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This paper focuses on Kant?s moral theory and how it can guide our actions in
philanthropy. Philanthropy is usually defined as a voluntary action aimed at
relieving suffering and improving the quality of lives of others. It has
been argued that, within the framework of Kant?s theory, it is our duty to
be beneficent, sacrificing a part of our welfare for others. The duty of
beneficence is a wide one. Interpreters of Kant disagree on what the wide
duty of beneficence requires. While a few argue that it only requires that
we provide help sometimes, others hold that the duty of beneficence should
be seen as more demanding, particularly in cases of emergency when help is
urgently required. We are morally obliged to promote the happiness of
others, but the duty of beneficence does not tell us whose happiness and how
much of our resources to give. Other than emergency cases, in fulfilling the
duty of beneficence, we can prioritize the ends of those near and dear to us
who concern us more. Moreover, on condition that we are not indifferent to
others, it is morally permissible to prioritize our ends. Finally, the paper
argues that it is not always straightforward what kind of action is required
in helping someone in need, and that beneficence in Kantian terms is not
limited to the philanthropic sector.

This paper discusses the relations between three forms of altruism:
behavioural, evolutionary and motivational. Altruism in a behavioural sense
is an act that benefits another person. It can range from volunteering to a
charity and helping a neighbour, to giving money to a non-profit
organisation or donating blood. People often dedicate their material and
nonmaterial resources for the benefit of others to gain psychological,
social and material benefits for themselves. Thus, their altruistic acts are
driven by egoistic motivation. Also, the final goal of an altruistic act may
be the increase in the welfare of a group or adherence to a certain moral
principle or a social norm. However, at least sometimes, the welfare of
others is the ultimate goal of our actions, when our altruistic acts are
performed from altruistic motivation. In evolutionary sense, altruism means
the sacrifice of reproductive success for the benefit of other organisms.
According to evolutionary theories, behaviour which promotes the
reproductive success of the receiver at the cost of the actor is favoured by
natural selection, because it is either beneficial for the altruist in the
long run, or for his genes, or for the group he belongs to. However,
altruism among people emerges as a distinctly human combination of innate
and learned behaviours. Not only do we benefit the members of our own group,
but we are capable of transcending our tribalistic instincts and putting the
benefit of strangers at our own personal expense as our ultimate goal.

This paper focuses on Sen?s concept of contrapreferential choice. Sen has
developed this concept in order to overcome weaknesses of the rational choice
theory. According to rational choice theory a decision-maker can be always
seen as someone who maximises utility, and each choice he makes as the one
that brings to him the highest level of personal wellbeing. Sen argues that
in some situations we chose alternatives that bring us lower level of
wellbeing than we could achieve if we had chosen some other alternative
available to us. This happens when we base our decisions on moral principles,
when we act out of duty. Sen calls such action a commitment-based action.
When we act out of commitment we actually neglect our preferences and thus we
make a contrapreferential choice, as Sen argues. This paper shows that,
contrary to Sen, a commitment-based action can be explained within the
framework of rational choice theory. However, when each choice we make can be
explained within the framework of rational choice theory, when in everything
we do maximisation principle can be loaded, then the variety of our motives
and traits is lost, and the explanatory power of the rational choice theory
is questionable.

Each of us makes a number of decisions, from the less important to those with
far-reaching consequences. As members of different groups, we are also actors
of group decision making. In order to make a rational decision, a
choice-making procedure must satisfy a number of assumptions (conditions) of
rationality. In addition, when it comes to group decisions, those procedures
should also be ?fair.? However, it is not possible to define a procedure of
choice-making that would transform individual orders of alternatives based on
preferences of perfectly rational individuals into a single social order and
still meet conditions of rationality and ethics. The theory of deliberative
democracy appeared in response to the impossibility of Social Choice theory.
The basic assumption of deliberative democracy is that individuals adjust
their preferences taking into account interests of the community. They are
open for discussion with other group members and are willing to change their
attitudes in order to achieve common interests. Ideally, group members come
to an agreement during public discussion (deliberation). Still, this concept
cannot completely over?come all the difficulties posed by the theory of
social choice. Specifically, there is no solution for strategic and
manipulative behavior of individuals. Also, the concept of deliberative
democracy faces certain problems particular to this approach, such as, to
name but a few, problems with the establishment of equality of participants
in the debate and their motivation, as well as problems with the organization
of public hearings.

Human development is ?a process of expanding the real freedoms that people
enjoy? (Sen 1999: 3). Therefore, widening of people?s choices should be the
goal of the public policies aiming at human development promotion. In order
to assess the level of human development, to compare it with other countries?
achievements, or to evaluate different policy proposals, decision-makers have
to rely on an accurate indicator of human development. Since gross national
product (GNP) and gross domestic product (GDP) could not serve this function,
the human development index (HDI) has been introduced as a more adequate
measure. The aim of this paper is to discuss whether human development index
reflects the basic tenets of human development. The arguments presented lead
to the conclusion that the HDI does not fully reflect the ideas of human
development. Since human development is much broader concept than any
individual indicator could capture, country?s level of development should be
assessed by the combination of different indicators.