Suchergebnisse

Because some forms of self-starvation such as hunger striking are exempt from attributions of pathology, and due to incomplete understanding of its etiology, anorexia nervosa (AN) is and must presently be defined by psychological criteria as well as behavioral and bodily measures. Although opaque, typical motivational frames of mind in AN lack the apparent cognitive and volitional dysfunction usually indicating disorder. In contrast to other conditions that exhibit more evident dysfunction, this distinguishes AN from the perspective of medical epistemology: the opacity of AN motivation jeopardizing the epistemic warrant for assigning it to the category of a mental disorder (and so influencing decisions over diagnosis and recovery). This seems to invite non-medical approaches to its prevention and care.

My aim here is to clarify the practice of honoring and validating the relational model of self which plays an important role in feminist therapy. This practice rests on a tangle of psychological claims, moral and political values, and mental health norms which require analysis. Also, severe pathology affects the relative "relationality" of the self. By understanding it we can better understand the senses of autonomy compatible with and even required for a desired relationality.

Whether mentally disturbed defendants should be given psychotropic drugs to render them "synthetically" competent to stand trial.

The context for this interdisciplinary work by a philosopher and a clinician is the psychiatric care provided to those with severe mental disorders. Such a setting makes distinctive moral demands on the very character of the practitioner, it is shown calling for special virtues and greater virtue than many other practice settings