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Several studies have established the existence of religious–secular divisions in Canadians' party preferences in recent elections. Previous research assumes that such differences arose with the emergence of issues often described as part of a culture war between religious and secular at the end of the twentieth century. This study, however, shows that such divisions are of older provenance. Using surveys of voters conducted in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s and controlling for the potential impact of opinions on culture-war issues, the results seen here demonstrate that the religious–secular divide is older than previously believed and not rooted in the proverbial culture wars. This suggests that the religious–secular divide in Canadian politics reflects an even more fundamental and long-standing tension between religious and secular authority.

Arguing that religious diversity creates incentives for political cooperation, recent research questions the assumption that religious diversity leads to more fragmented party systems and finds a negative association between religious diversity and the fragmentation of vote shares. Before this revisionist perspective can be believed, however, we need to observe the causal processes linking religious diversity and party system fragmentation. One of these is that religious diversity is negatively associated with the number of religious parties contesting elections. Using data counting the number of religious parties in elections around the world between 2011 and 2015, the analysis shows that religious diversity is negatively associated with the number of religious parties. In line with the revisionist perspective, these results suggest that religious diversity creates incentives for political cooperation that lead elites to cooperate across religious group lines in support of parties representing their shared political interests.

The literature examining the number of parties cross‐nationally has focused extensively on the impact of electoral systems; the study of social cleavages is, by comparison, less well developed. While a sizeable body of research has examined the effects of ethnic and other measures of diversity, other cleavages have received less attention. This article focuses on the impact of socioeconomic development—reflecting class and urban‐rural cleavages—on party system fragmentation. Examining a large cross‐national dataset, the analysis shows that, in line with the expectations of social cleavage theory and independently of other social cleavage variables, socioeconomic development is associated with higher levels of party system fragmentation.

The literature examining the number of parties cross‐nationally has focused extensively on the impact of electoral systems; the study of social cleavages is, by comparison, less well developed. While a sizeable body of research has examined the effects of ethnic and other measures of diversity, other cleavages have received less attention. This article focuses on the impact of socioeconomic development—reflecting class and urban‐rural cleavages—on party system fragmentation. Examining a large cross‐national dataset, the analysis shows that, in line with the expectations of social cleavage theory and independently of other social cleavage variables, socioeconomic development is associated with higher levels of party system fragmentation.

While recent studies suggest the party loyalties of Members of Parliament (MPs) influence voting behaviour on free votes independently of personal preferences, it remains to be seen to what extent party loyalties influence MPs' voting behaviour more generally. To this end, this paper examines the impact of the partisan context of the vote on the effects of party loyalties. Using data from 20 divisions decided largely as free votes and controlling for personal preferences using a survey measuring MPs' attitudes, the analysis shows that the effect of party loyalty on voting behaviour is strongest under the most partisan conditions: when the outcome is anticipated to be close and most consequential to the success/failure of a bill. These findings suggest party loyalty effects may emerge on other highly partisan divisions with partisan consequences, and not appear on less partisan divisions.

Research focusing on several post-communist countries has found evidence of social cleavage effects on political behaviour similar to those found in Western Europe. In some post-communist countries, however, social cleavage effects appear far weaker (if at all). To understand why this is the case, I perform a case study of Romania, focusing on the religious-secular cleavage. Drawing upon research that emphasises the role of parties in forming cleavages, I argue that the reason for the absence of social cleavage effects is due to party competition for the same group of voters by parties from opposing ends of the ideological spectrum. By shifting their positions, some parties have prevented the appearance of cleavages by shaping individuals' perceptions of the parties and, in doing so, have even altered individuals' own left-right self-placements. Adapted from the source document.

Research focusing on several post-communist countries has found evidence of social cleavage effects on political behaviour similar to those found in Western Europe. In some post-communist countries, however, social cleavage effects appear far weaker (if at all). To understand why this is the case, I perform a case study of Romania, focusing on the religious–secular cleavage. Drawing upon research that emphasises the role of parties in forming cleavages, I argue that the reason for the absence of social cleavage effects is due to party competition for the same group of voters by parties from opposing ends of the ideological spectrum. By shifting their positions, some parties have prevented the appearance of cleavages by shaping individuals' perceptions of the parties and, in doing so, have even altered individuals' own left–right self-placements.

Research focusing on several post-communist countries has found evidence of social cleavage effects on political behaviour similar to those found in Western Europe. In some post-communist countries, however, social cleavage effects appear far weaker (if at all). To understand why this is the case, I perform a case study of Romania, focusing on the religious—secular cleavage. Drawing upon research that emphasises the role of parties in forming cleavages, I argue that the reason for the absence of social cleavage effects is due to party competition for the same group of voters by parties from opposing ends of the ideological spectrum. By shifting their positions, some parties have prevented the appearance of cleavages by shaping individuals' perceptions of the parties and, in doing so, have even altered individuals' own left—right self-placements.

Conventional wisdom on party systems in advanced industrial democracies holds that modern electorates are dealigned and that social cleavages no longer structure party politics. Recent work on class cleavages has challenged this stylized fact. The analysis performed here extends this criticism to the religious-secular cleavage. Using path analysis and comparing the current electorates of the United States, Germany, and Great Britain with the early 1960s, this paper demonstrates that the religious-secular cleavage remains or has become a significant predictor of conservative vote choice. While the effects of the religious-secular cleavage on vote choice have become largely indirect, the total of the direct and indirect effects is substantial and equivalent to the effects of class and status. Examines the religious-secular cleavage against dealignment arguments. Addresses endogeneity problems in previous literature regarding religiosity effects. Finds that religiosity effects on vote choice remain significant over time. Relative to more proximate vote choice predictors, religiosity effects are sizable. Findings contradict dealignment; social identities still politically relevant. [Copyright Elsevier Ltd.]

Conventional wisdom on party systems in advanced industrial democracies holds that modern electorates are dealigned and that social cleavages no longer structure party politics. Recent work on class cleavages has challenged this stylized fact. The analysis performed here extends this criticism to the religious-secular cleavage. Using path analysis and comparing the current electorates of the United States, Germany, and Great Britain with the early 1960s, this paper demonstrates that the religious-secular cleavage remains or has become a significant predictor of conservative vote choice. While the effects of the religious-secular cleavage on vote choice have become largely indirect, the total of the direct and indirect effects is substantial and equivalent to the effects of class and status. Examines the religious-secular cleavage against dealignment arguments. Addresses endogeneity problems in previous literature regarding religiosity effects. Finds that religiosity effects on vote choice remain significant over time. Relative to more proximate vote choice predictors, religiosity effects are sizable. Findings contradict dealignment; social identities still politically relevant. [Copyright Elsevier Ltd.]