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Engl. Zsfassung u.d.T.: Biographical dictionary of members of the Constituent Assembly of Lithuania (1920 - 1922)

It could be easily traced a stereotype in public discourse – corruption is thought to be the biggest evil when it appears in public sector. On the contrary the private sector is being seen as an autonomic sphere in which corruption doesn't make such a big harm. Or even almost any harm at all. At the most radical point of view corruption in the private sector even could not exist. Nevertheless we may see that at least some specific corrupt acts in private sphere (such as embezzlement) are being condemned and prosecuted by means of criminal law since quite a long time ago. Still such acts as bribery and abuse of power even at the end of the 20th century were held as hardly related to private sector. Analysis provided in the study shows that qualitative and quantitative attributes of harm which is being caused by corruption in private or public sector should not be related with the specific sector itself. It is not a sector which makes corruption more or less harmful, but the specific interests which are being exposed quite randomly in the context of one or another sector. This is why corruption in a private sector could not be treated a priori as "lesser evil". At least five factors has made a global breakthrough on the perception of the harmfulness of corruption in private sector: 1) some great recent scandals related to the corruption in private sector (affair of Jerome Kerviel related to the funds of Société Générale, affair of Arthur Anderson and Enron, affair related to corrupt acts of workers union of Volkswagen etc.); 2) better understanding of links between an abstract category of corruption in private sector and specific interests being abused by such corruption; 3) origin and development of wide and influential networks of active international and local anticorruption organisations and initiatives; 4) transformation and even some constraints in understanding of the privacy in western civilisation; 5) privatisation and outsourcing of public functions which has been seen for a decades and even centuries as an integral part of public administration. In the international level the European Union and its institutions has been the pioneers in activating the fight against corruption in private sector. From 1995 they equally related the concept of corruption with both private and public sectors. And they took the bold position not to be in line with such authorities in anticorruption policy as World Bank and Transparency International which held that corruption is related only to public office and powers. In this context Lithuania could also be held as a pioneer in criminalisation of wide range of corrupt acts in the private sector: even before the above-mentioned political acts of European Union institutions the Lithuanian Parliament has adopted laws criminalising general bribery and abuse of power in private sector. Unfortunately some later developments in Lithuanian criminal law or to be more specific in the practice of the Supreme Court of Lithuania significantly narrowed the broad concept of the above-mentioned criminalisation. The court decided that specific harm to the public interests should be established in order to convect a person for bribery and abuse of power in private sector. The study provides two basic criterion to provide a typology of corruption in private sector: (1) who is being specifically harmed and (2) what specific harm (negative consequences) is being made. Corruption in private sector could harm: (1) clients of private businesses; (2) companies when employees commits corrupt acts on their expense; (3) owners and shareholders of affected companies; (4) employees in affected companies, their families and dependents; (5) third-parties being directly aimed or affected by bribery or other corrupt act and also those being harmed by unfair competition caused by corruption in private sector; (6) the society, i. e. unspecified or hardly specified group of individuals; (7) the state. Also corruption in private sector could bring both pecuniary and nonpecuniary loss.

It could be easily traced a stereotype in public discourse – corruption is thought to be the biggest evil when it appears in public sector. On the contrary the private sector is being seen as an autonomic sphere in which corruption doesn't make such a big harm. Or even almost any harm at all. At the most radical point of view corruption in the private sector even could not exist. Nevertheless we may see that at least some specific corrupt acts in private sphere (such as embezzlement) are being condemned and prosecuted by means of criminal law since quite a long time ago. Still such acts as bribery and abuse of power even at the end of the 20th century were held as hardly related to private sector. Analysis provided in the study shows that qualitative and quantitative attributes of harm which is being caused by corruption in private or public sector should not be related with the specific sector itself. It is not a sector which makes corruption more or less harmful, but the specific interests which are being exposed quite randomly in the context of one or another sector. This is why corruption in a private sector could not be treated a priori as "lesser evil". At least five factors has made a global breakthrough on the perception of the harmfulness of corruption in private sector: 1) some great recent scandals related to the corruption in private sector (affair of Jerome Kerviel related to the funds of Société Générale, affair of Arthur Anderson and Enron, affair related to corrupt acts of workers union of Volkswagen etc.); 2) better understanding of links between an abstract category of corruption in private sector and specific interests being abused by such corruption; 3) origin and development of wide and influential networks of active international and local anticorruption organisations and initiatives; 4) transformation and even some constraints in understanding of the privacy in western civilisation; 5) privatisation and outsourcing of public functions which has been seen for a decades and even centuries as an integral part of public administration. In the international level the European Union and its institutions has been the pioneers in activating the fight against corruption in private sector. From 1995 they equally related the concept of corruption with both private and public sectors. And they took the bold position not to be in line with such authorities in anticorruption policy as World Bank and Transparency International which held that corruption is related only to public office and powers. In this context Lithuania could also be held as a pioneer in criminalisation of wide range of corrupt acts in the private sector: even before the above-mentioned political acts of European Union institutions the Lithuanian Parliament has adopted laws criminalising general bribery and abuse of power in private sector. Unfortunately some later developments in Lithuanian criminal law or to be more specific in the practice of the Supreme Court of Lithuania significantly narrowed the broad concept of the above-mentioned criminalisation. The court decided that specific harm to the public interests should be established in order to convect a person for bribery and abuse of power in private sector. The study provides two basic criterion to provide a typology of corruption in private sector: (1) who is being specifically harmed and (2) what specific harm (negative consequences) is being made. Corruption in private sector could harm: (1) clients of private businesses; (2) companies when employees commits corrupt acts on their expense; (3) owners and shareholders of affected companies; (4) employees in affected companies, their families and dependents; (5) third-parties being directly aimed or affected by bribery or other corrupt act and also those being harmed by unfair competition caused by corruption in private sector; (6) the society, i. e. unspecified or hardly specified group of individuals; (7) the state. Also corruption in private sector could bring both pecuniary and nonpecuniary loss.

It could be easily traced a stereotype in public discourse – corruption is thought to be the biggest evil when it appears in public sector. On the contrary the private sector is being seen as an autonomic sphere in which corruption doesn't make such a big harm. Or even almost any harm at all. At the most radical point of view corruption in the private sector even could not exist. Nevertheless we may see that at least some specific corrupt acts in private sphere (such as embezzlement) are being condemned and prosecuted by means of criminal law since quite a long time ago. Still such acts as bribery and abuse of power even at the end of the 20th century were held as hardly related to private sector. Analysis provided in the study shows that qualitative and quantitative attributes of harm which is being caused by corruption in private or public sector should not be related with the specific sector itself. It is not a sector which makes corruption more or less harmful, but the specific interests which are being exposed quite randomly in the context of one or another sector. This is why corruption in a private sector could not be treated a priori as "lesser evil". At least five factors has made a global breakthrough on the perception of the harmfulness of corruption in private sector: 1) some great recent scandals related to the corruption in private sector (affair of Jerome Kerviel related to the funds of Société Générale, affair of Arthur Anderson and Enron, affair related to corrupt acts of workers union of Volkswagen etc.); 2) better understanding of links between an abstract category of corruption in private sector and specific interests being abused by such corruption; 3) origin and development of wide and influential networks of active international and local anticorruption organisations and initiatives; 4) transformation and even some constraints in understanding of the privacy in western civilisation; 5) privatisation and outsourcing of public functions which has been seen for a decades and even centuries as an integral part of public administration. In the international level the European Union and its institutions has been the pioneers in activating the fight against corruption in private sector. From 1995 they equally related the concept of corruption with both private and public sectors. And they took the bold position not to be in line with such authorities in anticorruption policy as World Bank and Transparency International which held that corruption is related only to public office and powers. In this context Lithuania could also be held as a pioneer in criminalisation of wide range of corrupt acts in the private sector: even before the above-mentioned political acts of European Union institutions the Lithuanian Parliament has adopted laws criminalising general bribery and abuse of power in private sector. Unfortunately some later developments in Lithuanian criminal law or to be more specific in the practice of the Supreme Court of Lithuania significantly narrowed the broad concept of the above-mentioned criminalisation. The court decided that specific harm to the public interests should be established in order to convect a person for bribery and abuse of power in private sector. The study provides two basic criterion to provide a typology of corruption in private sector: (1) who is being specifically harmed and (2) what specific harm (negative consequences) is being made. Corruption in private sector could harm: (1) clients of private businesses; (2) companies when employees commits corrupt acts on their expense; (3) owners and shareholders of affected companies; (4) employees in affected companies, their families and dependents; (5) third-parties being directly aimed or affected by bribery or other corrupt act and also those being harmed by unfair competition caused by corruption in private sector; (6) the society, i. e. unspecified or hardly specified group of individuals; (7) the state. Also corruption in private sector could bring both pecuniary and nonpecuniary loss.

It could be easily traced a stereotype in public discourse – corruption is thought to be the biggest evil when it appears in public sector. On the contrary the private sector is being seen as an autonomic sphere in which corruption doesn't make such a big harm. Or even almost any harm at all. At the most radical point of view corruption in the private sector even could not exist. Nevertheless we may see that at least some specific corrupt acts in private sphere (such as embezzlement) are being condemned and prosecuted by means of criminal law since quite a long time ago. Still such acts as bribery and abuse of power even at the end of the 20th century were held as hardly related to private sector. Analysis provided in the study shows that qualitative and quantitative attributes of harm which is being caused by corruption in private or public sector should not be related with the specific sector itself. It is not a sector which makes corruption more or less harmful, but the specific interests which are being exposed quite randomly in the context of one or another sector. This is why corruption in a private sector could not be treated a priori as "lesser evil". At least five factors has made a global breakthrough on the perception of the harmfulness of corruption in private sector: 1) some great recent scandals related to the corruption in private sector (affair of Jerome Kerviel related to the funds of Société Générale, affair of Arthur Anderson and Enron, affair related to corrupt acts of workers union of Volkswagen etc.); 2) better understanding of links between an abstract category of corruption in private sector and specific interests being abused by such corruption; 3) origin and development of wide and influential networks of active international and local anticorruption organisations and initiatives; 4) transformation and even some constraints in understanding of the privacy in western civilisation; 5) privatisation and outsourcing of public functions which has been seen for a decades and even centuries as an integral part of public administration. In the international level the European Union and its institutions has been the pioneers in activating the fight against corruption in private sector. From 1995 they equally related the concept of corruption with both private and public sectors. And they took the bold position not to be in line with such authorities in anticorruption policy as World Bank and Transparency International which held that corruption is related only to public office and powers. In this context Lithuania could also be held as a pioneer in criminalisation of wide range of corrupt acts in the private sector: even before the above-mentioned political acts of European Union institutions the Lithuanian Parliament has adopted laws criminalising general bribery and abuse of power in private sector. Unfortunately some later developments in Lithuanian criminal law or to be more specific in the practice of the Supreme Court of Lithuania significantly narrowed the broad concept of the above-mentioned criminalisation. The court decided that specific harm to the public interests should be established in order to convect a person for bribery and abuse of power in private sector. The study provides two basic criterion to provide a typology of corruption in private sector: (1) who is being specifically harmed and (2) what specific harm (negative consequences) is being made. Corruption in private sector could harm: (1) clients of private businesses; (2) companies when employees commits corrupt acts on their expense; (3) owners and shareholders of affected companies; (4) employees in affected companies, their families and dependents; (5) third-parties being directly aimed or affected by bribery or other corrupt act and also those being harmed by unfair competition caused by corruption in private sector; (6) the society, i. e. unspecified or hardly specified group of individuals; (7) the state. Also corruption in private sector could bring both pecuniary and nonpecuniary loss.

AbstractUsing individual-level data from three Lithuanian legislative elections (2008, 2012, 2016), this article investigates voter bias in an open-list proportional representation system in which parties rank candidates but voters are able to fully influence the rank order through preferential voting. This study examines the average effects of and variation in gender bias among voters of different parties. Most importantly, it also investigates how party cues interact with gender cues—that is, whether discriminatory tendencies vary by a candidate's party-determined viability. After establishing that there is no evidence of elite bias in favor of or against women candidates, with the exception of the Social Democrats and a few other parties, I demonstrate that, on average, female Lithuanian politicians receive approximately 7% fewer preferential votes than their male counterparts. In addition, the models predict that gender bias is most pronounced against the female candidates who are best placed to enter parliament. Finally, I demonstrate that Social Democratic voters are, on average, the most undisposed toward female candidates, correcting for positive elite bias toward female candidates from the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party, while voters of the Homeland Union party (conservatives) strongly prefer women politicians.

Lithuania's chosen geopolitical orientation is expressed by commonality of certain values based on the membership in NATO and the European Union. Respect for democracy is one of the most fundamental among those values. However, despite the certain pressure to recognise the very value, even some of the essential elements of democracy are being interpreted quite differently. An expressive example may be a determination whether the most important political issues affecting the life of the community should be addressed directly by the citizens themselves, or (sometimes even only) by political elite of the community legitimised by the way of election. Therefore (even if we agree to share the same values), one thing is the prevailing consensus and even pressure regarding (at least) the obligatoriness of "democratic rhetoric", and quite another – the specific contents of the concepts of democracy and democratic practices. The various aspects of democratic theory are not analysed in this study more systematically on the basis of this difference. The attention is rather given to the certain requirements or attributes to the principle of democracy and to democratic regime as they are ascribed in the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania. Thus the study is not pointed at things that are certainly noteworthy in the discourse of democratic theory, but they were not formulated or at least mentioned (maybe just not yet?) in the jurisprudence of Constitutional Court: consensus democracy, economic democracy, inclusive democracy, and even (wow, it turns out after more than two decades of Court work it is possible!) liberal democracy. In this text the author starts to consistently structure and systemise the more or less examined democracy related issues mentioned in the final acts of the Constitutional Court (principal concept of democracy, constitutional democracy, parliamentary democracy, participatory democracy, a pluralistic democracy, direct democracy, representative democracy, etc.). Carefully, sometimes even captiously, he analyses the content assigned to them. The author seeks not only to deliver (describe) the Constitutional Court's jurisprudence on democracy, but also to evaluate its evolution, consistency, logical validity, while in more "suspicious" cases, its relation with the scientific doctrine of democracy. Investigating the recent Constitutional Court's jurisprudence that clearly transforms the sovereignty paradigm formed in the acts adopted two decades ago, considerable attention is paid to the limitation to address some of "the most significant issues concerning the life of the State and the Nation" by referendum.

Lithuania's chosen geopolitical orientation is expressed by commonality of certain values based on the membership in NATO and the European Union. Respect for democracy is one of the most fundamental among those values. However, despite the certain pressure to recognise the very value, even some of the essential elements of democracy are being interpreted quite differently. An expressive example may be a determination whether the most important political issues affecting the life of the community should be addressed directly by the citizens themselves, or (sometimes even only) by political elite of the community legitimised by the way of election. Therefore (even if we agree to share the same values), one thing is the prevailing consensus and even pressure regarding (at least) the obligatoriness of "democratic rhetoric", and quite another – the specific contents of the concepts of democracy and democratic practices. The various aspects of democratic theory are not analysed in this study more systematically on the basis of this difference. The attention is rather given to the certain requirements or attributes to the principle of democracy and to democratic regime as they are ascribed in the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania. Thus the study is not pointed at things that are certainly noteworthy in the discourse of democratic theory, but they were not formulated or at least mentioned (maybe just not yet?) in the jurisprudence of Constitutional Court: consensus democracy, economic democracy, inclusive democracy, and even (wow, it turns out after more than two decades of Court work it is possible!) liberal democracy. In this text the author starts to consistently structure and systemise the more or less examined democracy related issues mentioned in the final acts of the Constitutional Court (principal concept of democracy, constitutional democracy, parliamentary democracy, participatory democracy, a pluralistic democracy, direct democracy, representative democracy, etc.). Carefully, sometimes even captiously, he analyses the content assigned to them. The author seeks not only to deliver (describe) the Constitutional Court's jurisprudence on democracy, but also to evaluate its evolution, consistency, logical validity, while in more "suspicious" cases, its relation with the scientific doctrine of democracy. Investigating the recent Constitutional Court's jurisprudence that clearly transforms the sovereignty paradigm formed in the acts adopted two decades ago, considerable attention is paid to the limitation to address some of "the most significant issues concerning the life of the State and the Nation" by referendum.

Po Kovo 11-osios palaipsniui paplitęs ir politiškai istoriškai de facto sankcionuotas dviejų Lietuvos Respublikų išskyrimas Lietuvos valstybės raidoje: I Respublika (1918–1940 m.), II Respublika (1990–2005 m.), straipsnio autoriaus manymu, yra ne tiek teisinė, kiek ideologinė konstrukcija, įvardijanti ne tiek valstybės valdymo formas, kiek pilnaverčio valstybingumo etapus. Šios schemos genezė atsiskleidžia prieštaringo XX a. lietuviškojo politinio istorinio naratyvo kontekste. Dviejų Respublikų koncepcija faktiškai akcentuoja dabartinės Lietuvos valstybės diskontinuitetą ir šiuolaikiškumą. Dėl objektyviai "silpno" santykio su Lietuvos Didžiąja Kunigaikštyste, šioje schemoje, priešingai nei Lenkijoje, laikotarpiui iki XVIII a. pabaigos iš esmės nelieka vietos, nors svarbiausi konstituciniai valstybės aktai teigia priešingai – jie akcentuoja valstybingumo, teisės tradicijų tęstinumą ir perimamumą. Teisinių, politinių ir istorinių diskursų disharmonija rodo, jog tiek tarpukario, tiek šiuolaikinė lietuviška istorinė sąmonė dėl objektyvių priežasčių šiuo aspektu yra ambivalentiška ir selektyvi. Trijų Respublikų schema – I Respublika (iki XVIII a. pab.), II Respublika (1918–1940 m.), III Respublika (1990–2005 m.) būtų tikslesnė, tačiau, kaip ir Lenkijoje, sunku išvengti dviprasmybių nustatant I Respublikos pradžią – tektų paradoksaliai sieti ją su valstybės pradžia (XIII a.), ar ne mažiau paradoksaliai – su luominio parlamentinio režimo pradžia (XVI a. pr.). Vis dėlto trilypė schema, analogiška lenkiškai – ji datuojama pagal parlamentarizmo pradžią, būtų istoriškai tikslesnė ir konstruktyvesnė. Ją galima naudoti tiek valstybės valdymo formos (plg. istoriko Edvardo Gudavičiaus teiginius dėl XVI–XVIII a. Lenkijos ir Lietuvos valstybės "respublikiškumo"), tiek etapo atžvilgiais. Dėl vienokio ar kitokio pažeidžiamumo, ypač lietuviško "Respublikos" termino, priešingai nei lenkiško "Rzeczpospolita" – tiek valstybė, tiek respublika – prasminio siaurumo, pirmiausia dėl negebėjimo integruoti monarchinio lietuviškojo valstybingumo (XIII–XV a.) laikotarpio, svarstytina, ar nevertėtų apskritai atsisakyti "respublikinės schemos" – tiek dvilypės, tiek trilypės, pakeičiant ją prasmiškai neutralesne bei universalesne, lietuviškojo valstybingumo epochas geriau atspindinčia triada: Pirmoji Lietuvos valstybė (XIII–XVIII a.), Antroji Lietuvos valstybė (1918–1940 m.), Trečioji Lietuvos valstybė (1990–2005 m.). Bet kokiu atveju, vienoks ar kitoks Lietuvos valstybingumo etapų įvardijimas ar suskaičiavimas, schemų sukūrimas tebus dar viena, matyt, tautinio naratyvo farvateryje atsiradusi politinė, istorinė ir teisinė konstrukcija, pažeidžiama kaip ir kitos. Tačiau tikėtina, jog mažiau pažeidžiama.

(such draft laws are submitted to by the President). In practice, however, citizens' legislative initiatives are related to politicians' rather than citizens' initiatives. Citizens' legislative initiative most often used to be employed not so much for the sake of promoting the idea of lawmaking but for making use of citizens' signatures for exerting political pressure on the Seimas ruling majority by opposition powers and communicating a certain message to the electorate. Out of seven initiatives, one brought some results. Exercising the right of petition at the Seimas is in fact an indirect legislative initiative. It diminishes the significance of the Constitutional right of 50.000 citizens' initiative. This right does not make any practical influence: so far only two laws have been passed on the basis of the problems addressed in petitions.

(such draft laws are submitted to by the President). In practice, however, citizens' legislative initiatives are related to politicians' rather than citizens' initiatives. Citizens' legislative initiative most often used to be employed not so much for the sake of promoting the idea of lawmaking but for making use of citizens' signatures for exerting political pressure on the Seimas ruling majority by opposition powers and communicating a certain message to the electorate. Out of seven initiatives, one brought some results. Exercising the right of petition at the Seimas is in fact an indirect legislative initiative. It diminishes the significance of the Constitutional right of 50.000 citizens' initiative. This right does not make any practical influence: so far only two laws have been passed on the basis of the problems addressed in petitions.

(such draft laws are submitted to by the President). In practice, however, citizens' legislative initiatives are related to politicians' rather than citizens' initiatives. Citizens' legislative initiative most often used to be employed not so much for the sake of promoting the idea of lawmaking but for making use of citizens' signatures for exerting political pressure on the Seimas ruling majority by opposition powers and communicating a certain message to the electorate. Out of seven initiatives, one brought some results. Exercising the right of petition at the Seimas is in fact an indirect legislative initiative. It diminishes the significance of the Constitutional right of 50.000 citizens' initiative. This right does not make any practical influence: so far only two laws have been passed on the basis of the problems addressed in petitions.

(such draft laws are submitted to by the President). In practice, however, citizens' legislative initiatives are related to politicians' rather than citizens' initiatives. Citizens' legislative initiative most often used to be employed not so much for the sake of promoting the idea of lawmaking but for making use of citizens' signatures for exerting political pressure on the Seimas ruling majority by opposition powers and communicating a certain message to the electorate. Out of seven initiatives, one brought some results. Exercising the right of petition at the Seimas is in fact an indirect legislative initiative. It diminishes the significance of the Constitutional right of 50.000 citizens' initiative. This right does not make any practical influence: so far only two laws have been passed on the basis of the problems addressed in petitions.