Suchergebnisse

Compared to many other countries in Europe, Estonia managed to curtail the spread of the new coronavirus rather effectively. This paper offers an overview of the measures undertaken to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic in March-May 2020 and explain why Estonia managed to successfully contain the epidemic. The paper argues that the management of the crisis was facilitated by political factors, quick policy learning, cooperation with the scientific community, and the existing ICT and e-government infrastructure. ; Comparada con otros países de Europa, Estonia ha logrado restringir la propagación del coronavirus relativamente bien. Este artículo se propone brindar una visión general de las medidas tomadas entre marzo y mayo del 2020 para enfrentar la crisis de la COVID-19 y explicar por qué Estonia logró contener la epidemia. El artículo argumenta que el manejo de la crisis fue facilitado por factores políticos, por el rápido aprendizaje sobre políticas públicas, por la cooperación con la comunidad científica, y por la infraestructura de tecnologías de comunicación e información y gobierno digital. ; Em comparação com outros países europeus, a Estônia conseguiu reduzir a disseminação do coronavírus de maneira bastante eficaz. Este artigo busca dar uma visão geral das medidas tomadas para enfrentar a crise da COVID-19 entre os meses de março e maio de 2020 e explicar por que a Estônia conseguiu conter a epidemia com sucesso. O artigo argumenta que a gestão da crise foi facilitada por fatores políticos, pela rapidez na aprendizagem de políticas públicas, pela cooperação com a comunidade científica e pela infraestrutura existente de TIC e governo eletrônico.

Abstract Compared to many other countries in Europe, Estonia managed to curtail the spread of the new coronavirus rather effectively. This paper offers an overview of the measures undertaken to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic in March-May 2020 and explain why Estonia managed to successfully contain the epidemic. The paper argues that the management of the crisis was facilitated by political factors, quick policy learning, cooperation with the scientific community, and the existing ICT and e-government infrastructure.

Compared to many other countries in Europe, Estonia managed to curtail the spread of corona virus rather effectively. The goals of this paper are to give an overview of the measures undertaken to tackle the corona-crisis in March-May 2020 and to explain why Estonia managed to successfully contain the epidemic. The paper argues that the management of the crisis was facilitated by political factors, quick policy learning, cooperation with the scientific community, and the existing ICT and e-government infrastructure.

The recent global financial and economic crises, followed by fiscal crisis, have led many governments in Europe to adopt austerity measures in order to cope with the concurrent problems of lower revenues and high public debt. It can be expected that the need to undertake large-scale cutbacks would lead to changes in budgeting practices, budgetary institutions and modes of fiscal governance. Based on the existing literature on fiscal governance and budgeting, it can be conjectured that in response to fiscal stress, the following shifts have taken (or are taking) place in fiscal governance and budgetary institutions: movement from decentralized and bottom-up modes of budget preparation to centralized and top-down modes, adoption of numerical fiscal rules, and the revival of the 'more rational' budgetary decision-making techniques (e.g., performance-based budgeting, results-based budgeting, etc.).

The goal of this article is to analyze the challenges involved in contracting for policy advice with the example of performance budgeting reform in Estonia in 2009-2011. The Estonian Ministry of Finance has sought to prepare a major change in the budgeting system by outsourcing the analytical preparation of different aspects of the reform to various private sector organizations. The case study seeks to identify the challenges and pitfalls involved in contracting for policy and management advice in the area of a major public sector reform. The Estonian experience shows that such a reform strategy can run into serious problems, including fragmented and inconsistent reform plan, limited learning, and high transaction costs. The contractualization of reform preparation has constrained deliberations on the planned changes to the strategic planning and budgeting system among the stakeholders and undermined the democratic legitimacy of the reform. Adapted from the source document.

Unlike most other countries in Europe, which engaged in expansionary fiscal policies in 2009, the government of Estonia followed the opposite path by adopting several austerity packages, combining expenditure cuts and tax increases. This paper explores whether (and to what extent) the theoretical propositions from the literature on political economy of fiscal adjustment that focus on institutional factors are able to explain how it was possible to undertake such extensive fiscal adjustment in Estonia. The case study shows, first, that a coalition government and a minority government are able to achieve fiscal adjustments, especially if there is political commitment to lower the deficit. Second, the study indicates that an externally imposed fiscal rule can act as a major focal point in guiding deficit-reduction efforts. Third, the Estonian case demonstrates that centralised budgetary institutions are conducive to fiscal adjustment and mitigate the problems arising from size fragmentation. Adapted from the source document.

The goal of this article is to analyze the challenges involved in contracting for policy advice with the example of performance budgeting reform in Estonia in 2009–2011. The Estonian Ministry of Finance has sought to prepare a major change in the budgeting system by outsourcing the analytical preparation of different aspects of the reform to various private sector organizations. The case study seeks to identify the challenges and pitfalls involved in contracting for policy and management advice in the area of a major public sector reform. The Estonian experience shows that such a reform strategy can run into serious problems, including fragmented and inconsistent reform plan, limited learning, and high transaction costs. The contractualization of reform preparation has constrained deliberations on the planned changes to the strategic planning and budgeting system among the stakeholders and undermined the democratic legitimacy of the reform.

The goal of this article is to examine to what extent legislators in Estonia use performance information in budgetary decision‐making. Interviews with the members of the finance committee of the parliament show that legislators make only limited use of the formal documents containing performance information. Instead, they rely, for the most part, on informal social networks for gathering information they consider necessary for budget discussions. According to the legislators, the main reasons for limited use of performance information are the following: the documents containing performance are too long and cumbersome, the legislative budget process is too time‐constrained, and the parliament has only a limited role in making substantive changes to the budget. The study also indicates that more experienced politicians are less interested in performance information than the novices but there are no significant differences between legislators from governing and opposition parties.

This article examines the evolution of budgetary institutions in Estonia between 1993 and 2008, with a main focus on rules governing the preparation, adoption, and implementation of the state budget. It discusses the initial choice of budgetary institutions in 1993 and subsequent developments in the light of theoretical propositions put forth by the fiscal governance literature. The case of Estonia poses a number of puzzles, and the article seeks to explain the institutional choices in Estonia: Why did the coalition government opt for a delegation mode of fiscal governance in 1993? Why has the preparation phase of the budget process evolved toward a contracts approach from 1994 onward, while the adoption phase has moved closer to a delegation mode? The article demonstrates that alongside government type, institutional choices can be influenced by lesson‐drawing from history, examples of other countries, and negative experiences gained in legislative budget process.