IN THIS ARTILLE IT IS SHOWN THAT IF DURING AN ELECTION EACH VOTER PICKS THE PARTY WITH WHICH HE AGREES ON A MAJORITY PARTY ON EVERY ISSUE.THIS "INVERTED MAJORITY DECISION" RESEMBLES THE STRUCTURE UNDERLYING THE CONDORCET PARADOX AND SIMPSON'S PARADOX.EACH CONCERNS A BELATION OF PAIRWISE DECISION AND POINTS OUT A POSSIBLE PARADOX OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY.
John Rawls's theory of justice tries to resolve the question of fair allocation: When, if ever, may some members of society claim rightful privilege over their fellows? Rawls's answer is maximin justice: inequalities are just if, by permitting them, society treats best those whom she treats worst. Rawls attempts to show that this rule binds us all under the terms of a social contract. The present paper tries to show that Rawls's theory will not stand scrutiny. The social contract, as he gives it, disfranchises all but a single social stratum: Why are others bound by it? The maximin principle, allegedly agreed to under this social contract, requires that we judge allocations by ignoring all but one of society's many strata. This leads in turn to arbitrary judgments including ones which at once increase inequality and decrease the total shared by society. An alternative argument is offered, beginning with a social contract requiring agreement on all inequalities among agents for a series of hypothetical social strata. This device is meant to bind all strata, and leads to a principle of general advantage: Inequalities are just if but only if they serve the advantage of some strata and the disadvantage of none. This seemingly paradoxical rule has a clear interpretation and avoids the main difficulties attributed to maximin justice. Like maximin, however, the new doctrine would evidently require a radical redistribution of income in a society like our own.
