Suchergebnisse

Natural disasters may constitute a major shock to public finances and debt sustainability because of their impact on output and the need for government response with reconstruction and relief expenses. The question arises of whether governments can use financial development policy as the means to mitigate or insure against this negative fiscal impact. This paper uses a panel vector autoregressive model, estimated on annual data for high- and middle-income countries over 1975–2008, to study the role of debt market development and insurance penetration in enabling fiscal response after catastrophes. The authors find that countries with higher debt market development suffer smaller real consequences from disasters but that their deficits expand further following the mitigating fiscal response. Disasters in countries with high insurance penetration also experience smaller real consequences of disasters but without the need for further deficit expansions. From an ex-post perspective, the availability of insurance could offer the best mitigation approach against the real and fiscal consequences of disasters.

New data are presented for a large number of countries on how frequently former high-ranking politicians become bank directors. Politician-banker connections at this level are relatively rare, but their frequency is robustly correlated with many important characteristics of banks and institutions. At the micro level, banks that are politically connected are larger and more profitable than other banks, despite being less leveraged and having less risk. At the country level, this connectedness is strongly negatively related to economic development. Controlling for this, the analysis finds that the phenomenon is more prevalent where institutions are weaker and governments more powerful but less accountable. Bank regulation tends to be more pro-banker and the banking system less developed where connectedness is higher. A benign, public-interest view is hard to reconcile with these patterns.