Suchergebnisse

Die sozialen Sicherungssysteme müssen reformiert werden, damit sie im demografischen Wandel finanzierbar bleiben. Es gilt, das Erwerbspersonenpotenzial auf dem Arbeitsmarkt besser auszuschöpfen. Durch eine Verbesserung der Kindertagesbetreuung und den Umbau des Ehegattensplittings sollte die Politik insbesondere die Frauen- und Müttererwerbstätigkeit fördern. Um Anreize für Arbeitnehmer*innen im Niedrigeinkommenssegment zu schaffen, müssen die bestehenden Hartz-IV-Hinzuverdienstregelungen ausgeweitet und die hohen Grenzbelastungen beim Hinzuverdienst reduziert werden.

This paper explores the implications of gender-based income taxation in a noncooperative model of household behavior. In a first step, we show how gender-based taxes can act as Pigou taxes and correct the externality induced by a non-cooperative household equilibrium. We find that the first-best Pigou tax rules are solely determined by spouses' relative marginal rates of substitution between the public household good and private consumption. Breaking down this eneral rule into the primitives of themodel, the spouse with a comparative advantage in home production should be taxed at a higher rate. In a second step, we embed our non-cooperative framework in a standard second-best planning problem in which taxes serve a revenue-raising purpose. In thiscase, the optimal structure of differential taxation by gender is partly determined by a Ramsey-type inverse elasticity rule and partly by a Pigouvian tax element. We showthat these two forces work in opposite directions in determining whether men or women should be taxed at a higher rate, and that either one could be dominant, depending on the revenue-raising position of the government. This result is robust to the introduction of two groups of households that differ in their mode of decision-making, which can beeither cooperative or non-cooperative.

SummaryStandard theories of household decision making assume that family members have complete information about preferences and are able to reach efficient outcomes. However, partners in intimate relationships may often need to coordinate their choices in the face of incomplete information. To reduce uncertainty there is an incentive for partners to acquire information through communication. In this study we investigate empirically the determinants of communication between partners and its consequences in the specific context of sexual satisfaction. In particular we show the importance of schooling for information acquisition effort. Although education indirectly improves sexual satisfaction through the communication mechanism, we also find direct adverse effects of schooling on sexual wellbeing. This is interpreted in terms of opportunity cost effect arising from the market returns to schooling that make it more difficult to coordinate work and love lives. The econometric estimates show that the positive communication effects of education vanish at longer relationship durations as couples learn about their preferences. While sexual satisfaction is positively correlated with life satisfaction, it is only when controlling for sexual wellbeing that schooling has a statistically signification association with overall life satisfaction.