In: Wirtschaftspolitische Studien aus den Instituten für Europäische Wirtschaftspolitik und für Industrie- und Gewerbepolitik der Universität Hamburg 67
In: The journal of modern African studies: a quarterly survey of politics, economics & related topics in contemporary Africa, Volume 7, Issue 3, p. 407-424
Thisarticle concerns two important arenas of political competition in Zambia: on the one hand, between parties and, on the other, within the ruling party itself. Competition between political parties exists especially between the United National Independence Party (U.N.I.P.) and two small party rivals, the African National Congress (A.N.C.) and the United Party (U.P.). Many U.N.I.P. officials at various levels have looked forward to the establishment of a one-party state in Zambia, on the familiar grounds that minor opposition parties appeal to parochial loyalties: that they oppose constructive programmes irresponsibly and hamper their implementation: and that political opposition is a luxury which diverts time, energy, and money away from the important tasks of development. In pursuit of its objective of eliminating inter-party competition, U.N.I.P. has generally employed two different sets of tactics, based on different assumptions about the strength and potential of the two minor parties.
Regulatory agencies often delegate responsibility for implementing policy to agencies at lower levels of government. This article models strategic bargaining between New York State regulatory principals at the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) and county landfill agents as an iterated prisoner's dilemma game. Data are drawn from regional DEC and county records over a 7-year period. Local regulatory agents balance local political pressures, career aspirations, and the probability of being caught and punished in deciding whether to cooperate or defect with regional DEC regulators. Regional DEC regulatory principals balance their support from governor and legislature, the importance of the regulatory issue, and the constraints of scarce resources in deciding whether to cooperate or defect with local landfill operators.
Dimension stones, or ornamental stones, are naturally occurring rocks that have properties that make them suitable for decorative exterior and interior use in the building industry. Large parts of Greenland should have a good potential for finding occurrences of valuable dimension stones, and the Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland (GEUS) and Greenland Resources A/S (GRAS) therefore carried out prospecting in several parts of Greenland in the summers of 2001–2004. The project is mainly financed by the Government of Greenland, but recently the European Union and Nuup Kommunea have also contributed.