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East Asia has emerged over the last decade as the most active site for the negotiation of regional inter-governmental collaboration. The primary focus has been on trade but, in the wake of the financial crises, governments have also engaged in historically unprecedented collaboration in several areas of finance. Multiple factors have driven this new regional engagement. Although the agreements have been primarily economic in their focus, the primary motivation for many of them has been to secure diplomatic or strategic gains. The aggregate benefits from the agreements are likely to be limited given the low levels of tariffs and the availability of provisions that facilitate the intra-regional exchange of components. They may, however, be of significant interest to producers of specific products either because they provide advantage over competitors (or remove the advantage that competitors through agreements that their governments have signed). The trade agreements thus often reflect particularistic interests that governments have been enlisted to champion.

The proliferation of regional economic agreements involving East Asian economies in the years since the financial crises is usually explained in the political economy literature by reference to economic factors. These agreements have been viewed either as a response to the costs of increasing interdependence and/or to the demand by domestic exporters to level the playing field when their rivals benefit from preferential trade agreements. A detailed examination of economic data finds no support, however, for the argument that intra-regional economic interdependence in East Asia has increased significantly since the financial crises. Case studies suggest that business has not played a major role in either promoting or opposing the agreements - not surprisingly in that the agreements are unlikely to have a major economic impact, and are not being widely used. Rather than there being an 'economic domino' effect at work, the new East Asian regionalism is best understood as being driven by a 'political domino' effect.

The relationship between economics and security remains relatively unexplored, particularly in the Asia-Pacific context. The articles in this special section of the journal seek to broaden our comprehension of various dimensions of this relationship. One

East Asian governments have long recognized that national security must incorporate a reduction of their vulnerability to the disruption of essential imports. The rapid economic growth of China and India has intensified competition for increasingly scarce resources, elevating resource security once again to the top of the international agenda. Issues that were previously regarded as 'technical' have been 'securitized' as state elites perceived possible conflicts over availability and pricing of natural resources as threats to national security.International institutions have the potential to contribute to the defusing of tensions over the supply of commodities by providing, through various means, assurances regarding the behaviour of partners. Only the global institutions concerned with commodities trade, the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), have legally binding arrangements and the authority to impose sanctions on states that fail to comply with their obligations. But both have weaknesses: the IEA's membership is limited; the WTO's rules relating to raw materials trade are far from comprehensive. Most of the regional institutions in this field seldom go beyond information exchange or the setting of aspirational targets. At the bilateral level, government attempts to enhance resource security through minerals chapters in preferential trade agreements have had little success. Bilateral investment treaties are the only instances of cooperation at the sub-global level that incorporate legally-binding provisions.The cooperation on resources issues in which countries have engaged has reflected the core characteristics of Asia-Pacific bilateral and regional intergovernmental institutions. The shallowness of cooperation reflects perceptions on the part of state elites that their interests in the resources sector are best served by national rather than collective action and that current cooperative arrangements fail to provide sufficient incentives to prevent states from succumbing to opportunistic behaviour in the event of a short-term clash of interests. The potential gains to be made from a cooperative approach to resource security remain largely unrealized.

The proliferation of regional economic agreements involving East Asian economies in the years since the financial crises is usually explained in the political economy literature by reference to economic factors. These agreements have been viewed either as a response to the costs of increasing interdependence and/or to the demand by domestic exporters to level the playing field when their rivals benefit from preferential trade agreements. A detailed examination of economic data finds no support, however, for the argument that intra-regional economic interdependence in East Asia has increased significantly since the financial crises. Case studies suggest that business has not played a major role in either promoting or opposing the agreements - not surprisingly in that the agreements are unlikely to have a major economic impact, and are not being widely used. Rather than there being an 'economic domino' effect at work, the new East Asian regionalism is best understood as being driven by a 'political domino' effect.

Since the turn of the century the Asia-Pacific region has become the most active location for the negotiation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) - a dramatic change from the period before the financial crises of 1997-98. Substantial variance in scope exists among the more than 80 PTAs currently being implemented, negotiated or which are under study in the region. Those involving the United States are by far the most comprehensive. At the other end of the spectrum are those involving ASEAN and China, which are largely 'aspirational' in their provisions. This variance points to the range of economic and political objectives that PTAs serve. Regardless of the comprehensiveness of their coverage, the overall economic effects of the new PTAs is likely to be small given the prevailing low level of tariffs, the intervention of other factors such as fluctuating exchange rates, the proliferation of agreements (which removes the advantages they accord individual partners), and the unwillingness of governments to liberalise 'sensitive' sectors. Few of the agreements move substantially beyond existing WTO provisions. The proliferation of PTAs not only has tended to shift attention and resources away from negotiations at the global level but also runs the risk of fragmenting the 'pro-liberalisation' coalition in countries that have signed multiple agreements.

East Asia has emerged over the last decade as the most active site for the negotiation of regional inter-governmental collaboration. The primary focus has been on trade but, in the wake of the financial crises, governments have also engaged in historically unprecedented collaboration in several areas of finance. Multiple factors have driven this new regional engagement. Although the agreements have been primarily economic in their focus, the primary motivation for many of them has been to secure diplomatic or strategic gains. The aggregate benefits from the agreements are likely to be limited given the low levels of tariffs and the availability of provisions that facilitate the intra-regional exchange of components. They may, however, be of significant interest to producers of specific products either because they provide advantage over competitors (or remove the advantage that competitors through agreements that their governments have signed). The trade agreements thus often reflect particularistic interests that governments have been enlisted to champion.

East Asian governments have long recognized that national security must incorporate a reduction of their vulnerability to the disruption of essential imports. The rapid economic growth of China and India has intensified competition for increasingly scarce resources, elevating resource security once again to the top of the international agenda. Issues that were previously regarded as 'technical' have been 'securitized' as state elites perceived possible conflicts over availability and pricing of natural resources as threats to national security.International institutions have the potential to contribute to the defusing of tensions over the supply of commodities by providing, through various means, assurances regarding the behaviour of partners. Only the global institutions concerned with commodities trade, the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), have legally binding arrangements and the authority to impose sanctions on states that fail to comply with their obligations. But both have weaknesses: the IEA's membership is limited; the WTO's rules relating to raw materials trade are far from comprehensive. Most of the regional institutions in this field seldom go beyond information exchange or the setting of aspirational targets. At the bilateral level, government attempts to enhance resource security through minerals chapters in preferential trade agreements have had little success. Bilateral investment treaties are the only instances of cooperation at the sub-global level that incorporate legally-binding provisions.The cooperation on resources issues in which countries have engaged has reflected the core characteristics of Asia-Pacific bilateral and regional intergovernmental institutions. The shallowness of cooperation reflects perceptions on the part of state elites that their interests in the resources sector are best served by national rather than collective action and that current cooperative arrangements fail to provide sufficient incentives to prevent states from succumbing to opportunistic behaviour in the event of a short-term clash of interests. The potential gains to be made from a cooperative approach to resource security remain largely unrealized.

Since the turn of the century the Asia-Pacific region has become the most active location for the negotiation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) - a dramatic change from the period before the financial crises of 1997-98. Substantial variance in scope exists among the more than 80 PTAs currently being implemented, negotiated or which are under study in the region. Those involving the United States are by far the most comprehensive. At the other end of the spectrum are those involving ASEAN and China, which are largely 'aspirational' in their provisions. This variance points to the range of economic and political objectives that PTAs serve. Regardless of the comprehensiveness of their coverage, the overall economic effects of the new PTAs is likely to be small given the prevailing low level of tariffs, the intervention of other factors such as fluctuating exchange rates, the proliferation of agreements (which removes the advantages they accord individual partners), and the unwillingness of governments to liberalise 'sensitive' sectors. Few of the agreements move substantially beyond existing WTO provisions. The proliferation of PTAs not only has tended to shift attention and resources away from negotiations at the global level but also runs the risk of fragmenting the 'pro-liberalisation' coalition in countries that have signed multiple agreements.

The Asia-Pacific region is home to a large and rapidly growing number of preferential trade agreements (PTAs). These agreements differ widely in design, scope and purpose. The "noodle bowl" that has resulted runs the risk of distorting investment and trade. Neither global institutions (the WTO) nor regional institutions such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) grouping have successfully addressed these issues. Amidst this increasingly messy situation, the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement stands out for a range of important economic and political reasons, not least of which is its potential to take existing PTAs in the Asia-Pacific region in a new direction. The aim of the TPP negotiators is to produce a comprehensive, high quality, multi-party agreement to tame the tangle of PTAs and be a potential stepping stone to achieving the goal of liberalizing regional trade on a non-discriminatory basis. The economic gains from removing border barriers among the countries involved in the initial TPP negotiations are likely to be limited, however, given the small size of many of the economies and the existing PTAs among them. To date, the US has been unwilling to offer a single set of arrangements for all TPP partners, preferring to build on existing bilateral agreements. Pessimism about the immediate results from the TPP should be tempered, however, by considerations of the dynamics that it might set in train; on the other hand, it has the potential to divide the region and exacerbate China's concerns about "containment".

When the talks for a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) were launched in 2010, there appeared to be a coincidence of interests between the American and Australian governments in negotiating a high-quality, '21st-century' trade arrangement that would multilat

China was a latecomer to the preferential trading bandwagon that has swept East Asia in the years since the financial crises. The Chinese government was unwilling to go down the path of negotiating bilateral and minilateral agreements until the terms of its accession to the World Trade Organization were finalized. Since then, it has become one of the most active participants in the negotiation of preferential trading arrangements, currently being engaged in negotiations with more than 20 countries. The paper will address the following questions about China's move to preferential trade: (a) What forces are driving China's approach to the negotiation of preferential trade agreements? (b) To what extent is it possible to untangle economic and political motivations in China's choice of partners for PTA negotiations? And, which economic interests are being pursued most aggressively? (c) How are conflicting domestic interests reconciled in the policy-making process? (d) To what extent will the new PTAs facilitate Chinese-dominated production networks in the regions? (e) What overall impact will the PTAs have on the Chinese economy?

While the global financial crisis (GFC) precipitated stagnation in the United States and throughout most of Europe, Asia escaped largely unscathed (and notably suffered less economic damage than during the Asian financial crises of a decade earlier). In this article, we examine how the GFC has affected Asian states' attitudes towards and participation in regional and global institutions. The GFC produced a significant disjunction in Asia's inter-governmental relations in finance and trade at both the regional and global levels, most notably manifested in the multilateralisation of the Chiang Mai Initiative, and Asia's new role in global economic governance courtesy of its representation in the G20. However, substantial continuities are also evident in the divided interests of Asian countries: these not only threaten the effectiveness of regional cooperation but continue to prevent the region from effectively exercising its collective economic weight in global forums

The Asia-Pacific region is home to a large and rapidly growing number of preferential trade agreements (PTAs). These agreements differ widely in design, scope and purpose. The "noodle bowl" that has resulted runs the risk of distorting investment and trade. Neither global institutions (the WTO) nor regional institutions such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) grouping have successfully addressed these issues. Amidst this increasingly messy situation, the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement stands out for a range of important economic and political reasons, not least of which is its potential to take existing PTAs in the Asia-Pacific region in a new direction. The aim of the TPP negotiators is to produce a comprehensive, high quality, multi-party agreement to tame the tangle of PTAs and be a potential stepping stone to achieving the goal of liberalizing regional trade on a non-discriminatory basis. The economic gains from removing border barriers among the countries involved in the initial TPP negotiations are likely to be limited, however, given the small size of many of the economies and the existing PTAs among them. To date, the US has been unwilling to offer a single set of arrangements for all TPP partners, preferring to build on existing bilateral agreements. Pessimism about the immediate results from the TPP should be tempered, however, by considerations of the dynamics that it might set in train; on the other hand, it has the potential to divide the region and exacerbate China's concerns about "containment".

China was a latecomer to the preferential trading bandwagon that has swept East Asia in the years since the financial crises. The Chinese government was unwilling to go down the path of negotiating bilateral and minilateral agreements until the terms of its accession to the World Trade Organization were finalized. Since then, it has become one of the most active participants in the negotiation of preferential trading arrangements, currently being engaged in negotiations with more than 20 countries. The paper will address the following questions about China's move to preferential trade: (a) What forces are driving China's approach to the negotiation of preferential trade agreements? (b) To what extent is it possible to untangle economic and political motivations in China's choice of partners for PTA negotiations? And, which economic interests are being pursued most aggressively? (c) How are conflicting domestic interests reconciled in the policy-making process? (d) To what extent will the new PTAs facilitate Chinese-dominated production networks in the regions? (e) What overall impact will the PTAs have on the Chinese economy?