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ABSTRACTA model of concessional bargaining among farmers explains the success (or lack thereof) of cooperative institutions in rural farm settings in the developing regions. Concessional bargaining in day‐to‐day interactions generates goodwill, which helps smoothen future dealings amongst farmers as well as with outside agents. In particular, we model the existence of goodwill amongst farmers as enhancing their ability to collectively bargain with an outside dealer that buys their farm produce. Results suggest that when dealing with each other, farmers offer higher concessions when the risk of loss or reversal in bargaining power is high; however, the level of concession is also influenced by the degree of reciprocity and parameters that affect bargaining surplus. Findings provide further insights over the success of cooperative institutions in rural farm settings where inter‐farmer goodwill dynamics determines the cooperative's bargaining outcomes. Specifically, when farmers generously reciprocate each other's goodwill gestures, it leads to better outcomes through increasing their cooperative reservation price. In contrast, when the degree of reciprocity is lower, or when the risk of bargaining power switching is higher, farmers extract more surplus from other farmers, and this also lowers the cooperative's bargaining outcomes and makes the cooperative arrangement unviable in the long term.

A conceptual model of entrepreneurial uptake by water-scarce farmers explores how farmers accumulate social and human capitals while managing multiple risks in current and future livelihood choices. Social networking and human capital accumulation differentially impact on successes in agriculture and entrepreneurial ventures. The risk of farm subsidy removal and the uncertainties associated with finding and succeeding in a suitable enterprise, present the farmer with difficult trade-offs in terms of which type of capital to accumulate. Results suggest that in the presence of multiple risks, farmers may act to increase their investments in human capital even when chances of finding a suitable business opportunity are low; whereas in some cases, they may accumulate higher social capital to enhance their farm subsidy support even under better chances of finding suitable business opportunities. Further, an increase in risk of agricultural unviability, by itself, does not automatically lead to farmers shifting to enterprise.

A dynamic model of self insurance and market insurance demand against uncertain natural hazards is developed where agents incur emotional costs when the true information about potential future catastrophes becomes known. Agents purposefully ignore the incoming signals about future hazards in order to avoid finding out the true information. Faced with the emotional costs associated with true information revelation, self-deception through true information avoidance effort may be the optimal strategy to maximize current and future expected utility. Government interventions for complementing private risk mitigation and adaptation through incentives and regulations may have a varying influence on such agents exhibiting emotional costs.

AbstractThis paper explores the impact of salinity on livelihood choices of rural households in south‐western Bangladesh. We find interdependence among households' decisions involving various livelihood choices. High salinity reduces a household's probability of entrepreneurship while those households that stick only to agriculture suffer significant crop losses because of salinity. Households also face a trade‐off between subsistence and entrepreneurial activities, that is, participation in one type of activity reduces the probability of participation in the other. Households with more agricultural land, in fact, benefit from high salinity levels by taking up fisheries related activities, whereas marginal households resort to increasing labour supply. Copyright © 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.