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"Lockheed, Atlanta, and the struggle for racial integration tells the story of business/government equal employment opportunity policies by examining Georgia's Lockheed Aircraft, 1950-1990 ... This book connects the local story of workplace desegregation to national narratives of civil rights reform; affirmative action; the role of government and public/private partnerships; and the business reaction to both state intervention in employment generally in the late 70s/1980s and to the emergence of black political power in the same time frame" --

Just what exactly will follow the American century? This is the question Randall L. Schweller explores in his provocative assessment of international politics in the twenty-first century. Schweller considers the future of world politics, correlating our reliance on technology and our multitasking, distracted, disorganized lives with a fragmenting world order. He combines the Greek myth of the Golden Apple of Discord, which explains the start of the Trojan War, with a look at the second law of thermodynamics, or entropy. "In the coming age," Schweller writes, "disorder will reign supreme as the world succumbs to ... entropy, an irreversible process of disorganization that governs the direction of all physical changes taking place in the universe." Interweaving his theory of global disorder with issues on the world stage--coupled with a disquisition on board games and the cell phone app "Angry Birds"--Schweller's thesis yields astonishing insights. Maxwell's Demon and the Golden Apple will appeal to leaders of multinational corporations and government programs as well as instructors of undergraduate courses in international relations. --Provided by publisher.

Why do totalitarian propaganda such as those created in Nazi Germany and the former German Democratic Republic initially succeed, and why do they ultimately fail? Outside observers often make two serious mistakes when they interpret the propaganda of this time. First, they assume the propaganda worked largely because they were supported by a police state, that people cheered Hitler and Honecker because they feared the consequences of not doing so. Second, they assume that propaganda really succeeded in persuading most of the citizenry that the Nuremberg rallies were a reflection of how most G

Why have states throughout history regularly underestimated dangers to their survival? Why have some states been able to mobilize their material resources effectively to balance against threats, while others have not been able to do so? The phenomenon of "underbalancing" is a common but woefully underexamined behavior in international politics. Underbalancing occurs when states fail to recognize dangerous threats, choose not to react to them, or respond in paltry and imprudent ways. It is a response that directly contradicts the core prediction of structural realism's balance-of-power theory--that states motivated to survive as autonomous entities are coherent actors that, when confronted by dangerous threats, act to restore the disrupted balance by creating alliances or increasing their military capabilities, or, in some cases, a combination of both. Consistent with the new wave of neoclassical realist research, "Unanswered Threats" offers a theory of underbalancing based on four domestic-level variables--elite consensus, elite cohesion, social cohesion, and regime/government vulnerability--that channel, mediate, and redirect policy responses to external pressures and incentives. The theory yields five causal schemes for underbalancing behavior, which are tested against the cases of interwar Britain and France, France from 1877 to 1913, and the War of the Triple Alliance (1864-1870) that pitted tiny Paraguay against Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay. Randall Schweller concludes that those most likely to underbalance are incoherent, fragmented states whose elites are constrained by political considerations

"Because such evil lay at the heart of the National Socialist movement, its overwhelming rhetoric has often led to its negative characterization as propaganda. As Randall Bytwerk points out, however, that association was anything but negative in the minds of the leaders of the National Socialist movement. In their view, the clear, simplistic, and even one-sided presentation of information was necessary to effectively mobilize all elements of the German population to the National Socialist program." "Gathered here are thirteen of the key speeches of this historically significant movement, including Hitler's announcement of the party's reestablishment in 1925 following the unsuccessful Beer Hall Putsch, four addresses by Joseph Goebbels, the 1938 Kristallnacht speech by Julius Streicher, and four speeches drafted as models for party leaders' use on various public occasions." "Landmark Speeches of National Socialism is an important volume for students of rhetoric, World War II, Nazi Germany, and the Holocaust."--Jacket

Why have states throughout history regularly underestimated dangers to their survival? Why have some states been able to mobilize their material resources effectively to balance against threats, while others have not been able to do so? The phenomenon of "underbalancing" is a common but woefully underexamined behavior in international politics. Underbalancing occurs when states fail to recognize dangerous threats, choose not to react to them, or respond in paltry and imprudent ways. It is a response that directly contradicts the core prediction of structural realism's balance-of-power theory--that states motivated to survive as autonomous entities are coherent actors that, when confronted by dangerous threats, act to restore the disrupted balance by creating alliances or increasing their military capabilities, or, in some cases, a combination of both. Consistent with the new wave of neoclassical realist research, "Unanswered Threats" offers a theory of underbalancing based on four domestic-level variables--elite consensus, elite cohesion, social cohesion, and regime/government vulnerability--that channel, mediate, and redirect policy responses to external pressures and incentives. The theory yields five causal schemes for underbalancing behavior, which are tested against the cases of interwar Britain and France, France from 1877 to 1913, and the War of the Triple Alliance (1864-1870) that pitted tiny Paraguay against Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay. Randall Schweller concludes that those most likely to underbalance are incoherent, fragmented states whose elites are constrained by political considerations