2021's Conference of Parties, the 26th UN Climate Change Conference of Parties (COP26), is crucially important as governments—for the first time since the Paris Agreement—are expected to agree on concrete commitments and greater ambitions to limit global warming to 1·5°C. COP26 President-Designate Alok Sharma stated that delivery of US$100 billion in climate finance is going to be the key to whether the goals of COP26 succeed or fail. At the same time, people worldwide have started acknowledging the impacts of the climate crisis on peace and security—otherwise called the climate security nexus.1, 2 The concern then becomes where and how objectives and investments in adaptation and peacebuilding can be aligned, and how trade-offs between climate finance, peace, and security can be minimised or avoided.
Policy measures regarding adaptation to climate change include efforts to adjust socio-economic and ecologic systems. Colombia has undertaken various measures in terms of climate change mitigation and adaptation since becoming a party of the Kyoto protocol in 2001 and a party of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1995. The first national communication to the UNFCCC stated how Colombian agriculture will be severely impacted under different emission scenarios and time frames. The analyses in this document further support that climate change will severely threaten the socioeconomics of Colombian agriculture. We first query national data sources to characterize the agricultural sector. We then use 17 Global Circulation Model (GCM) outputs to quantify how Colombian agricultural production may be affected by climate change, and show the expected changes to years 2040–2069 ("2050") under the A2 scenario of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES-A2) and the overall trends in both precipitation and temperature to 2100. We then evaluate expected changes within different regions and measure the proportion of area affected within each crop's distributional range. By 2050, climatic change in Colombia will likely impact 3.5 million people, 14 % of national GDP corresponding to agriculture, employment of 21 % of the population, agro-industries, supply chains, and food and nutritional security. If no adaptation measures are taken, 80 % of crops would be impacted in more than 60 % of their current areas of cultivation, with particularly severe impacts in high value perennial and exportable crops. Impacts also include soil degradation and organic matter losses in the Andes hillsides; likely flooding in the Caribbean and Pacific coasts; niche losses for coffee, fruit, cocoa, and bananas; changes in prevalence of pests and diseases; and increases in the vulnerabilities of non-technically developed smallholders. There is, however, still time to change the current levels of vulnerability if a multidisciplinary focus (i.e., agronomic, economic, and social) in vulnerable sectors is undertaken. Each sub-sector and the Government need to invest in: (1) data collection, (2) detailed, regionally-based impact assessments, (3) research and development, and (4) extension and technology transfer. Support to vulnerable smallholders should be given by the state in the form of agricultural insurance systems contextualized under the phenomenon of climate change. A national coordination scheme led by (but not restricted to) the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MADR) with the contributions of national and international institutions is needed to address agricultural adaptation. ; Peer-reviewed
During 2019, an analysis process was carried out on the transformations generated by Local Technical Agroclimatic Committees (Mesas Técnicas Agroclimáticas-MTA in Spanish) in the territories where they have been established in the last six years. The study focuses on observable changes in communities, organizations, or institutions that have modified their actions, relationships, policies, and practices in four Latin American countries. Five transformation areas have been identified: i) greater confidence in the quality of climate and agroclimatic information at the local level; ii) enhanced knowledge, understanding, and connection of agroclimatic information; iii) democratization of climate knowledge; iv) transformations in agricultural practices, and v) political advocacy and institutional transformation. Over 140 outcomes or changes were verified in those areas. It has become evident that the MTAs analyzed have encouraged a closer approach of national meteorological institutions to the needs of territories, which in turn has promoted the creation of local practice communities on the application of climate knowledge in decision-making. Indeed, there is evidence that farmers adapt their production practices making decisions based on information on local climate variability, reducing losses and increasing profitability. It has also been shown that that the development of inter-institutional alliances derived from MTAs in the countries helps to build and strengthen local and national public policies for adaptation to climate change and variability in agriculture. Finally, several opportunities and challenges related to leadership and the sustainability of the MTAs establishment process in Latin America were identified.
This appendix describes more in details the methods used in the WFP - CGIAR project "Assessing the relationship between climate, food security and conflict in Ethiopia and in the Central American Dry Corridor (CADC). Quantitative analysis on the impact of climate variability on conflict in Ethiopia and in the CADC countries." In this study, we investigate the climate-food security-conflict nexus in Ethiopia and the CADC (Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras). Both Ethiopia and the CADC are hotspots of high climate variabilities, high political insecurity, and conflicts and widespread food and nutrition insecurities across their populations.
Conflicts are increasingly analysed as exhibiting a stealth complexity in which triggers and consequences are intricately linked to climate, environmental degradation and the struggle to control a finite pool of natural resources. The climate crisis is a multifaceted reality and, against this background, many pressing priorities compete with each other. The disruptive effect of climate variability and change on food systems is particularly acute and constitutes a direct and tangible threat to livelihoods globally. The objective of this paper is to demonstrate and discuss the importance of food systems under a climate crisis in exacerbating conflicts in the Sahelian region and propose interventions beyond and complementary to the usual military and security solutions. We demonstrate for the Sahel that (i) climate hazards are frequent and exposure to climate variability is high, (ii) hotspots of high climate variability and conflict exist, and (iii) impact pathways by which climate exacerbates food systems that can lead to conflicts are documented in the literature. While these three findings suggest clear links between conflict and climate, we find that (iv) current peace indices do not include climate and food systems indicators and therefore provide an uncomplete picture, and (v) food systems programming for climate adaptation has so far not explicitly considered peace and security outcomes. Furthermore, we propose that food systems programming that truly tackles the climate crisis should take more explicit account of peace and security outcomes in conflict-affected areas.
AbstractConflicts are increasingly analysed as exhibiting a stealth complexity in which triggers and consequences are intricately linked to climate, environmental degradation and the struggle to control a finite pool of natural resources. The climate crisis is a multifaceted reality and, against this background, many pressing priorities compete with each other. The disruptive effect of climate variability and change on food systems is particularly acute and constitutes a direct and tangible threat to livelihoods globally. The objective of this paper is to demonstrate and discuss the importance of food systems under a climate crisis in exacerbating conflicts in the Sahelian region and propose interventions beyond and complementary to the usual military and security solutions. We demonstrate for the Sahel that (i) climate hazards are frequent and exposure to climate variability is high, (ii) hotspots of high climate variability and conflict exist, and (iii) impact pathways by which climate exacerbates food systems that can lead to conflicts are documented in the literature. While these three findings suggest clear links between conflict and climate, we find that (iv) current peace indices do not include climate and food systems indicators and therefore provide an uncomplete picture, and (v) food systems programming for climate adaptation has so far not explicitly considered peace and security outcomes. Furthermore, we propose that food systems programming that truly tackles the climate crisis should take more explicit account of peace and security outcomes in conflict-affected areas.
