Suchergebnisse

Berlin richtet sich gegenüber Russland neu aus, doch wichtige Fragen bleiben offen. Das künftige Ausmaß deutschen Einflusses in Europa hängt von der Ukraine-Hilfe ab. (IP)

Germany has started to change course but it is not yet ready, mentally or militarily, to manage the threat that Russia is likely to pose to European security in the coming years. (IPQ)

Bis heute ist Berlins Umgang mit Moskau vom Glauben an liberale Interdependenz geprägt. Doch Dialog reicht sicher nicht aus. Optionen und Szenarien, wie die Spannungen gemanagt werden müssen. (IP)

The relationship between EU foreign policy and national foreign policies of the member states is changing due to various factors: the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 and subsequent creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS); the economic crisis in Europe; and shifts in the global balance of power. The article explores these new dynamics in light of two cases, Estonia and Finland. It examines why the two countries support further integration in the area of foreign policy and what determines the limits of their support, applying rationalist and constructivist approaches. From a rationalist perspective, Finland and Estonia view the EU and the EEAS as a means to pursue national interests and make diplomacy more cost-effective; these aspects have become more important due to the economic crisis and changes in the international context. At the same time both countries value the EU as a security community and a source of solidarity, which points to the importance of socialization, as conceptualized by constructivists. However, the predominance of national foreign policy identity and an instrumental approach to the EU leaves limited space for deeper socialization, in spite of the new mechanisms of socialization introduced by the EEAS.

Since the 'Bulldozer Revolution' in Serbia in 2000, the EU has had to deal with a wave of mass protests in its neighbourhood. Its responses to the 'colour revolutions' in the East and Arab uprisings in the South have cast doubt on its foreign policy identity as a normative power and its commitment to promote democracy outside its borders. Based on an analysis of thirteen cases in 2000-2012, the article identifies four models of EU involvement in the protests: (1) model power, (2) promoter of (regime) change, (3) mediator/facilitator and (4) guardian of stability. It discusses these models in light of the concept of 'normative power Europe' (NPE) and stresses the need to look at the interplay between normative and power political considerations in order to account for the EU's (in)action in different cases. First, model power has been an important form of EU normative power in the Eastern neighbourhood, but its effects have been unintended and often troubling for the EU. Second, promoting regime change, as the EU has done in the cases of Serbia and Syria, can be a strong form of pursuing normative goals, but it contradicts the emphasis of NPE on normative instruments. Third, mediation/facilitation, practised most successfully in the case of Ukraine in 2004, comes closer to the specific characteristics of NPE; yet, the EU's readiness and ability to mediate has often been limited. Fourth, defending stability has been the most common EU response, reflecting its security concerns and a preference for system change over regime change.

Since the 'Bulldozer Revolution' in Serbia in 2000, the EU has had to deal with a wave of mass protests in its neighbourhood. Its responses to the 'colour revolutions' in the East and Arab uprisings in the South have cast doubt on its foreign policy identity as a normative power and its commitment to promote democracy outside its borders. Based on an analysis of thirteen cases in 2000-2012, the article identifies four models of EU involvement in the protests: (1) model power, (2) promoter of (regime) change, (3) mediator/facilitator and (4) guardian of stability. It discusses these models in light of the concept of 'normative power Europe' (NPE) and stresses the need to look at the interplay between normative and power political considerations in order to account for the EU's (in)action in different cases. First, model power has been an important form of EU normative power in the Eastern neighbourhood, but its effects have been unintended and often troubling for the EU. Second, promoting regime change, as the EU has done in the cases of Serbia and Syria, can be a strong form of pursuing normative goals, but it contradicts the emphasis of NPE on normative instruments. Third, mediation/facilitation, practised most successfully in the case of Ukraine in 2004, comes closer to the specific characteristics of NPE; yet, the EU's readiness and ability to mediate has often been limited. Fourth, defending stability has been the most common EU response, reflecting its security concerns and a preference for system change over regime change. Adapted from the source document.