEDERALISM EXTENDED ONLY OUTWARD - FROM SOVEREIGN REPUBLICS, NATION-STATES, - BUT NOT INWARD IN ANY COUNTRY. KANT'S DIVISION OF POLITICS AND MORALITY, AND HIS VIEW OF LIBERTY, ARE BOTH DISCUSSED.
LOCKE IS SOMETIMES REPRESENTED AS A CONSTANT AND SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORIST, SOMETIMES AS A TEORIST OF NATURAL LAW, SOMPTIMES AS A THEORIST OF NATURAL RIGHTS (PARTICULARLY NATUALA PROPERTY RIGHTS). THE PROBLEM IS THAT ALL THREE CHARACTERIZATIONS ARE RIGHT; AND THE DIFFICULTY IS THAT OF FINDING AN EQULIBRIUM BETWEEN THESE,SUCH THAT NONE OF THEM IS BRACKETED OUT AS "NOT SERIOUS".
A KIND OF INTERNATIONAL FEDERALISM- A UNIVERSAL ORGANIZATION OF STATES VOLUNTARILY OBEYING INTERNATIONAL LAWS, IF NOT A WORLD STATE- WAS MORE IMPORTANT TO KANT THAN TO ANY OTHER POLITICAL PHILOSOPHER, SINCE FOR HIM THE POSSIBILITY OF A PUBLIC LEGAL ORDER AT ANY LEVEL WAS JEOPARDIZED BY THE ABSENCE OF SUCH AN ORDER AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL, THE RELATIONS OF INDEPENDENT STATES.
POLITICS AND LEGALITY SERVE A HIGH PURPOSE IN I. KANT'S PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY: THEY ARE THE GUARANTORS OF THOSE (NEGATIVE) CONDITIONS WHICH MAKE THE DIGNITY OF MEN AS "ENDS-IN-THEMSELVES" MORE NEARLY POSSIBLE. THEY MAKE THE EXERCISE OF GOOD WILL LESS DIFFICULT BY REMOVING IMPEDIMENTS SUCH AS FEAR OF VIOLENCE WHICH COULD INCLINE THE WILL TO ACT ON MAXIMS WHICH CANNOT BE UNIVERSALIZED.
HAD ROUSSEAU NOT BEEN CENTRALLY CONCERNED WITH FREEDOM, SOME OF THE STRUCTURAL FEATURES OF HIS POLITICAL THOUGHT WOULD BE UNACCOUNTABLE. ABOVE ALL, THE NOTION OF GENERAL WILL WOULD NOT HAVE BECOME THE CORE OF HIS POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY. ROUSSEAU'S REASONS FOR USING 'GENERAL WILL' AS HIS CENTRAL POLITICAL CONCEPT WERE ESSENTIALLY PHILOSOPHICAL. THE TWO TERMS OF GENERAL WILL - 'WILL' AND 'GENERALITY' - REPRESENT TWO MAIN STRANDS IN HIS THOUGHT. 'GENERALITY' STANDS FOR THE RULE OF LAW, FOR CIVIC EDUCATION THAT DRAWS US OUT OF OURSELVES AND TOWARDS THE GENERAL (OR COMMON) GOOD. 'WILL' STANDS FOR ROUSSEAU'S CONVICTION THAT CIVIL ASSOCIATION IS 'THE MOST VOLUNTARY ACT IN THE WORLD'. AND IF ONE COULD 'GENERALIZE' THE WILL, SO THAT IT 'ELECTS' ONLY LAW, CITIZENSHIP, AND THE COMMON GOOD, AND AVOIDS 'WILLFUL' SELF-LOVE, THEN ONE WOULD HAVE A GENERAL WILL IN ROUSSEAU'S PARTICULAR SENSE. THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF ROUSSEAU'S GENERAL WILL IS FURTHER BROUGHT OUT THROUGH A COMPARISON WITH KANT'S 'GOOD WILL' ABOUT WHICH ROUSSEAU WOULD HAVE FELT SEVERE DOUBTS.
The centrality of 'Will' in Rousseau's thought is examined. 'Generality' stands for the rule of law, civic education and 'the common good'. The characteristics of Rousseau's approach are highlighted by a comparison with those of Kant. (SJK)
Discusses the work of Louis Hartz, who by 1973 had begun to formulate a radically new 'reading' of political thought set out in A Synthesis of World History. As he tried to integrate the surviving parts of the earlier books into this final testament, 'fragment' theory itself became a fragment. (JLN)
Hannah Arendt is right to give prominence to Kant's Critique of Judgment--for that work contains Kant's fullest treatment of 'ends' and purposes, and Kantian politics is meant to be a 'legal' realisation of moral ends. But Arendt is wrong to try to extract a 'new' Kantian politics from Judgment's aesthetic ideas: Kantian politics is already 'there', and need not be squeezed out of his theory of art. She has chosen the right work, but given it a bizarre reading. (Abstract amended)
KANT'S GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS (1875) IS ANALYZED IN THIS ESSAY, THE PURPOSE OF WHICH IS TO RELATE THAT WORK OF KANT'S TO THE FULL RANGE OF HIS MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, INCLUDING THE GROUNDWORK'S THESIS THAT IT IS A MORAL IMPERATIVE THAT PEOPLE SHOULD BE TREATED AS ENDS IN THEMSELVES, NEVER AS ONLY A MEANS TO AN END.
IN HIS RECENT REVIEW (NOVEMBER 1983) OF HANNAH ARENDT'S LECTURES ON KANT'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, STEVEN M. DELUE CERTAINLY SUCCEEDED IN THROWING SOME LIGHT ON BOTH ARENDT AND KANT. BUT WHAT SEEMS TO HAVE ESCAPED HIME ENTIRELY IS THE SHEER ODDITY, THE BRILLIANT PERVERSITY, OF THE BOOK, VIEWED AS ITS TITLE ENCOURAGES-AS "LECTUURES ON KANT'S POLITICAL PHILOSPHY." THE CENTRAL CLAIM OF THE LECTURES-SKILLFULLY EDITED AND INTRODUCED BY RONALD BEINER-IS BOLD, IMAGINATIVE, AND RISK TAKING: "SINCE KANT DID NOT WRITE HIS POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, THE BEST WAY TO FIND OUT WHAT HE THOUGHT ABOUT THIS MATTER IS TO TURN TO HIM CRITIQUE OF AESTHETIC JUDGMENT." TO BE SURE, ARENDT GRANTS THAT KANT PRODUCED EXPLICITLY POLITICAL WRITINGS. BUT ETHERNAL PEACE IS CHARACTERIZED AS A "REVERIE" CAST IN AN "IRONICAL TONE," WHILE THE RECHTSLEHRE IS STYLED "BORING AND PEDANTIC"; HENCE THE NECESSITY, FOR ARENDT, TO TURN TO THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT, WHOSE "TOPICS" ARE OF "EMINENT POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE."
