Suchergebnisse

We study optimal climate policy for a "policy bloc" of countries facing a market where emissions offsets can be purchased from a non-policy "fringe" of countries (such as for the CDM). Policy-bloc firms benefit from free quota allocations whose quantity is updated according to firms' past emissions, or their outputs. We show that the resulting abatement and its allocation between policy bloc and fringe are both inefficient. When firms buy offsets directly from the fringe and all quotas are traded at a single price, the policy bloc chooses to either not constrain the offset market, or ban offsets completely. The former (latter) case occurs when free allocation of quotas is not (very) generous, and the offset market is large (small). It is preferable for policy-bloc countries' governments to instead buy offsets directly from the fringe at a quota price below marginal damage cost of emissions, while the policy-bloc quota price will be above this cost. With maximization of global welfare and a unified quota price, this price is higher, and offsets constrained in fewer cases, but the solution still inefficient. Full efficiency then requires a higher quota price in the policy bloc than in the fringe.

Several European countries have decided to phase out coal power generation. Emissions from electricity generation are already regulated by the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS), and in some countries like Germany the phaseout of coal will be accompanied with cancellation of emissions allowances. In this paper we examine the consequences of phasing out coal, both for the broader economy, the electricity sector, and for CO2 emissions. We show analytically how the welfare impacts for a phaseout region depend on i) whether and how allowances are canceled, ii) whether other countries join phaseout policies, and iii) terms-of-trade effects in the ETS market. Based on numerical simulations with a computable general equilibrium model for the European economy, we quantify the economic and environmental impacts of alternative phaseout scenarios, considering both unilateral and multilateral phaseout. We find that terms-of-trade effects in the ETS market play an important role for the welfare effects across EU member states. For Germany, coal phaseout combined with unilateral cancellation of allowances is found to be welfare-improving if the German citizens value emissions reductions at 65 Euro per ton or more.

Several European countries have decided to phase out coal power generation. Emissions from electricity generation are already regulated by the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS), and in some countries like Germany the phaseout of coal will be accompanied with cancellation of emissions allowances. In this paper we examine the consequences of phasing out coal, both for the broader economy, the electricity sector, and for CO2 emissions. We show analytically how the welfare impacts for a phaseout region depend on i) whether and how allowances are canceled, ii) whether other countries join phaseout policies, and iii) terms-of-trade effects in the ETS market. Based on numerical simulations with a computable general equilibrium model for the European economy, we quantify the economic and environmental impacts of alternative phaseout scenarios, considering both unilateral and multilateral phaseout. We find that terms-oftrade effects in the ETS market play an important role for the welfare effects across EU member states. For Germany, coal phaseout combined with unilateral cancellation of allowances is found to be welfare-improving if the German citizens value emissions reductions at 65 Euro per ton or more.

We study optimal climate policy for a policy bloc of countries facing a market where emissions offsets can be purchased from a non-policy fringe of countries (such as for the CDM). Policy-bloc firms benefit from free quota allocations whose quantity is updated according to firms' past emissions, or their outputs. We show that the resulting abatement and its allocation between policy bloc and fringe are both inefficient. When firms buy offsets directly from the fringe and all quotas are traded at a single price, the policy bloc chooses to either not constrain the offset market, or ban offsets completely. The former (latter) case occurs when free allocation of quotas is not (very) generous, and the offset market is large (small). It is preferable for policy-bloc countries' governments to instead buy offsets directly from the fringe at a quota price below marginal damage cost of emissions, while the policy-bloc quota price will be above this cost. With maximization of global welfare and a unified quota price, this price is higher, and offsets constrained in fewer cases, but the solution still inefficient. Full efficiency then requires a higher quota price in the policy bloc than in the fringe.

We study interactions between a "policy bloc's" emissions quota market and an offset market where emissions offsets can be purchased from a non-policy "fringe" of countries (such as for the CDM under the Kyoto Protocol). Policy-bloc firms are assumed to benefit from free quota allocations that are updated according to either past emissions or past outputs. We show that both overall abatement, and the allocation of given abatement between the policy bloc and the fringe, tend to be inefficient. When the policy-bloc quota market and offset markets are fully integrated (and firms buy offsets directly from the fringe), and all quotas and offsets must be traded at a single price, it is optimal for the policy bloc to either not constrain the offset market whatsoever, or to ban offsets completely. The former (latter) case occurs when free allocation of quotas is not too generous (very generous), and the offset market can profitably deliver large (only a small) quota amounts. Governments of policy countries would however instead prefer to buy offsets directly from the fringe at a price below the policy-bloc quota price. The offset price will then be below the marginal damage cost of emissions, and the quota price in the policy bloc above marginal damage cost. This solution is also inefficient as the policy bloc (acting as a monopsonist) purchases too few offsets from the fringe.

After the failure of the United Nations climate change conference at Copenhagen the EU is under domestic pressure to justify ambitious unilateral emissions reduction targets. Cost efficiency of EU-wide emission abatement becomes increasingly important in order to sustain EU leadership in climate policy. We argue that administered EU targets for renewable energies are doomed to make emission reduction much more costly than necessary and therfore could rather hinder than promote public support to unilateral action.