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Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz was an outstanding contributor to many fields of human knowledge. The historiography of philosophy has tagged him as a "rationalist". But what does this exactly mean? Is he a "rationalist" in the same sense in Mathematics and Politics, in Physics and Jurisprudence, in Metaphysics and Theology, in Logic and Linguistics, in Technology and Medicine, in Epistemology and Ethics? What are the most significant features of his "rationalism", whatever it is? For the first time an outstanding group of Leibniz researchers, some acknowledged as leading scholars, others in the beginning of a promising career, who specialize in the most significant areas of Leibniz's contributions to human thought and action, were requested to spell out the nature of his rationalism in each of these areas, with a view to provide a comprehensive picture of what it amounts to, both in its general drive and in its specific features and eventual inner tensions. The chapters of the book are the result of intense discussion in the course of an international conference focused on the title question of this book, and were selected in view of their contribution to this topic. They are clustered in thematically organized parts. No effort has been made to hide the controversies underlying the different interpretations of Leibniz's "rationalism" – in each particular domain and as a whole. On the contrary, the editor firmly believes that only through a variety of conflicting interpretive perspectives can the multi-faceted nature of an oeuvre of such a magnitude and variety as Leibniz's be brought to light and understood as it deserves.

« Si la connaissance se donne comme connaissance de la vérité, c'est qu'elle produit la vérité par le jeu d'une falsification première et toujours reconduite qui pose la distinction du vrai et du faux . » Leçons sur la volonté de savoir, Gallimard-Seuil, Paris, 2011 (1re éd. : 1971)."If knowledge is given as knowledge of the truth, it is because it produces the truth by the game of a first, primary falsification renewed again and again which raises the distinction of true and false" [my translation]. Michel Foucault, Lessons on the will to know, Gallimard-Seuil, Paris, 2011 (1st ed .: 1971)I wonder how can Foucault, who refers to Nietzsche as source of inspiration, speak of falsification and deny at the same time objectivity of truth – besides the obvious pun. The challenge of Nietzsche is to contest the objectivity of truth as human desiderata, in such a context Foucault's notion of falsification (of what? falsification of an objective reality?) does either make no sense at all or encodes some other meaning beyond being false – a possible reading would be to take it that Foucault means "distortion", or better "will to deceive ".Perhaps, Foucault's observation amounts to the simple remark that some of the so-called scientific justifications of institutionalized qualifications and anathemas that have important political and socio-economic consequences such as those involving notions as health, disease, or gender do not have the scientific backing they are purported to have (now scientific backing, I guess, must be understood in a rather standard or naïve sense of distinguishing between sciences and pseudo-sciences). This might in some sense be a sensible reflection, and it must be conceded that Foucault had the merit of undertaking extensive and thorough examinations of archives, protocols and reports buried in institutions of various kinds which animated his legendary charming style of writing. Of course, this is quite far away from constituting a revolutionary assault on the notions of (scientific) truth, knowledge and meaning, but, one can say, I think, that his work motivated and still motivates some new approaches to the study of institutional archives. If the reading proposed in the preceding paragraph seems a too meagre result and we are prepared to read Foucault's remarks as involving more thorny epistemological matters, there are of course other ways to delve into them: On one hand I allow me to suggest studying the sceptics of the ancient Greek tradition, or the study of analogical dialectical reasoning within the Arabic Jurisprudence theories of the Middle-Ages (or more generally their theory of Argumentation that has been largely ignored also by the analytic approaches to Argumentation theory and Epistemic Logic), or if one dares to go so far the millenary Jain epistemological lessons on the Art of the Point of View provide plenty to learn from (this constitutes another gap in the recent studies on reasoning and knowledge). On the other one cannot escape the feeling that claims as those of Foucault, though they might be seen as involving interesting questions, many of them have been brought forward without awareness (or perhaps even because of lack of awareness) of the discussions that took place in depth and length in philosophy of logic and knowledge – moreover, as a quick look on nowadays publications bring to the fore, such kind of discussions are nowadays experiencing a creative impulse at a breath-taking pace (particularly so in the context of social sciences). True, analytic philosophers and some philosophers of logic stemming from analytic philosophy quite often ignore history of philosophy or even the history of the science they are purported to study, or more generally philosophical approaches foreign to their own framework – with the result that quite often they produced a rather superficial analysis of the links between knowledge and truth – however, this only points out, that it is time that we start learning each from the other Am I falsifying Foucault? Who knows …

« Si la connaissance se donne comme connaissance de la vérité, c'est qu'elle produit la vérité par le jeu d'une falsification première et toujours reconduite qui pose la distinction du vrai et du faux . » Leçons sur la volonté de savoir, Gallimard-Seuil, Paris, 2011 (1re éd. : 1971)."If knowledge is given as knowledge of the truth, it is because it produces the truth by the game of a first, primary falsification renewed again and again which raises the distinction of true and false" [my translation]. Michel Foucault, Lessons on the will to know, Gallimard-Seuil, Paris, 2011 (1st ed .: 1971)I wonder how can Foucault, who refers to Nietzsche as source of inspiration, speak of falsification and deny at the same time objectivity of truth – besides the obvious pun. The challenge of Nietzsche is to contest the objectivity of truth as human desiderata, in such a context Foucault's notion of falsification (of what? falsification of an objective reality?) does either make no sense at all or encodes some other meaning beyond being false – a possible reading would be to take it that Foucault means "distortion", or better "will to deceive ".Perhaps, Foucault's observation amounts to the simple remark that some of the so-called scientific justifications of institutionalized qualifications and anathemas that have important political and socio-economic consequences such as those involving notions as health, disease, or gender do not have the scientific backing they are purported to have (now scientific backing, I guess, must be understood in a rather standard or naïve sense of distinguishing between sciences and pseudo-sciences). This might in some sense be a sensible reflection, and it must be conceded that Foucault had the merit of undertaking extensive and thorough examinations of archives, protocols and reports buried in institutions of various kinds which animated his legendary charming style of writing. Of course, this is quite far away from constituting a revolutionary assault on the notions of (scientific) truth, ...

Intro -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- 1 Brief Reminder of Constructive Type Theory -- 1.1 Fundamentals of the CTT Approach -- 1.2 The Basic CTT Framework for Intuitionistic Predicate Logic -- 1.2.1 About the Rules -- 1.2.2 Intuitionistic Logic in CTT -- References -- 2 Dialogues with Play-Objects -- 2.1 Standard Dialogical Games -- 2.2 The Formation of Propositions -- 2.3 Play-Objects -- 2.4 The Development of a Play -- 2.5 Example -- References -- 3 From Dialogical Strategies to CTT Demonstrations -- 3.1 Towards the Core -- 3.1.1 Getting Rid of Infinite Ramifications -- 3.1.2 Disregarding Formation Rules -- 3.1.3 Disregarding Irrelevant Variations in the Order of O-moves -- 3.2 From the Core to a CTT Demonstration -- 3.2.1 Generalities -- 3.2.2 The Algorithm -- 3.3 Adequacy of the Translation Algorithm -- References -- 4 The Dialogical Take on the Axiom of Choice, and Its Translation into CTT -- 4.1 The Dialogical Take on the Axiom of Choice -- 4.1.1 Two Plays on the Axiom of Choice -- 4.1.2 The Core of a Winning P-strategy -- 4.2 From the Dialogical Strategy to the CTT Demonstration of the Axiom of Choice -- 4.3 The Extensional Version of the Axiom of Choice -- 4.3.1 Martin-Löf on the Extensional Version with Uniqueness -- 4.3.2 The Dialogical Way -- References -- 5 Building a Winning P-strategy Out of a CTT Demonstration -- 5.1 Transforming CTT Demonstrations -- 5.1.1 Guidelines -- 5.1.2 The Procedure -- 5.2 Adequacy of the Algorithm -- References -- 6 Conclusions and Work in Progress -- References -- 7 Errata to: Linking Game-Theoretical Approaches with Constructive Type Theory -- Errata to: N. Clerbout and S. Rahman, Linking Game-Theoretical Approaches with Constructive Type Theory, SpringerBriefs in Philosophy, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-19063-1.

International audience The main aim of the paper is to offer a solution compatible with Graham Priest'sNoneism and Amie Thomasson's Artifactual theory which stresses the epistemic features ofthe notion of individuality in fiction in a framework where individuals are conceived of asfunctions (the framework is known as the world-lines-semantics of Hintikka). According toour view, it is the endorsement of a reader's perspective that extends the range of the valuesof the functions (individuals) and that offers an alternative solution to cases of identity insideand outside the scope of a fictionality (or representation) operator. More technically, thisproposal can be seen as both extending the notion of individuality of the Artifactual theoryand furnishing an epistemic twist to Priest's principle of freedom.

International audience The main aim of this paper is to study the notion of conditionalright by means of a dialogical approach to constructive type theory(CTT). We will develop this idea in a framework where the distinctionbetween local-reason and strategic-reason leads to the furtherdistinction between two basic kinds of pieces of evidence, factual andlogical. The present paper is based on Rahman (2015). However,though the underlying CTT-analysis is the same, the dialogical reconstructionmakes use of a new way of linking dialogical logic and CTT.

International audience ; Voilà deux ans que le Réseau LACTO («Langage, argumentation et cognition dans les traditions orales») a été mis en place à l'initiative conjointe des Universités CDG-Lille 3 et MNG-Brazzaville. Des rencontres à caractère scientifique et organisationnel se sont tenues alternativement au Congo (du 19 au 21 janvier 2013) et en France (du 7 au 9 novembre 2013), avec l'implication d'autres universityés, en vue de circonscrire la complexité épistémologique du rapport entre l'oralité et la scripturalité, ou plutôt entre l'orature et l'écriture. Le présent ouvrage est, pour l'essentiel, le résultat des discussions issues de ces rencontres, en guise de tentative de réponse à la question principalement soulevée. Ainsi, contre l'exclusion de l'une ou l'autre instance dans la définition des deux paradigmes du discours philosophique ou scientifique - le paradigme oral et le paradigme écrit - les contributions des uns et des autres s'accordent sur la vision que l'une ne saurait aller sans l'autre. Autrement dit, aucun paradigme ne saurait être pensé en totale exclusion de l'autre, si tant est qu'ils obligent le discours à s'implémenter dans l'espace et à travers le temps. Les catégories de l'espace et du temps constituent de ce fait tout à la fois une trame empirique et un cadre sémantique de déploiement du discours aussi bien oral qu'écrit, dans une optique qui se veut clairement et fondamentalement dialogique. Il est par ailleurs une certaine lecture de la présente réflexion qui laisse entrevoir une triple articulation d'essence logique et herméneutique. Car c'est bien d'une quête de la connaissance et du sens qu'il s'agit : d'abord concernant les rapports épistémologiques de l'orature à l'écriture et de l'écriture à l'orature dans leur histoire, en ouvrant sur la dimension dialogique (Charles Zacharie Bowao, Marcel Nguimbi); ensuite relativement à la mise en situation de l'oralité, qu'il s'agisse du philosopher en langue orale africaine (Mahamadé Savadogo), de la parole proverbiale prise, dans sa dimension logique, mais aussi sociale et politique, tant dans son être que dans son expression sentencielle en contexte d'oralité et de néo-oralité (Mamadou Kabirou Gano, Gildas Nzokou), ou encore relativement à la temporalité propre à la prise de décision et à l'action aujourd'hui (Oumar Dia) ; enfin, relativement à la forme et au contenu du dialogue dans des perspectives herméneutique (Christian Berner), logique (Bernadette Dango Adjoua, Shahid Rahman) et psychanalytique (Dieu-donné Limikou).

International audience ; the demise of the logical positivism programme. The answers given to these qu- tions have deepened the already existing gap between philosophy and the history and practice of science. While the positivists argued for a spontaneous, steady and continuous growth of scientific knowledge the post-positivists make a strong case for a fundamental discontinuity in the development of science which can only be explained by extrascientific factors. The political, social and cultural environment, the argument goes on, determine both the questions and the terms in which they should be answered. Accordingly, the sociological and historical interpretation - volves in fact two kinds of discontinuity which are closely related: the discontinuity of science as such and the discontinuity of the more inclusive political and social context of its development. More precisely it explains the discontinuity of the former by the discontinuity of the latter subordinating in effect the history of science to the wider political and social history. The underlying idea is that each historical and - cial context generates scientific and philosophical questions of its own. From this point of view the question surrounding the nature of knowledge and its development are entirely new topics typical of the twentieth-century social context reflecting both the level and the scale of the development of science.

International audience ; Knowledge was a major issue in science and philosophy in the twentieth century. Its first irruption was in the heated controversy concerning the foundations of mathematics. To justify his rejection of the use of the actual infinite in mathematical reasoning, Brouwer has made the construction of mathematical objects dependent on the knowing subject. This approach was rejected by the mainstream of analytical philosophers who feared a fall into pyschologism. Several years later, the question of the progress of scientific knowledge was put forward in the thirties by the post-positivist philosophers to fill the vacuum in the philosophy of science following the demise of the logical positivism programme. The answers given to these questions have deepened the already existing gap between philosophy and the history and practice of science. While the positivists argued for a spontaneous, steady and continuous growth of scientific knowledge the post-positivists make a strong case for a fundamental discontinuity in the development of science which can only be explained by extrascientific factors. The political, social and cultural environment, the argument goes on, determine both the questions and the terms in which they should be answered. Accordingly, the sociological and historical interpretation involves in fact two kinds of discontinuity which are closely related: the discontinuity of science as such and the discontinuity of the more inclusive political and social context of its development. More precisely it explains the discontinuity of the former by the discontinuity of the latter subordinating in effect the history of science to the wider political and social history. The underlying idea is that each historical and social context generates scientific and philosophical questions of its own. From this point of view the question surrounding the nature of knowledge and its development are entirely new topics typical of the twentieth century social context reflecting both the level and the scale of the development of science. To the surprise of modern historians of science and philosophy, the same kind of questions, which would allegedly be new topics specific to the twentieth century concerning the nature of knowledge and its progress, were already raised more than eleven centuries earlier in the context of the Arabic tradition which, as we discuss further on, developed a trans-cultural and trans-national concept of the unity of science (see the contributions of Deborah Black and Jon McGinnis which tackle the issue of the nature of knowledge). The neglect of the Arabic tradition in philosophy of science is a major a gap not only in the development of science but a fundamental flaw in the writing of its history and philosophy caused by the total reduction of epistemology to political and social history of science. How has this period of the history of science and philosophy come to be ignored? In what circumstances were the questions akin to the nature of knowledge raised in the first place? What is the relation between on the one hand the questions of knowledge and its growth and on the other hand the unity of science in the Arabic tradition? The answers to some of these questions are the aim of the present volume, the first of the series Logic, Epistemology and the Unity of Science to be devoted to a so-called non-western tradition. Let us first highlight in a kind of overview some landmarks concerning the timing of the emergence of the Arabic tradition and its significance for the history of science.

International audience ; Knowledge was a major issue in science and philosophy in the twentieth century. Its first irruption was in the heated controversy concerning the foundations of mathematics. To justify his rejection of the use of the actual infinite in mathematical reasoning, Brouwer has made the construction of mathematical objects dependent on the knowing subject. This approach was rejected by the mainstream of analytical philosophers who feared a fall into pyschologism. Several years later, the question of the progress of scientific knowledge was put forward in the thirties by the post-positivist philosophers to fill the vacuum in the philosophy of science following the demise of the logical positivism programme. The answers given to these questions have deepened the already existing gap between philosophy and the history and practice of science. While the positivists argued for a spontaneous, steady and continuous growth of scientific knowledge the post-positivists make a strong case for a fundamental discontinuity in the development of science which can only be explained by extrascientific factors. The political, social and cultural environment, the argument goes on, determine both the questions and the terms in which they should be answered. Accordingly, the sociological and historical interpretation involves in fact two kinds of discontinuity which are closely related: the discontinuity of science as such and the discontinuity of the more inclusive political and social context of its development. More precisely it explains the discontinuity of the former by the discontinuity of the latter subordinating in effect the history of science to the wider political and social history. The underlying idea is that each historical and social context generates scientific and philosophical questions of its own. From this point of view the question surrounding the nature of knowledge and its development are entirely new topics typical of the twentieth century social context reflecting both the level and the ...

International audience ; the demise of the logical positivism programme. The answers given to these qu- tions have deepened the already existing gap between philosophy and the history and practice of science. While the positivists argued for a spontaneous, steady and continuous growth of scientific knowledge the post-positivists make a strong case for a fundamental discontinuity in the development of science which can only be explained by extrascientific factors. The political, social and cultural environment, the argument goes on, determine both the questions and the terms in which they should be answered. Accordingly, the sociological and historical interpretation - volves in fact two kinds of discontinuity which are closely related: the discontinuity of science as such and the discontinuity of the more inclusive political and social context of its development. More precisely it explains the discontinuity of the former by the discontinuity of the latter subordinating in effect the history of science to the wider political and social history. The underlying idea is that each historical and - cial context generates scientific and philosophical questions of its own. From this point of view the question surrounding the nature of knowledge and its development are entirely new topics typical of the twentieth-century social context reflecting both the level and the scale of the development of science.

A Smart City is a solution to the problems caused by increasing urbanization. Australia has demonstrated a strong determination for the development of Smart Cities. However, the country has experienced uneven growth in its urban development. The purpose of this study is to compare and identify the smartness of major Australian cities to the level of development in multi-dimensions. Eventually, the research introduces the openings to make cities smarter by identifying the focused priority areas. To ensure comprehensive coverage of all aspects of the smart city&rsquo ; s performance, 90 indicators were selected to represent 26 factors and six components. The results of the assessment endorse the impacts of recent government actions taken in different urban areas towards building smarter cities. The research has pointed out the areas of deficiencies for underperforming major cities in Australia. Following the results, appropriate recommendations for Australian cities are provided to improve the city&rsquo ; s smartness.