Suchergebnisse

This paper aims to contribute to the literature on 'institutional maintenance work'. Focusing on the institutional disruption resulting from a regulatory project of market rationalization, it enriches the description and analysis of the specific institutional maintenance work performed by powerful actors who engage in resistance against what they perceive as a threat to their discretion. Built on an in-depth qualitative study, our case concerns an attempt to change the form of over-the-counter markets as part of a recent financial reform. The paper contributes to the expanding literature on the maintenance of institutions by suggesting, in particular, that the creation of incommensurables should be added to the list of strategies available to powerful incumbents seeking to resist institutional change. Bridging the gap between the literatures on institutional maintenance and commensuration, it also demonstrates that specific institutional changes can usefully be understood as changes in commensuration systems. This innovatively suggests the existence of degrees of commensuration and calls for a finer-grained understanding of the institutional work required to maintain institutions in a context where the degree of commensuration experienced by a field or a market threatens to increase under coercive pressure.

International audience ; This paper aims to contribute to the literature on "institutional maintenance work". Focusing on the institutional disruption resulting from a regulatory project of market rationalisation, it enriches the description and analysis of the specific institutional maintenance work performed by powerful actors who engage in resistance against what they perceive as a threat to their discretion. Built on an in-depth qualitative study, our case concerns an attempt to change the form of over-the-counter markets as part of a recent financial reform. The paper contributes to the expanding literature on the maintenance of institutions by suggesting, in particular, that the creation of incommensurables should be added to the list of strategies available to powerful incumbents seeking to resist institutional change. Bridging the gap between the literatures on institutional maintenance and commensuration, it also demonstrates that specific institutional changes can usefully be understood as changes in commensuration systems. This innovatively suggests the existence of degrees of commensuration and calls for a finer-grained understanding of the institutional work required to maintain institutions in a context where the degree of commensuration experienced by a field or a market threatens to increase under coercive pressure.

International audience ; This paper aims to contribute to the literature on "institutional maintenance work". Focusing on the institutional disruption resulting from a regulatory project of market rationalisation, it enriches the description and analysis of the specific institutional maintenance work performed by powerful actors who engage in resistance against what they perceive as a threat to their discretion. Built on an in-depth qualitative study, our case concerns an attempt to change the form of over-the-counter markets as part of a recent financial reform. The paper contributes to the expanding literature on the maintenance of institutions by suggesting, in particular, that the creation of incommensurables should be added to the list of strategies available to powerful incumbents seeking to resist institutional change. Bridging the gap between the literatures on institutional maintenance and commensuration, it also demonstrates that specific institutional changes can usefully be understood as changes in commensuration systems. This innovatively suggests the existence of degrees of commensuration and calls for a finer-grained understanding of the institutional work required to maintain institutions in a context where the degree of commensuration experienced by a field or a market threatens to increase under coercive pressure.

In this paper, we examine how categorization is resisted. We analyze the way actors draw on cultural repertoires to resist or adapt to changes that will potentially alter the definition and nature of the markets in which they compete. We approach this question through a qualitative study of the heated debate over the new regulation of over-the-counter (OTC) financial markets in Europe between 2010 and 2011. Our paper enriches the existing literature on the political nature of categorization. Our results show that in response to unwanted change, incumbent firms try to create incommensurability with their own industry's standard cultural repertoire. Most importantly, this incommensurability is not argued in the name of any higher-order sets of values. Our main contribution lies in the article's focus on the way powerful actors resist categorization, highlighting the link between forms of commensuration and the status of the actors who attempt to instrument it. ; Ce papier traite de la résistance à la catégorisation. L'analyse montre comment les acteurs d'un marché utilisent des répertoires culturels pour résister ou s'adapter à des changements susceptibles d'affecter la nature et la définition même des marchés sur lesquels ils se trouvent en concurrence. Nous proposons une analyse qualitative du débat actuel sur la régulation des marchés financiers de gré à gré, en nous concentrant sur le cas européen et sur la période 2010-2011. Ce papier contribue à la littérature académique sur le caractère politique des processus de catégorisation. Nos résultats montrent comment, face à un changement non souhaité, les principales entreprises concernées sont amenées à revendiquer l'incommensurabilité de leur activité avec le répertoire culturel habituel de leur secteur d'activité. Cette incommensurabilité a la spécificité de ne pas prendre appui sur un répertoire de valeurs d'ordre supérieur. Notre principale contribution concerne ainsi l'étude d'une stratégie mise en oeuvre par des acteurs puissants pour résister à une ...

In this paper, we examine how categorization is resisted. We analyze the way actors draw on cultural repertoires to resist or adapt to changes that will potentially alter the definition and nature of the markets in which they compete. We approach this question through a qualitative study of the heated debate over the new regulation of over-the-counter (OTC) financial markets in Europe between 2010 and 2011. Our paper enriches the existing literature on the political nature of categorization. Our results show that in response to unwanted change, incumbent firms try to create incommensurability with their own industry's standard cultural repertoire. Most importantly, this incommensurability is not argued in the name of any higher-order sets of values. Our main contribution lies in the article's focus on the way powerful actors resist categorization, highlighting the link between forms of commensuration and the status of the actors who attempt to instrument it. ; Ce papier traite de la résistance à la catégorisation. L'analyse montre comment les acteurs d'un marché utilisent des répertoires culturels pour résister ou s'adapter à des changements susceptibles d'affecter la nature et la définition même des marchés sur lesquels ils se trouvent en concurrence. Nous proposons une analyse qualitative du débat actuel sur la régulation des marchés financiers de gré à gré, en nous concentrant sur le cas européen et sur la période 2010-2011. Ce papier contribue à la littérature académique sur le caractère politique des processus de catégorisation. Nos résultats montrent comment, face à un changement non souhaité, les principales entreprises concernées sont amenées à revendiquer l'incommensurabilité de leur activité avec le répertoire culturel habituel de leur secteur d'activité. Cette incommensurabilité a la spécificité de ne pas prendre appui sur un répertoire de valeurs d'ordre supérieur. Notre principale contribution concerne ainsi l'étude d'une stratégie mise en oeuvre par des acteurs puissants pour résister à une catégorisation non souhaitée, ce qui nous permet de souligner le lien entre le statut des acteurs et les stratégies qu'ils ont à leur disposition dans les processus de commensuration.

In this paper, we examine how categorization is resisted. We analyze the way actors draw on cultural repertoires to resist or adapt to changes that will potentially alter the definition and nature of the markets in which they compete. We approach this question through a qualitative study of the heated debate over the new regulation of over-the-counter (OTC) financial markets in Europe between 2010 and 2011. Our paper enriches the existing literature on the political nature of categorization. Our results show that in response to unwanted change, incumbent firms try to create incommensurability with their own industry's standard cultural repertoire. Most importantly, this incommensurability is not argued in the name of any higher-order sets of values. Our main contribution lies in the article's focus on the way powerful actors resist categorization, highlighting the link between forms of commensuration and the status of the actors who attempt to instrument it. ; Ce papier traite de la résistance à la catégorisation. L'analyse montre comment les acteurs d'un marché utilisent des répertoires culturels pour résister ou s'adapter à des changements susceptibles d'affecter la nature et la définition même des marchés sur lesquels ils se trouvent en concurrence. Nous proposons une analyse qualitative du débat actuel sur la régulation des marchés financiers de gré à gré, en nous concentrant sur le cas européen et sur la période 2010-2011. Ce papier contribue à la littérature académique sur le caractère politique des processus de catégorisation. Nos résultats montrent comment, face à un changement non souhaité, les principales entreprises concernées sont amenées à revendiquer l'incommensurabilité de leur activité avec le répertoire culturel habituel de leur secteur d'activité. Cette incommensurabilité a la spécificité de ne pas prendre appui sur un répertoire de valeurs d'ordre supérieur. Notre principale contribution concerne ainsi l'étude d'une stratégie mise en oeuvre par des acteurs puissants pour résister à une ...

In this paper, we examine the process of risk commodification involved in the creation of a market for weather derivatives in Europe. We approach this issue through an in-depth qualitative study in which we focus on the commensuration process by which promoters try to draw weather risk into the financial world. By offering a concrete description of a derivatives market as a meeting place between different metrics, our results highlight the failure of a process of commensuration – a phenomenon rarely studied empirically in the literature – and its unexpected results. Compared to existing research, we use the theoretical framework provided by Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) to enrich the literature on commensuration specifically as regards the different forms of agreement to which commensuration attempts can lead. Our results highlight the crucial role of a common interest for commensuration to succeed, and the conditions necessary for this common interest to occur. We conclude that there are limits to the thesis of financial theory, according to which all kinds of risk can be transformed into financial risk, and exchanged on financial markets.