Suchergebnisse

It could be easily traced a stereotype in public discourse – corruption is thought to be the biggest evil when it appears in public sector. On the contrary the private sector is being seen as an autonomic sphere in which corruption doesn't make such a big harm. Or even almost any harm at all. At the most radical point of view corruption in the private sector even could not exist. Nevertheless we may see that at least some specific corrupt acts in private sphere (such as embezzlement) are being condemned and prosecuted by means of criminal law since quite a long time ago. Still such acts as bribery and abuse of power even at the end of the 20th century were held as hardly related to private sector. Analysis provided in the study shows that qualitative and quantitative attributes of harm which is being caused by corruption in private or public sector should not be related with the specific sector itself. It is not a sector which makes corruption more or less harmful, but the specific interests which are being exposed quite randomly in the context of one or another sector. This is why corruption in a private sector could not be treated a priori as "lesser evil". At least five factors has made a global breakthrough on the perception of the harmfulness of corruption in private sector: 1) some great recent scandals related to the corruption in private sector (affair of Jerome Kerviel related to the funds of Société Générale, affair of Arthur Anderson and Enron, affair related to corrupt acts of workers union of Volkswagen etc.); 2) better understanding of links between an abstract category of corruption in private sector and specific interests being abused by such corruption; 3) origin and development of wide and influential networks of active international and local anticorruption organisations and initiatives; 4) transformation and even some constraints in understanding of the privacy in western civilisation; 5) privatisation and outsourcing of public functions which has been seen for a decades and even centuries as an integral part of public administration. In the international level the European Union and its institutions has been the pioneers in activating the fight against corruption in private sector. From 1995 they equally related the concept of corruption with both private and public sectors. And they took the bold position not to be in line with such authorities in anticorruption policy as World Bank and Transparency International which held that corruption is related only to public office and powers. In this context Lithuania could also be held as a pioneer in criminalisation of wide range of corrupt acts in the private sector: even before the above-mentioned political acts of European Union institutions the Lithuanian Parliament has adopted laws criminalising general bribery and abuse of power in private sector. Unfortunately some later developments in Lithuanian criminal law or to be more specific in the practice of the Supreme Court of Lithuania significantly narrowed the broad concept of the above-mentioned criminalisation. The court decided that specific harm to the public interests should be established in order to convect a person for bribery and abuse of power in private sector. The study provides two basic criterion to provide a typology of corruption in private sector: (1) who is being specifically harmed and (2) what specific harm (negative consequences) is being made. Corruption in private sector could harm: (1) clients of private businesses; (2) companies when employees commits corrupt acts on their expense; (3) owners and shareholders of affected companies; (4) employees in affected companies, their families and dependents; (5) third-parties being directly aimed or affected by bribery or other corrupt act and also those being harmed by unfair competition caused by corruption in private sector; (6) the society, i. e. unspecified or hardly specified group of individuals; (7) the state. Also corruption in private sector could bring both pecuniary and nonpecuniary loss.

It could be easily traced a stereotype in public discourse – corruption is thought to be the biggest evil when it appears in public sector. On the contrary the private sector is being seen as an autonomic sphere in which corruption doesn't make such a big harm. Or even almost any harm at all. At the most radical point of view corruption in the private sector even could not exist. Nevertheless we may see that at least some specific corrupt acts in private sphere (such as embezzlement) are being condemned and prosecuted by means of criminal law since quite a long time ago. Still such acts as bribery and abuse of power even at the end of the 20th century were held as hardly related to private sector. Analysis provided in the study shows that qualitative and quantitative attributes of harm which is being caused by corruption in private or public sector should not be related with the specific sector itself. It is not a sector which makes corruption more or less harmful, but the specific interests which are being exposed quite randomly in the context of one or another sector. This is why corruption in a private sector could not be treated a priori as "lesser evil". At least five factors has made a global breakthrough on the perception of the harmfulness of corruption in private sector: 1) some great recent scandals related to the corruption in private sector (affair of Jerome Kerviel related to the funds of Société Générale, affair of Arthur Anderson and Enron, affair related to corrupt acts of workers union of Volkswagen etc.); 2) better understanding of links between an abstract category of corruption in private sector and specific interests being abused by such corruption; 3) origin and development of wide and influential networks of active international and local anticorruption organisations and initiatives; 4) transformation and even some constraints in understanding of the privacy in western civilisation; 5) privatisation and outsourcing of public functions which has been seen for a decades and even centuries as an integral part of public administration. In the international level the European Union and its institutions has been the pioneers in activating the fight against corruption in private sector. From 1995 they equally related the concept of corruption with both private and public sectors. And they took the bold position not to be in line with such authorities in anticorruption policy as World Bank and Transparency International which held that corruption is related only to public office and powers. In this context Lithuania could also be held as a pioneer in criminalisation of wide range of corrupt acts in the private sector: even before the above-mentioned political acts of European Union institutions the Lithuanian Parliament has adopted laws criminalising general bribery and abuse of power in private sector. Unfortunately some later developments in Lithuanian criminal law or to be more specific in the practice of the Supreme Court of Lithuania significantly narrowed the broad concept of the above-mentioned criminalisation. The court decided that specific harm to the public interests should be established in order to convect a person for bribery and abuse of power in private sector. The study provides two basic criterion to provide a typology of corruption in private sector: (1) who is being specifically harmed and (2) what specific harm (negative consequences) is being made. Corruption in private sector could harm: (1) clients of private businesses; (2) companies when employees commits corrupt acts on their expense; (3) owners and shareholders of affected companies; (4) employees in affected companies, their families and dependents; (5) third-parties being directly aimed or affected by bribery or other corrupt act and also those being harmed by unfair competition caused by corruption in private sector; (6) the society, i. e. unspecified or hardly specified group of individuals; (7) the state. Also corruption in private sector could bring both pecuniary and nonpecuniary loss.

It could be easily traced a stereotype in public discourse – corruption is thought to be the biggest evil when it appears in public sector. On the contrary the private sector is being seen as an autonomic sphere in which corruption doesn't make such a big harm. Or even almost any harm at all. At the most radical point of view corruption in the private sector even could not exist. Nevertheless we may see that at least some specific corrupt acts in private sphere (such as embezzlement) are being condemned and prosecuted by means of criminal law since quite a long time ago. Still such acts as bribery and abuse of power even at the end of the 20th century were held as hardly related to private sector. Analysis provided in the study shows that qualitative and quantitative attributes of harm which is being caused by corruption in private or public sector should not be related with the specific sector itself. It is not a sector which makes corruption more or less harmful, but the specific interests which are being exposed quite randomly in the context of one or another sector. This is why corruption in a private sector could not be treated a priori as "lesser evil". At least five factors has made a global breakthrough on the perception of the harmfulness of corruption in private sector: 1) some great recent scandals related to the corruption in private sector (affair of Jerome Kerviel related to the funds of Société Générale, affair of Arthur Anderson and Enron, affair related to corrupt acts of workers union of Volkswagen etc.); 2) better understanding of links between an abstract category of corruption in private sector and specific interests being abused by such corruption; 3) origin and development of wide and influential networks of active international and local anticorruption organisations and initiatives; 4) transformation and even some constraints in understanding of the privacy in western civilisation; 5) privatisation and outsourcing of public functions which has been seen for a decades and even centuries as an integral part of public administration. In the international level the European Union and its institutions has been the pioneers in activating the fight against corruption in private sector. From 1995 they equally related the concept of corruption with both private and public sectors. And they took the bold position not to be in line with such authorities in anticorruption policy as World Bank and Transparency International which held that corruption is related only to public office and powers. In this context Lithuania could also be held as a pioneer in criminalisation of wide range of corrupt acts in the private sector: even before the above-mentioned political acts of European Union institutions the Lithuanian Parliament has adopted laws criminalising general bribery and abuse of power in private sector. Unfortunately some later developments in Lithuanian criminal law or to be more specific in the practice of the Supreme Court of Lithuania significantly narrowed the broad concept of the above-mentioned criminalisation. The court decided that specific harm to the public interests should be established in order to convect a person for bribery and abuse of power in private sector. The study provides two basic criterion to provide a typology of corruption in private sector: (1) who is being specifically harmed and (2) what specific harm (negative consequences) is being made. Corruption in private sector could harm: (1) clients of private businesses; (2) companies when employees commits corrupt acts on their expense; (3) owners and shareholders of affected companies; (4) employees in affected companies, their families and dependents; (5) third-parties being directly aimed or affected by bribery or other corrupt act and also those being harmed by unfair competition caused by corruption in private sector; (6) the society, i. e. unspecified or hardly specified group of individuals; (7) the state. Also corruption in private sector could bring both pecuniary and nonpecuniary loss.

It could be easily traced a stereotype in public discourse – corruption is thought to be the biggest evil when it appears in public sector. On the contrary the private sector is being seen as an autonomic sphere in which corruption doesn't make such a big harm. Or even almost any harm at all. At the most radical point of view corruption in the private sector even could not exist. Nevertheless we may see that at least some specific corrupt acts in private sphere (such as embezzlement) are being condemned and prosecuted by means of criminal law since quite a long time ago. Still such acts as bribery and abuse of power even at the end of the 20th century were held as hardly related to private sector. Analysis provided in the study shows that qualitative and quantitative attributes of harm which is being caused by corruption in private or public sector should not be related with the specific sector itself. It is not a sector which makes corruption more or less harmful, but the specific interests which are being exposed quite randomly in the context of one or another sector. This is why corruption in a private sector could not be treated a priori as "lesser evil". At least five factors has made a global breakthrough on the perception of the harmfulness of corruption in private sector: 1) some great recent scandals related to the corruption in private sector (affair of Jerome Kerviel related to the funds of Société Générale, affair of Arthur Anderson and Enron, affair related to corrupt acts of workers union of Volkswagen etc.); 2) better understanding of links between an abstract category of corruption in private sector and specific interests being abused by such corruption; 3) origin and development of wide and influential networks of active international and local anticorruption organisations and initiatives; 4) transformation and even some constraints in understanding of the privacy in western civilisation; 5) privatisation and outsourcing of public functions which has been seen for a decades and even centuries as an integral part of public administration. In the international level the European Union and its institutions has been the pioneers in activating the fight against corruption in private sector. From 1995 they equally related the concept of corruption with both private and public sectors. And they took the bold position not to be in line with such authorities in anticorruption policy as World Bank and Transparency International which held that corruption is related only to public office and powers. In this context Lithuania could also be held as a pioneer in criminalisation of wide range of corrupt acts in the private sector: even before the above-mentioned political acts of European Union institutions the Lithuanian Parliament has adopted laws criminalising general bribery and abuse of power in private sector. Unfortunately some later developments in Lithuanian criminal law or to be more specific in the practice of the Supreme Court of Lithuania significantly narrowed the broad concept of the above-mentioned criminalisation. The court decided that specific harm to the public interests should be established in order to convect a person for bribery and abuse of power in private sector. The study provides two basic criterion to provide a typology of corruption in private sector: (1) who is being specifically harmed and (2) what specific harm (negative consequences) is being made. Corruption in private sector could harm: (1) clients of private businesses; (2) companies when employees commits corrupt acts on their expense; (3) owners and shareholders of affected companies; (4) employees in affected companies, their families and dependents; (5) third-parties being directly aimed or affected by bribery or other corrupt act and also those being harmed by unfair competition caused by corruption in private sector; (6) the society, i. e. unspecified or hardly specified group of individuals; (7) the state. Also corruption in private sector could bring both pecuniary and nonpecuniary loss.

Lithuania's chosen geopolitical orientation is expressed by commonality of certain values based on the membership in NATO and the European Union. Respect for democracy is one of the most fundamental among those values. However, despite the certain pressure to recognise the very value, even some of the essential elements of democracy are being interpreted quite differently. An expressive example may be a determination whether the most important political issues affecting the life of the community should be addressed directly by the citizens themselves, or (sometimes even only) by political elite of the community legitimised by the way of election. Therefore (even if we agree to share the same values), one thing is the prevailing consensus and even pressure regarding (at least) the obligatoriness of "democratic rhetoric", and quite another – the specific contents of the concepts of democracy and democratic practices. The various aspects of democratic theory are not analysed in this study more systematically on the basis of this difference. The attention is rather given to the certain requirements or attributes to the principle of democracy and to democratic regime as they are ascribed in the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania. Thus the study is not pointed at things that are certainly noteworthy in the discourse of democratic theory, but they were not formulated or at least mentioned (maybe just not yet?) in the jurisprudence of Constitutional Court: consensus democracy, economic democracy, inclusive democracy, and even (wow, it turns out after more than two decades of Court work it is possible!) liberal democracy. In this text the author starts to consistently structure and systemise the more or less examined democracy related issues mentioned in the final acts of the Constitutional Court (principal concept of democracy, constitutional democracy, parliamentary democracy, participatory democracy, a pluralistic democracy, direct democracy, representative democracy, etc.). Carefully, sometimes even captiously, he analyses the content assigned to them. The author seeks not only to deliver (describe) the Constitutional Court's jurisprudence on democracy, but also to evaluate its evolution, consistency, logical validity, while in more "suspicious" cases, its relation with the scientific doctrine of democracy. Investigating the recent Constitutional Court's jurisprudence that clearly transforms the sovereignty paradigm formed in the acts adopted two decades ago, considerable attention is paid to the limitation to address some of "the most significant issues concerning the life of the State and the Nation" by referendum.

Lithuania's chosen geopolitical orientation is expressed by commonality of certain values based on the membership in NATO and the European Union. Respect for democracy is one of the most fundamental among those values. However, despite the certain pressure to recognise the very value, even some of the essential elements of democracy are being interpreted quite differently. An expressive example may be a determination whether the most important political issues affecting the life of the community should be addressed directly by the citizens themselves, or (sometimes even only) by political elite of the community legitimised by the way of election. Therefore (even if we agree to share the same values), one thing is the prevailing consensus and even pressure regarding (at least) the obligatoriness of "democratic rhetoric", and quite another – the specific contents of the concepts of democracy and democratic practices. The various aspects of democratic theory are not analysed in this study more systematically on the basis of this difference. The attention is rather given to the certain requirements or attributes to the principle of democracy and to democratic regime as they are ascribed in the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania. Thus the study is not pointed at things that are certainly noteworthy in the discourse of democratic theory, but they were not formulated or at least mentioned (maybe just not yet?) in the jurisprudence of Constitutional Court: consensus democracy, economic democracy, inclusive democracy, and even (wow, it turns out after more than two decades of Court work it is possible!) liberal democracy. In this text the author starts to consistently structure and systemise the more or less examined democracy related issues mentioned in the final acts of the Constitutional Court (principal concept of democracy, constitutional democracy, parliamentary democracy, participatory democracy, a pluralistic democracy, direct democracy, representative democracy, etc.). Carefully, sometimes even captiously, he analyses the content assigned to them. The author seeks not only to deliver (describe) the Constitutional Court's jurisprudence on democracy, but also to evaluate its evolution, consistency, logical validity, while in more "suspicious" cases, its relation with the scientific doctrine of democracy. Investigating the recent Constitutional Court's jurisprudence that clearly transforms the sovereignty paradigm formed in the acts adopted two decades ago, considerable attention is paid to the limitation to address some of "the most significant issues concerning the life of the State and the Nation" by referendum.

(such draft laws are submitted to by the President). In practice, however, citizens' legislative initiatives are related to politicians' rather than citizens' initiatives. Citizens' legislative initiative most often used to be employed not so much for the sake of promoting the idea of lawmaking but for making use of citizens' signatures for exerting political pressure on the Seimas ruling majority by opposition powers and communicating a certain message to the electorate. Out of seven initiatives, one brought some results. Exercising the right of petition at the Seimas is in fact an indirect legislative initiative. It diminishes the significance of the Constitutional right of 50.000 citizens' initiative. This right does not make any practical influence: so far only two laws have been passed on the basis of the problems addressed in petitions.

(such draft laws are submitted to by the President). In practice, however, citizens' legislative initiatives are related to politicians' rather than citizens' initiatives. Citizens' legislative initiative most often used to be employed not so much for the sake of promoting the idea of lawmaking but for making use of citizens' signatures for exerting political pressure on the Seimas ruling majority by opposition powers and communicating a certain message to the electorate. Out of seven initiatives, one brought some results. Exercising the right of petition at the Seimas is in fact an indirect legislative initiative. It diminishes the significance of the Constitutional right of 50.000 citizens' initiative. This right does not make any practical influence: so far only two laws have been passed on the basis of the problems addressed in petitions.

(such draft laws are submitted to by the President). In practice, however, citizens' legislative initiatives are related to politicians' rather than citizens' initiatives. Citizens' legislative initiative most often used to be employed not so much for the sake of promoting the idea of lawmaking but for making use of citizens' signatures for exerting political pressure on the Seimas ruling majority by opposition powers and communicating a certain message to the electorate. Out of seven initiatives, one brought some results. Exercising the right of petition at the Seimas is in fact an indirect legislative initiative. It diminishes the significance of the Constitutional right of 50.000 citizens' initiative. This right does not make any practical influence: so far only two laws have been passed on the basis of the problems addressed in petitions.

(such draft laws are submitted to by the President). In practice, however, citizens' legislative initiatives are related to politicians' rather than citizens' initiatives. Citizens' legislative initiative most often used to be employed not so much for the sake of promoting the idea of lawmaking but for making use of citizens' signatures for exerting political pressure on the Seimas ruling majority by opposition powers and communicating a certain message to the electorate. Out of seven initiatives, one brought some results. Exercising the right of petition at the Seimas is in fact an indirect legislative initiative. It diminishes the significance of the Constitutional right of 50.000 citizens' initiative. This right does not make any practical influence: so far only two laws have been passed on the basis of the problems addressed in petitions.

Different shortcomings have been attributed to both legislators (the people & the parliament) in all countries & at all times. The key shortcoming of the people as a legislator is its unability to duly solve state-level issues: the totality of citizens can easily be misled, they lack knowledge or competence on specific issues, their decisions are based on stereotypes etc. Another limitation of people is related to the possibility that anonymity of its decisions can provoke cruelty & intolerance. Despite logical validity of the above-mentioned shortcomings their practical correctness is not proven. Falseness is also not proven as the only existing example of a frequent people's participation in legislation (Switzerland) among other things proving the falseness of the above-mentioned reproaches could hardly serve as a basis for generalization. To the disadvantage of people as a legislator, a procedural argument is presented: during a referendum it is not possible to adopt a maximum best & balanced law as in every case there is a choice "either... or." There is a vote en bloc & no editorial (even most rational) amendments are possible. Besides, the legislation that involves a referendum is related to huge costs. The people's participation in legislation is beneficial because it ensures a higher legitimacy of the decisions & brings people closer to the ruling elite (thus the gap between what citizens expect from the administration & what they receive from the administration is minimized), moreover, this guarantees every citizen's right to participate in tackling his/her affairs. There is one case where the laws adopted by the people have all the strengths of the laws adopted by the parliament & the people, & avoid almost all the failings. These are ratification referenda where the parliament-approved draft laws are adopted (or rejected). The people are only a nominal legislator in Lithuania. The recent practice proves that currently the requirements for holding a referendum make it impossible to pass laws in referenda. This conclusion is confirmed by the fact that the requirements for initiating a referendum are practically impossible to meet: so far nobody has managed to collect 300.000 signatures required to initiate a referendum, ie., 12 percent of the citizens of the Republic of Lithuania who have the right to vote. Consequently, the Seimas is de facto the only legislator in Lithuania. The Parliament as a lawmaker also has some weaknesses. First parliament members, unlike the people, are more prone to bribing or may be subject to some other personal impact. On the other hand, in contemporary electoral system, the parliamentarians who seek to stay in office pander both certain social or territorial groups of the electorate by adopting laws beneficial to them. The people as the whole is not the only popular actor in the legislative process. Individual citizens & their groups have certain powers as well. Yet they are not legislators as such, but rather merely participants of the legislative process. As compared to foreign practice, in Lithuania the conditions & procedure exercising citizens' legislative initiative (50.000 signatures required) are subject to relatively liberal regulation. Unlike in many countries of Europe, there are no direct restrictions on exercising this initiative. There are two indirect restrictions: 1) a draft law on the state budget of the Republic of Lithuania can only be prepared & submitted to the Seimas by the Government, 2) draft laws on ratification & denouncing international treaties are submitted by the President. In practice, however, citizens' legislative initiatives are related to politicians' rather than citizens' initiatives. Citizens' legislative initiative most often is used not to promote the idea of lawmaking but to use citizens' signatures for exerting political pressure on the Seimas ruling majority by opposition & communicating a certain message to the electorate. Out of seven initiatives, one brought some results. Exercising the right of petition at the Seimas is in fact an indirect legislative initiative. It diminishes the significance of the Constitutional right of 50.000 citizens' initiative. This right does not make any practical influence: so far only two laws have been passed on the basis of the problems addressed in petitions. Adapted from the source document.

In 2003, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania in its case-law formulated a thesis telling that the rule of law requires the state to provide the legislator with both a right and an obligation to prohibit acts which result in injuring or endangering the interests of persons, society or the state. The international agreements ratified by the Seimas, the membership in the European Union and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development as well create legal obligations relating liability for corruption in private sector for our country. Thus, appropriate legal liability (including liability for corruption in private sector) might be only conditionally regarded as the issue of discretion of the Seimas. In case the acts in question are sufficiently harmful and (or) the criminalisation thereof is connected with the implementation of the obligations of Lithuania, their inclusion into the Criminal Code of the Republic in Lithuania and active prosecution in respect of them is the duty of the Republic of Lithuania. The research paper aims to evaluate the regulation of liability for corruption in private sector in Lithuanian legal system. It must be noted that it examines not only the issues of criminal liability for corruption in private sector. Taking into account the fact that the standards for the application of criminal liability are particularly high (including inter alia the presumption of innocence), the research question was set on whether the existing legal regulation (labour law) provides possibilities to protect from employees displaying unacceptable standards of behaviour. Legal requirements relating the legal liability for corruption in private sector are provided for in a few international and supranational legal acts, i.e. (a) Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of 22 July 2003 on combating corruption in the private sector; (b) United Nations Convention against Corruption of 31 October 2005 (c) Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption of 27 January 1999; (d) Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption of 15 May 2003; (e) Council of Europe Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competitions of 18 September 2014 (this Convention has not entered into force yet). Regrettably, these few international instruments are as well rather limited: for example, the Framework Decision requires criminalisation of only active and passive bribery in private sector, and the scope of application thereof fails to include not only any unilateral acts of corruption, but as well the corruption acts related to the aspiration to receive other benefit rather than remuneration, whereas the only one universal instrument of international law, the United Nations Convention against Corruption, requires the contracting states only to consider the criminalisation of corruption in private sector rather than the criminalisation itself. All three documents mentioning active and passive bribery in private sector (including Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption besides the two already referred) are applied in restricted scope, i.e. only in cases when a bribe is given for acts or refraining from acting, in breach of the duties. This means that criminal liability is not applied in case the bribe is taken or even forced to give for proper performance of duties. However, Lithuania fails to proper implement event the limited duties formulated in the mentioned documents. Although in accordance with these three mentioned documents the subject of corruption in private sector is considered to be any employee in the private sector, Article 230(3) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania provides that criminal liability for active and passive bribery may arise only in cases when an employee holds administrative powers or is entitled to act on behalf of the legal person or other organisation, or provides public services. As according to the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania most of employees in private companies are not held "persons to be treated as public servants", therefore, they might be held liable only for a restricted number of criminal activities – fraud, commercial espionage or disclosure of a commercial secret. Even upon the evidence of existence of dangerous acts, they may not be held liable for active and passive bribery or embezzlement. Due to the settled case-law which links the status of the "persons to be treated as public servants" with the exceptional importance of the company where they work for the public interest, even the majority of directors of companies and other persons acting on behalf of them may not be prosecuted for the mentioned acts. A part of corruption activities of the companies connected to their relations with clients, users and partners are standard ones, another part of corruption activities differ according to the field of activities of companies. Most of corruption activities of private companies occur either in the field of supply chain (production, distribution, marketing), or the purchasing field. These usually include active and private bribery, fraud, unfair commercial activities, misleading advertising or similar activities, subject to criminal or economic sanctions. Meanwhile, in the field of provision of legal services, pharmacy, healthcare, education, etc. possible corruption activities are of specific nature, and the prevention is provided for in special laws and codes of behaviour. Neither international, nor European Union legal acts regulate liability for corruption in labour relations, therefore, this issue is regulated only in national legislation. The main sanctions in labour law applicable in respect of an employee for corruption activities are the suspension of the performance of the labour agreement (a provisional measure) and termination of labour contract on the initiative of the employer upon the fault of the employee (Article 58 of the Labour Code). Besides, in respect of employees who act as directors a measure of revocation may be applied, and indeed, this measure is an important one for the protection of the company from a corrupted director. As well, particular sanctions for failure to execute the duties or improper execution thereof might be established in the internal documents of a company. These may include a warning, termination of additional payments or bonuses, etc. Due to the open list of measures applicable in labour relations, the liability for corruption activities in labour relations is broader in scope than criminal liability. On the other hand, rather short time-limits for the termination of the labour agreement on the initiative of the employer in case of fault of an employee and its weak deterrence weakens the effectiveness of this sanction. The problem of application of short time limits is not acute when the revocation of an employee is applied; however, the latter instrument is possible only in respect of heads of a legal person.

In 2003, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania in its case-law formulated a thesis telling that the rule of law requires the state to provide the legislator with both a right and an obligation to prohibit acts which result in injuring or endangering the interests of persons, society or the state. The international agreements ratified by the Seimas, the membership in the European Union and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development as well create legal obligations relating liability for corruption in private sector for our country. Thus, appropriate legal liability (including liability for corruption in private sector) might be only conditionally regarded as the issue of discretion of the Seimas. In case the acts in question are sufficiently harmful and (or) the criminalisation thereof is connected with the implementation of the obligations of Lithuania, their inclusion into the Criminal Code of the Republic in Lithuania and active prosecution in respect of them is the duty of the Republic of Lithuania. The research paper aims to evaluate the regulation of liability for corruption in private sector in Lithuanian legal system. It must be noted that it examines not only the issues of criminal liability for corruption in private sector. Taking into account the fact that the standards for the application of criminal liability are particularly high (including inter alia the presumption of innocence), the research question was set on whether the existing legal regulation (labour law) provides possibilities to protect from employees displaying unacceptable standards of behaviour. Legal requirements relating the legal liability for corruption in private sector are provided for in a few international and supranational legal acts, i.e. (a) Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of 22 July 2003 on combating corruption in the private sector; (b) United Nations Convention against Corruption of 31 October 2005 (c) Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption of 27 January 1999; (d) Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption of 15 May 2003; (e) Council of Europe Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competitions of 18 September 2014 (this Convention has not entered into force yet). Regrettably, these few international instruments are as well rather limited: for example, the Framework Decision requires criminalisation of only active and passive bribery in private sector, and the scope of application thereof fails to include not only any unilateral acts of corruption, but as well the corruption acts related to the aspiration to receive other benefit rather than remuneration, whereas the only one universal instrument of international law, the United Nations Convention against Corruption, requires the contracting states only to consider the criminalisation of corruption in private sector rather than the criminalisation itself. All three documents mentioning active and passive bribery in private sector (including Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption besides the two already referred) are applied in restricted scope, i.e. only in cases when a bribe is given for acts or refraining from acting, in breach of the duties. This means that criminal liability is not applied in case the bribe is taken or even forced to give for proper performance of duties. However, Lithuania fails to proper implement event the limited duties formulated in the mentioned documents. Although in accordance with these three mentioned documents the subject of corruption in private sector is considered to be any employee in the private sector, Article 230(3) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania provides that criminal liability for active and passive bribery may arise only in cases when an employee holds administrative powers or is entitled to act on behalf of the legal person or other organisation, or provides public services. As according to the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania most of employees in private companies are not held "persons to be treated as public servants", therefore, they might be held liable only for a restricted number of criminal activities – fraud, commercial espionage or disclosure of a commercial secret. Even upon the evidence of existence of dangerous acts, they may not be held liable for active and passive bribery or embezzlement. Due to the settled case-law which links the status of the "persons to be treated as public servants" with the exceptional importance of the company where they work for the public interest, even the majority of directors of companies and other persons acting on behalf of them may not be prosecuted for the mentioned acts. A part of corruption activities of the companies connected to their relations with clients, users and partners are standard ones, another part of corruption activities differ according to the field of activities of companies. Most of corruption activities of private companies occur either in the field of supply chain (production, distribution, marketing), or the purchasing field. These usually include active and private bribery, fraud, unfair commercial activities, misleading advertising or similar activities, subject to criminal or economic sanctions. Meanwhile, in the field of provision of legal services, pharmacy, healthcare, education, etc. possible corruption activities are of specific nature, and the prevention is provided for in special laws and codes of behaviour. Neither international, nor European Union legal acts regulate liability for corruption in labour relations, therefore, this issue is regulated only in national legislation. The main sanctions in labour law applicable in respect of an employee for corruption activities are the suspension of the performance of the labour agreement (a provisional measure) and termination of labour contract on the initiative of the employer upon the fault of the employee (Article 58 of the Labour Code). Besides, in respect of employees who act as directors a measure of revocation may be applied, and indeed, this measure is an important one for the protection of the company from a corrupted director. As well, particular sanctions for failure to execute the duties or improper execution thereof might be established in the internal documents of a company. These may include a warning, termination of additional payments or bonuses, etc. Due to the open list of measures applicable in labour relations, the liability for corruption activities in labour relations is broader in scope than criminal liability. On the other hand, rather short time-limits for the termination of the labour agreement on the initiative of the employer in case of fault of an employee and its weak deterrence weakens the effectiveness of this sanction. The problem of application of short time limits is not acute when the revocation of an employee is applied; however, the latter instrument is possible only in respect of heads of a legal person.