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In the wake of the disclosures surrounding PRISM and other US surveillanceprogrammes, this study makes an assessment of the large-scale surveillancepractices by a selection of EU member states: the UK, Sweden, France,Germany and the Netherlands. Given the large-scale nature of surveillancepractices at stake, which represent a reconfiguration of traditional intelligencegathering, the study contends that an analysis of European surveillanceprogrammes cannot be reduced to a question of balance between dataprotection versus national security, but has to be framed in terms of collectivefreedoms and democracy. It finds that four of the five EU member statesselected for in-depth examination are engaging in some form of large-scaleinterception and surveillance of communication data, and identifies parallels anddiscrepancies between these programmes and the NSA-run operations. Thestudy argues that these surveillance programmes do not stand outside therealm of EU intervention but can be engaged from an EU law perspective via (i)an understanding of national security in a democratic rule of law frameworkwhere fundamental human rights standards and judicial oversight constitute keystandards; (ii) the risks presented to the internal security of the Union as awhole as well as the privacy of EU citizens as data owners, and (iii) the potentialspillover into the activities and responsibilities of EU agencies. The study thenpresents a set of policy recommendations to the European Parliament.

In the wake of the disclosures surrounding PRISM and other US surveillanceprogrammes, this study makes an assessment of the large-scale surveillancepractices by a selection of EU member states: the UK, Sweden, France,Germany and the Netherlands. Given the large-scale nature of surveillancepractices at stake, which represent a reconfiguration of traditional intelligencegathering, the study contends that an analysis of European surveillanceprogrammes cannot be reduced to a question of balance between dataprotection versus national security, but has to be framed in terms of collectivefreedoms and democracy. It finds that four of the five EU member statesselected for in-depth examination are engaging in some form of large-scaleinterception and surveillance of communication data, and identifies parallels anddiscrepancies between these programmes and the NSA-run operations. Thestudy argues that these surveillance programmes do not stand outside therealm of EU intervention but can be engaged from an EU law perspective via (i)an understanding of national security in a democratic rule of law frameworkwhere fundamental human rights standards and judicial oversight constitute keystandards; (ii) the risks presented to the internal security of the Union as awhole as well as the privacy of EU citizens as data owners, and (iii) the potentialspillover into the activities and responsibilities of EU agencies. The study thenpresents a set of policy recommendations to the European Parliament.

Questions about how algorithms contribute to (in)security are under discussion across international political sociology. Building upon and adding to these debates, our collective discussion foregrounds questions about algorithmic violence. We argue that it is important to examine how algorithmic systems feed (into) specific forms of violence, and how they justify violent actions or redefine what forms of violence are deemed legitimate. Bringing together different disciplinary and conceptual vantage points, this collective discussion opens a conversation about algorithmic violence focusing both on its specific instances and on the challenges that arise in conceptualizing and studying it. Overall, the discussion converges on three areas of concern-the violence undergirding the creation and feeding of data infrastructures; the translation processes at play in the use of computer/machine vision across diverse security practices; and the institutional governing of algorithmic violence, especially its organization, limitation, and legitimation. Our two-fold aim is to show the potential of a cross-disciplinary conversation and to move toward an interactional research agenda. While our approaches diverge, they also enrich each other. Ultimately, we highlight the critical purchase of studying the role of algorithmic violence in the fabric of the international through a situated analysis of algorithmic systems as part of complex, and often messy, practices. ; publishedVersion ; Peer reviewed

This paper examines the EU's counter-terrorism policies responding to the Paris attacks of 13 November 2015. It argues that these events call for a re-think of the current information-sharing and preventive-justice model guiding the EU's counter-terrorism tools, along with security agencies such as Europol and Eurojust. Priority should be given to independently evaluating 'what has worked' and 'what has not' when it comes to police and criminal justice cooperation in the Union. Current EU counter-terrorism policies face two challenges: one is related to their efficiency and other concerns their legality. 'More data' without the necessary human resources, more effective cross-border operational cooperation and more trust between the law enforcement authorities of EU member states is not an efficient policy response. Large-scale surveillance and preventive justice techniques are also incompatible with the legal and judicial standards developed by the Court of Justice of the EU. The EU can bring further added value first, by boosting traditional policing and criminal justice cooperation to fight terrorism; second, by re-directing EU agencies' competences towards more coordination and support in cross-border operational cooperation and joint investigations, subject to greater accountability checks (Europol and Eurojust +); and third, by improving the use of policy measures following a criminal justice-led cooperation model focused on improving cross-border joint investigations and the use of information that meets the quality standards of 'evidence' in criminal judicial proceedings. Any EU and national counter-terrorism policies must not undermine democratic rule of law, fundamental rights or the EU's founding constitutional principles, such as the free movement of persons and the Schengen system. Otherwise, these policies will defeat their purpose by generating more insecurity, instability, mistrust and legal uncertainty for all.

This paper examines the EU's counter-terrorism policies responding to the Paris attacks of 13 November 2015. It argues that these events call for a re-think of the current information-sharing and preventive-justice model guiding the EU's counter-terrorism tools, along with security agencies such as Europol and Eurojust. Priority should be given to independently evaluating 'what has worked' and 'what has not' when it comes to police and criminal justice cooperation in the Union. Current EU counter-terrorism policies face two challenges: one is related to their efficiency and other concerns their legality. 'More data' without the necessary human resources, more effective cross-border operational cooperation and more trust between the law enforcement authorities of EU member states is not an efficient policy response. Large-scale surveillance and preventive justice techniques are also incompatible with the legal and judicial standards developed by the Court of Justice of the EU. The EU can bring further added value first, by boosting traditional policing and criminal justice cooperation to fight terrorism; second, by re-directing EU agencies' competences towards more coordination and support in cross-border operational cooperation and joint investigations, subject to greater accountability checks (Europol and Eurojust +); and third, by improving the use of policy measures following a criminal justice-led cooperation model focused on improving cross-border joint investigations and the use of information that meets the quality standards of 'evidence' in criminal judicial proceedings. Any EU and national counter-terrorism policies must not undermine democratic rule of law, fundamental rights or the EU's founding constitutional principles, such as the free movement of persons and the Schengen system. Otherwise, these policies will defeat their purpose by generating more insecurity, instability, mistrust and legal uncertainty for all.

This paper examines the EU's counter-terrorism policies responding to the Paris attacks of 13 November 2015. It argues that these events call for a re-think of the current information-sharing and preventive-justice model guiding the EU's counter-terrorism tools, along with security agencies such as Europol and Eurojust. Priority should be given to independently evaluating 'what has worked' and 'what has not' when it comes to police and criminal justice cooperation in the Union. Current EU counter-terrorism policies face two challenges: one is related to their efficiency and other concerns their legality. 'More data' without the necessary human resources, more effective cross-border operational cooperation and more trust between the law enforcement authorities of EU member states is not an efficient policy response. Large-scale surveillance and preventive justice techniques are also incompatible with the legal and judicial standards developed by the Court of Justice of the EU. The EU can bring further added value first, by boosting traditional policing and criminal justice cooperation to fight terrorism; second, by re-directing EU agencies' competences towards more coordination and support in cross-border operational cooperation and joint investigations, subject to greater accountability checks (Europol and Eurojust +); and third, by improving the use of policy measures following a criminal justice-led cooperation model focused on improving cross-border joint investigations and the use of information that meets the quality standards of 'evidence' in criminal judicial proceedings. Any EU and national counter-terrorism policies must not undermine democratic rule of law, fundamental rights or the EU's founding constitutional principles, such as the free movement of persons and the Schengen system. Otherwise, these policies will defeat their purpose by generating more insecurity, instability, mistrust and legal uncertainty for all.