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Academic discourse on global justice is at an all-time high. Within ethics and international law, scholars are undertaking new inquiries into age-old questions of building a just world order. Ethics – within political and moral philosophy – poses fundamental questions about responsibilities at the global level and produces a tightly reasoned set of frameworks regarding world order. International law, with its focus on legal norms and institutional arrangements, provides a path, as well as illuminates the obstacles, to implementing theories of the right or of the good. Yet despite the complementarity of these two projects, neither is drawing what it should from the other. The result is ethical scholarship that often avoids, or even misinterprets, the law; and law that marginalizes ethics even as it recognizes the importance of justice. The cost of this avoidance is a set of missed opportunities for both fields. This article seeks to help transform the limited dialogue between philosophers and international lawyers into a meaningful collaboration. Through a critical stocktaking of the contributions of the two disciplines, examining where they do and do not engage with the other, it offers an appraisal of the causes and costs of separation and an argument for an interdisciplinary approach.

Offering a new interdisciplinary approach to global justice and integrating the insights of international relations and contemporary ethics, this book asks whether the core norms of international law are just by appraising them according to a standard of global justice grounded in the advancement of peace and protection of human rights

ABSTRACT
A central challenge to the legitimacy of international investment law is its failure to take account of a state's commitments to its people under international human rights law—duties that stand on a special moral plane. The vortex of this challenge is the fair and equitable treatment standard, where tribunals protect the 'legitimate expectations' of investors but disregard these preeminent moral commitments. This article develops a new framework for integrating those commitments into fair and equitable treatment decision-making and treaty-drafting. Deploying an interdisciplinary approach that draws on political philosophy as well as extant law and doctrine, I argue that the current international political morality requires putting human rights on a higher plane than commitments to investors. As a result, tribunals should give great deference to state measures that negatively affect investors if the state justifies them based on its international human rights law obligations and lesser but still significant deference for measures based on encouragements or permissions in international human rights law. It operationalizes this approach for tribunals by recasting the doctrine of legitimate expectations and provides examples of how it would work in specific disputes. This article concludes with suggestions for integrating states' human rights mandates into future investment agreements.

Abstract
International law's duty of non-aggravation requires states to avoid actions that might inflame an international dispute, both to maintain international peace and to preserve the effectiveness of judicial or arbitral proceedings. Yet parties on the receiving end of calls for non-aggravation – whether from the Security Council or a tribunal – have little idea of what conduct they are expected to avoid. This state of affairs is most unfortunate in light of the centrality of this norm to the peaceful resolution of disputes and, in particular, examples of provocative and aggravating acts in recent years. This article attempts to give some meaning to this important, but frustratingly vague, norm of international law. After reviewing current understandings of the duty by political and judicial bodies, it justifies the need for a more specific understanding of non-aggravation. It then develops a set of criteria to distinguish aggravating from non-aggravating acts, a process informed by both existing expectations and the underlying purposes of the norm. Based on these criteria, the article offers a coding scheme of presumptively aggravating and non-aggravating acts. Beyond its relevance for decision-makers, the article seeks to encourage theoretical inquiry into the advantages and disadvantages of vague (or underspecified) norms in the international legal order.