Suchergebnisse

Abstract
When a stimulus is important, the corresponding brain responses increase, especially the P300 brain response. This is true for all kinds of important stimuli, also monetary rewards. In our study, we developed a hypnotic suggestion to reduce the subjective importance of monetary rewards. As successful suggestions do not contain negations, we suggested participants to feel safe during hypnosis instead of suggesting that money is not important anymore. We predicted lower P300 amplitudes when participants feel safe during hypnosis. We tested 24 highly suggestible participants playing a risk game in 2 conditions with monetary rewards while we measured their EEG brain responses. In the safety condition, we induced a hypnotic state and suggested that participants feel safe. In the control condition, participants played the risk game without hypnosis. Here we show that participants felt significantly safer in the safety condition and showed significantly lower P300 amplitudes to monetary rewards. Risk behavior did not differ significantly between conditions. Our results are important for substance use disorders, as decreased P300 responses to substance-related stimuli are associated with less craving and better abstinence. Therefore, we conclude that suggestions to feel safe during hypnosis might work as a treatment for individuals with substance use disorders.

Most analyzes of government instability in parliamentary democracies rests on a standard definition of what counts as a new government. Three criteria are used. A new government exists whenever there is a new Prime Minister, after the occurrence of a general election, and whenever the partisan composition of the government changes. Obviously fruitful in many respects, the definition is problematic if we are interested in the political phenomenon of government stability and instability; governmental durability based on the standard definition of governments is not a valid and useful measure of stability in many parliamentary systems. We argue that this measure from one perspective is too inclusive (not any change in government's partisan composition signifies instability), and from another angle too narrow (focusing almost exclusively on a government as a whole.) We investigate how changes in conceptualization of what constitute new governments, affects the degree of instability in parliamentary democracies. Clearly, definitions make a difference and we demonstrate that countries might be characterized as unstable from one perspective, yet stable from another. Clearly, the commonly used definition of government used to measure government duration inflates instability, at least for some countries. We demonstrate that using more precise definitions of government longevity - ones that do not equate any changes in government's partisan composition as a sign of instability - yield important ramifications for the rank-order of countries' governments instability.

Most analyzes of government instability in parliamentary democracies rests on a standard definition of what counts as a new government. Three criteria are used. A new government exists whenever there is a new Prime Minister, after the occurrence of a general election, and whenever the partisan composition of the government changes. Obviously fruitful in many respects, the definition is problematic if we are interested in the political phenomenon of government stability and instability; governmental durability based on the standard definition of governments is not a valid and useful measure of stability in many parliamentary systems. We argue that this measure from one perspective is too inclusive (not any change in government's partisan composition signifies instability), and from another angle too narrow (focusing almost exclusively on a government as a whole.) We investigate how changes in conceptualization of what constitute new governments, affects the degree of instability in parliamentary democracies. Clearly, definitions make a difference and we demonstrate that countries might be characterized as unstable from one perspective, yet stable from another. Clearly, the commonly used definition of government used to measure government duration inflates instability, at least for some countries. We demonstrate that using more precise definitions of government longevity - ones that do not equate any changes in government's partisan composition as a sign of instability - yield important ramifications for the rank-order of countries' governments instability.