Suchergebnisse

This dissertation offers an empirical investigation of the links between the political sphere and the management of local public services in France. When they administer public services, local governments can decide either to provide a service in-house, or to externalize its management, and therefore conclude contracts with private entities. First, this choice of governance is analyzed in the case of French school canteens and the political drivers of this choice are highlighted. The political contestation in the municipal election is found to be one of the drivers of the organizational choice. Second, we analyzed public-private contracts in case of externalization. We found those contracts to be more rigid than pure private contracts. Besides, this excessive rigidity can be explained by the level of political contestation in the municipality. Finally, the determinants of the local food supply is studied. We find that the availability of alternative food networks is sometimes driven by political considerations. This dissertation contributes to add knowledge to the understanding of the management of local public services, as well as to the understanding of food retail stores availability. ; Cette thèse propose une étude empirique des liens entre la sphère politique et la gestion des services publics locaux en France. Lorsqu'elles administrent les services publics, les administrations locales peuvent décider soit de fournir un service en régie, soit d'externaliser sa gestion, et donc de conclure des contrats avec des entités privées. Tout d'abord, ce choix de gouvernance est analysé dans le cas des cantines scolaires françaises et les moteurs politiques de ce choix sont mis en évidence. La contestation politique à l'élection municipale est considérée comme l'un des moteurs du choix organisationnel. Deuxièmement, nous avons analysé les contrats public-privé en cas d'externalisation. Nous avons constaté que ces contrats étaient plus rigides que les contrats privés purs. En outre, cette rigidité excessive peut s'expliquer par le niveau de contestation politique dans la municipalité. Enfin, les déterminants de l'approvisionnement alimentaire local sont étudiés. Nous constatons que la disponibilité des réseaux d'alimentation alternatifs est parfois motivée par des considérations politiques. Cette thèse contribue à ajouter des connaissances à la compréhension de la gestion des services publics locaux, ainsi qu'à la compréhension de la disponibilité des magasins de détail alimentaires.

This dissertation offers an empirical investigation of the links between the political sphere and the management of local public services in France. When they administer public services, local governments can decide either to provide a service in-house, or to externalize its management, and therefore conclude contracts with private entities. First, this choice of governance is analyzed in the case of French school canteens and the political drivers of this choice are highlighted. The political contestation in the municipal election is found to be one of the drivers of the organizational choice. Second, we analyzed public-private contracts in case of externalization. We found those contracts to be more rigid than pure private contracts. Besides, this excessive rigidity can be explained by the level of political contestation in the municipality. Finally, the determinants of the local food supply is studied. We find that the availability of alternative food networks is sometimes driven by political considerations. This dissertation contributes to add knowledge to the understanding of the management of local public services, as well as to the understanding of food retail stores availability. ; Cette thèse propose une étude empirique des liens entre la sphère politique et la gestion des services publics locaux en France. Lorsqu'elles administrent les services publics, les administrations locales peuvent décider soit de fournir un service en régie, soit d'externaliser sa gestion, et donc de conclure des contrats avec des entités privées. Tout d'abord, ce choix de gouvernance est analysé dans le cas des cantines scolaires françaises et les moteurs politiques de ce choix sont mis en évidence. La contestation politique à l'élection municipale est considérée comme l'un des moteurs du choix organisationnel. Deuxièmement, nous avons analysé les contrats public-privé en cas d'externalisation. Nous avons constaté que ces contrats étaient plus rigides que les contrats privés purs. En outre, cette rigidité excessive peut ...

This dissertation offers an empirical investigation of the links between the political sphere and the management of local public services in France. When they administer public services, local governments can decide either to provide a service in-house, or to externalize its management, and therefore conclude contracts with private entities. First, this choice of governance is analyzed in the case of French school canteens and the political drivers of this choice are highlighted. The political contestation in the municipal election is found to be one of the drivers of the organizational choice. Second, we analyzed public-private contracts in case of externalization. We found those contracts to be more rigid than pure private contracts. Besides, this excessive rigidity can be explained by the level of political contestation in the municipality. Finally, the determinants of the local food supply is studied. We find that the availability of alternative food networks is sometimes driven by political considerations. This dissertation contributes to add knowledge to the understanding of the management of local public services, as well as to the understanding of food retail stores availability. ; Cette thèse propose une étude empirique des liens entre la sphère politique et la gestion des services publics locaux en France. Lorsqu'elles administrent les services publics, les administrations locales peuvent décider soit de fournir un service en régie, soit d'externaliser sa gestion, et donc de conclure des contrats avec des entités privées. Tout d'abord, ce choix de gouvernance est analysé dans le cas des cantines scolaires françaises et les moteurs politiques de ce choix sont mis en évidence. La contestation politique à l'élection municipale est considérée comme l'un des moteurs du choix organisationnel. Deuxièmement, nous avons analysé les contrats public-privé en cas d'externalisation. Nous avons constaté que ces contrats étaient plus rigides que les contrats privés purs. En outre, cette rigidité excessive peut ...

This dissertation offers an empirical investigation of the links between the political sphere and the management of local public services in France. When they administer public services, local governments can decide either to provide a service in-house, or to externalize its management, and therefore conclude contracts with private entities. First, this choice of governance is analyzed in the case of French school canteens and the political drivers of this choice are highlighted. The political contestation in the municipal election is found to be one of the drivers of the organizational choice. Second, we analyzed public-private contracts in case of externalization. We found those contracts to be more rigid than pure private contracts. Besides, this excessive rigidity can be explained by the level of political contestation in the municipality. Finally, the determinants of the local food supply is studied. We find that the availability of alternative food networks is sometimes driven by political considerations. This dissertation contributes to add knowledge to the understanding of the management of local public services, as well as to the understanding of food retail stores availability. ; Cette thèse propose une étude empirique des liens entre la sphère politique et la gestion des services publics locaux en France. Lorsqu'elles administrent les services publics, les administrations locales peuvent décider soit de fournir un service en régie, soit d'externaliser sa gestion, et donc de conclure des contrats avec des entités privées. Tout d'abord, ce choix de gouvernance est analysé dans le cas des cantines scolaires françaises et les moteurs politiques de ce choix sont mis en évidence. La contestation politique à l'élection municipale est considérée comme l'un des moteurs du choix organisationnel. Deuxièmement, nous avons analysé les contrats public-privé en cas d'externalisation. Nous avons constaté que ces contrats étaient plus rigides que les contrats privés purs. En outre, cette rigidité excessive peut s'expliquer par le niveau de contestation politique dans la municipalité. Enfin, les déterminants de l'approvisionnement alimentaire local sont étudiés. Nous constatons que la disponibilité des réseaux d'alimentation alternatifs est parfois motivée par des considérations politiques. Cette thèse contribue à ajouter des connaissances à la compréhension de la gestion des services publics locaux, ainsi qu'à la compréhension de la disponibilité des magasins de détail alimentaires.

This dissertation offers an empirical investigation of the links between the political sphere and the management of local public services in France. When they administer public services, local governments can decide either to provide a service in-house, or to externalize its management, and therefore conclude contracts with private entities. First, this choice of governance is analyzed in the case of French school canteens and the political drivers of this choice are highlighted. The political contestation in the municipal election is found to be one of the drivers of the organizational choice. Second, we analyzed public-private contracts in case of externalization. We found those contracts to be more rigid than pure private contracts. Besides, this excessive rigidity can be explained by the level of political contestation in the municipality. Finally, the determinants of the local food supply is studied. We find that the availability of alternative food networks is sometimes driven by political considerations. This dissertation contributes to add knowledge to the understanding of the management of local public services, as well as to the understanding of food retail stores availability. ; Cette thèse propose une étude empirique des liens entre la sphère politique et la gestion des services publics locaux en France. Lorsqu'elles administrent les services publics, les administrations locales peuvent décider soit de fournir un service en régie, soit d'externaliser sa gestion, et donc de conclure des contrats avec des entités privées. Tout d'abord, ce choix de gouvernance est analysé dans le cas des cantines scolaires françaises et les moteurs politiques de ce choix sont mis en évidence. La contestation politique à l'élection municipale est considérée comme l'un des moteurs du choix organisationnel. Deuxièmement, nous avons analysé les contrats public-privé en cas d'externalisation. Nous avons constaté que ces contrats étaient plus rigides que les contrats privés purs. En outre, cette rigidité excessive peut s'expliquer par le niveau de contestation politique dans la municipalité. Enfin, les déterminants de l'approvisionnement alimentaire local sont étudiés. Nous constatons que la disponibilité des réseaux d'alimentation alternatifs est parfois motivée par des considérations politiques. Cette thèse contribue à ajouter des connaissances à la compréhension de la gestion des services publics locaux, ainsi qu'à la compréhension de la disponibilité des magasins de détail alimentaires.

We study the link between the choice of governance and political hazards using municipal school canteens. We provide evidence that in politically contested cities, mayors are more likely to choose to "make" rather than "buy" to avoid challenge of the contract with a private partner. A higher probability of losing office – proxied by close victory margins and political concentration – increases the probability to "make". We also provide evidence that in cities where the potential challenge on sustainable supply is high, mayors tend to "make" also to signal trustworthiness to the voter. A higher presence of ecologist's citizens and alternative supply organizations – proxied by the presence of Agenda 21 and the presence of alternative and organic food shops – increases the probability to "make".

We study the link between the choice of governance and political hazards using municipal school canteens. We provide evidence that in politically contested cities, mayors are more likely to choose to "make" rather than "buy" to avoid challenge of the contract with a private partner. A higher probability of losing office – proxied by close victory margins and political concentration – increases the probability to "make". We also provide evidence that in cities where the potential challenge on sustainable supply is high, mayors tend to "make" also to signal trustworthiness to the voter. A higher presence of ecologist's citizens and alternative supply organizations – proxied by the presence of Agenda 21 and the presence of alternative and organic food shops – increases the probability to "make".

We study the link between the choice of governance and political hazards using municipal school canteens. We provide evidence that in politically contested cities, mayors are more likely to choose to "make" rather than "buy" to avoid challenge of the contract with a private partner. A higher probability of losing office – proxied by close victory margins and political concentration – increases the probability to "make". We also provide evidence that in cities where the potential challenge on sustainable supply is high, mayors tend to "make" also to signal trustworthiness to the voter. A higher presence of ecologist's citizens and alternative supply organizations – proxied by the presence of Agenda 21 and the presence of alternative and organic food shops – increases the probability to "make".

We study the link between the choice of governance and political hazards using municipal school canteens. We provide evidence that in politically contested cities, mayors are more likely to choose to "make" rather than "buy" to avoid challenge of the contract with a private partner. A higher probability of losing office – proxied by close victory margins and political concentration – increases the probability to "make". We also provide evidence that in cities where the potential challenge on sustainable supply is high, mayors tend to "make" also to signal trustworthiness to the voter. A higher presence of ecologist's citizens and alternative supply organizations – proxied by the presence of Agenda 21 and the presence of alternative and organic food shops – increases the probability to "make".

We study the link between the choice of governance and political hazards using municipal school canteens. We provide evidence that in politically contested cities, mayors are more likely to choose to "make" rather than "buy" to avoid challenge of the contract with a private partner. A higher probability of losing office – proxied by close victory margins and political concentration – increases the probability to "make". We also provide evidence that in cities where the potential challenge on sustainable supply is high, mayors tend to "make" also to signal trustworthiness to the voter. A higher presence of ecologist's citizens and alternative supply organizations – proxied by the presence of Agenda 21 and the presence of alternative and organic food shops – increases the probability to "make".