Search results

The article analyzes the activity of Weimar Triangle (Germany, France, Poland) during Ukrainian crisis (2013-2014) as an efficient, but still largely underestimated negotiation force of the European Union. The evolution of role of Weimar Triangle in post-bipolar era is indicated, as well as the role of this specific structure during Ukrainian crisis.

International audience ; After a decade of humiliations, Russia has decided to restore its power. Its attempts to get closer first to Europe then to the USA have relatively failed. This led Vladimir Putin, since 2012, to promote the idea of a « post western world ». In the discourse as well as in its practice, Russia sets forth the denial of a so called « western superiority » in world affairs. For this purpose, Russia mainly uses military means which on one hand are quickly modernized but on the other hand remain with no comparison with the ones of the USA. At last Russia sets forth the creation and the development of alternative institutions in competition with the ones established during the bipolar era. ; Après une décennie d'humiliations, la Russie tente de restaurer sa puissance perdue. Les échecs relatifs de rapprochement avec l'Europe, d'abord, puis avec les États-Unis sous les deux premiers mandats de Vladimir Poutine, conduisent ce dernier à tenter de promouvoir, depuis 2012, un monde « post-occidental ». Le discours et la pratique russes se manifestent en premier lieu par un déni du primat occidental dans les affaires mondiales. Ce discours et cette pratique sont soutenus par des moyens essentiellement militaires croissants mais qui restent toutefois sans commune mesure avec ceux des États-Unis. Enfin, la Russie cherche à favoriser l'émergence de structures alternatives destinées à se substituer à celles nées à l'âge bipolaire.

Relationships between NATO and Russia remain tainted by mutual mistrust despite efforts two years ago by the US President to renew them. Recent issues surrounding AMB defence have revealed the degree to which Washington, Brussels and Moscow see the world differently. At the same time, however, the technical relationship is working pretty well, and areas of cooperation include well-identified common interests, such as Afghanistan.

The structure of European security has within it some highly original aspects, the twenty-year-old Weimar Triangle being one of them. At Polish instigation, it could possibly find renewed relevance today through being extended to Moscow. Were this to be so, a new and broad pan-European security structure could be created.

The Libyan question concerns not only most of the countries with interests in the Mediterranean but also all those with an interest in matters concerning Muslim minorities. This is certainly the case for the Russian Federation, as explained by the author, who is an expert on the country.

Russia's strategic relationship with France, and more generally with Europe and the Atlantic Alliance, is unlikely to change significantly following the many elections in the near future. The Afghan question, energy security and the relationship with China will remain determining, and underline the importance of anchoring Russia to the West.

Résumé La politique européenne de voisinage engagée par l'Union européenne en 2003 et le concept d'étranger proche lancé en 1992 couvrent d'une zone d'application commune. Le sort de cette zone dépendra largement de la nature des relations entre Bruxelles et Moscou et de leur volonté respective d'en faire un espace de coopération ou au contraire de conflictualité. Cette politique et ce concept conduisent notamment à poser la question de la représentation du voisin : or, voisin géographique, voisin politique ou institutionnel ne couvrent pas nécessairement les mêmes réalités. De ce point de vue, l'Ukraine et son voisinage, de l'Est comme de l'Ouest, constitue un exemple particulièrement représentation de ces problématiques.