Suchergebnisse

Most European parliaments use the successive procedure to reach decisions. This means that a parliament votes feasible alternatives one-by-one in a pre-determined order until one of them obtains a majority of votes. The paper has two objectives. First, I sketch a simple method making it easy to uncover instances of successful insincere voting under the successive procedure. Second, by focusing on data from one national assembly consistently using this procedure, I demonstrate that insincere or strategic voting is very rare. The finding does not indicate that politicians necessarily behave in a non-strategic or unsophisticated manner. It means only that strategic maneuvers may take place at earlier stages of the decision-making process, for example, in designing the voting agenda. Adapted from the source document.

Scandinavian countries differ with respect to dissolution powers. In Norway, it is not possible to call early elections, while Danish governments have an almost unrestricted right to dissolve parliament & the dissolution power has been quite frequently used. In Sweden, no early election has taken place after the new constitutions were implemented in 1975. Thus, in practice the dissolution power of Swedish governments are limited. This paper has three main purposes. First, I give an overview of constitutional rules regulating early election in 25 parliamentary countries. Second, I trace some of the effects of unlimited dissolution power in the hands of the minority as well as majority governments. Third, I deal with normative questions. Do convincing arguments support unrestricted dissolution power for parliamentary governments? 4 Tables, 3 Figures, 53 References. Adapted from the source document.

Setting the agenda for parliament is the most significant institutional weapon for governments to shape policy outcomes, because governments with significant agenda setting powers, like France or the UK, are able to produce the outcomes they prefer, while governments that lack agenda setting powers, such as the Netherlands and Italy in the beginning of the period examined, see their projects significantly altered by their Parliaments.With a strong comparative framework, this coherent volume examines fourteen countries and provides a detailed investigation into the mechanisms by which

Setting the agenda for parliament is the most significant institutional weapon for governments to shape policy outcomes, because governments with significant agenda setting powers, like France or the UK, are able to produce the outcomes they prefer, while governments that lack agenda setting powers, such as the Netherlands and Italy in the beginning of the period examined, see their projects significantly altered by their Parliaments. With a strong comparative framework, this coherent volume examines fourteen countries and provides a detailed investigation into the mechanisms by which.