Suchergebnisse

This thesis questions both conventional macroeconomic theory and economic policy doctrines about their ability to inform and address fiscal policy issues since the 2008 crisis. The introductory chapter proposes a descriptive analysis. After a long period of increasing public debt, budgetary deficits plunge during the recession, but interest rates continue to fall except in a few countries, whose governments were facing serious fiscal troubles. Inflation stabilizes at a low level, but interest rates turn negative. Potential growth continue to slowdown and the hypothesis of secular stagnation becomes plausible. The second chapter discusses the role of rating agencies and their real or perceived power. Rating agencies have been accused of increasing default risk by degrading the rating of troubled countries, causing interest rate hikes. We conduct an empirical study on the recent budgetary crisis that affected the GIIPS (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) within the euro area. The causal relationships between the ratings of the three main agencies (Moody's, Standard and Poor's and Fitch Ratings) and the five sovereign spreads are systematically tested. These tests suggest that it is rather the risk premium who causes a variation of the note, and not the opposite. The rating agency provides information that has already been anticipated by the financial markets. This result must be nuanced because a causal relationship of the warnings of degradation (outlook) is detected. The third chapter deals with the explanatory factors of real interest rates. The standard model (AS-AD) states that the equilibrium interest rate must increase following a fiscal expansion or as a result of a slowing of potential growth, regardless of the regime (classic, Keynesian or intermediate). Extensions of the model allow us to consider external influences, sovereign risk premiums, potential growth and expectations. This does not reverse the predictions of the model and the theory is reconciled with the facts only when the Keynesian ...

This thesis questions both conventional macroeconomic theory and economic policy doctrines about their ability to inform and address fiscal policy issues since the 2008 crisis. The introductory chapter proposes a descriptive analysis. After a long period of increasing public debt, budgetary deficits plunge during the recession, but interest rates continue to fall except in a few countries, whose governments were facing serious fiscal troubles. Inflation stabilizes at a low level, but interest rates turn negative. Potential growth continue to slowdown and the hypothesis of secular stagnation becomes plausible. The second chapter discusses the role of rating agencies and their real or perceived power. Rating agencies have been accused of increasing default risk by degrading the rating of troubled countries, causing interest rate hikes. We conduct an empirical study on the recent budgetary crisis that affected the GIIPS (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) within the euro area. The causal relationships between the ratings of the three main agencies (Moody's, Standard and Poor's and Fitch Ratings) and the five sovereign spreads are systematically tested. These tests suggest that it is rather the risk premium who causes a variation of the note, and not the opposite. The rating agency provides information that has already been anticipated by the financial markets. This result must be nuanced because a causal relationship of the warnings of degradation (outlook) is detected. The third chapter deals with the explanatory factors of real interest rates. The standard model (AS-AD) states that the equilibrium interest rate must increase following a fiscal expansion or as a result of a slowing of potential growth, regardless of the regime (classic, Keynesian or intermediate). Extensions of the model allow us to consider external influences, sovereign risk premiums, potential growth and expectations. This does not reverse the predictions of the model and the theory is reconciled with the facts only when the Keynesian ...

This thesis questions both conventional macroeconomic theory and economic policy doctrines about their ability to inform and address fiscal policy issues since the 2008 crisis. The introductory chapter proposes a descriptive analysis. After a long period of increasing public debt, budgetary deficits plunge during the recession, but interest rates continue to fall except in a few countries, whose governments were facing serious fiscal troubles. Inflation stabilizes at a low level, but interest rates turn negative. Potential growth continue to slowdown and the hypothesis of secular stagnation becomes plausible. The second chapter discusses the role of rating agencies and their real or perceived power. Rating agencies have been accused of increasing default risk by degrading the rating of troubled countries, causing interest rate hikes. We conduct an empirical study on the recent budgetary crisis that affected the GIIPS (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) within the euro area. The causal relationships between the ratings of the three main agencies (Moody's, Standard and Poor's and Fitch Ratings) and the five sovereign spreads are systematically tested. These tests suggest that it is rather the risk premium who causes a variation of the note, and not the opposite. The rating agency provides information that has already been anticipated by the financial markets. This result must be nuanced because a causal relationship of the warnings of degradation (outlook) is detected. The third chapter deals with the explanatory factors of real interest rates. The standard model (AS-AD) states that the equilibrium interest rate must increase following a fiscal expansion or as a result of a slowing of potential growth, regardless of the regime (classic, Keynesian or intermediate). Extensions of the model allow us to consider external influences, sovereign risk premiums, potential growth and expectations. This does not reverse the predictions of the model and the theory is reconciled with the facts only when the Keynesian ...