Suchergebnisse

TheNordic countries are no longer characterized by a stable five‐party system. Not only have smallChristian parties andGreen parties emerged in most countries, so‐called 'populist radical right parties' have also been increasingly successful in recent decades. This article examines to what extent the populist radical right parties in theNordic countries represent a new party family. Based on various and original data, including archive material, interviews with key representatives, party manifestos and expert surveys, the processes of deciding party names, the development of transnational linkages and ideological transformation are analyzed. The article demonstrates that even though theDanishPeople'sParty, theTrueFinns and theSwedenDemocrats have different historical legacies, they have converged ideologically (i.e., socioeconomically centrist and socioculturally authoritarian), adopted similar names and are on the verge of becoming a more formalized transnational actor. TheProgressParty inNorway is better seen as a hybrid between a populist radical right party and a more traditional conservative party. The findings challenge several classifications in the extensive literature on populist radical right parties. Most importantly, theTrueFinns should be included as a populist radical right party, whereas theNorwegian party should be treated more carefully. Furthermore,Nordic populist radical right parties are no longer – if they have ever been – so‐called 'neoliberal populists'. Finally, the findings suggest a re‐freezing of theNordic party systems in which a phase of divergence has been replaced by a phase of convergence.

This paper engages in a comparative analysis of the economic positions of radical right-wing populist parties in Western Europe. Following Ennser-Jedenastik (), we argue that those parties' political economy is best captured in terms of the nativist, populist and authoritarian features of their core ideology, each of which produces a specific set of economic policies independent from the issue of government intervention in the economy. On basis of an analysis of the election manifestos of seven radical right-wing populist parties in Western Europe in the period 2005-2015, we argue that those parties share similarities in their economic nativism, authoritarianism and populism, whilst their positions on the traditional role of the state in the economy are more diverse. The findings indicate also a unified nativist' response to the global financial crisis both in terms of welfare chauvinism and economic protectionism. We discuss the role of internal and external factors in explaining the economic profile of radical right-wing populist parties.