Suchergebnisse

Intro -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- Abbreviations -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 The Carry Trade and the Banking School -- 1.2 A British Bank Is Run with Precision? -- 1.3 Current Research in Economic History -- 1.4 The Monetary Thought of the Non-conformist Conscience -- 1.5 Re-introducing the Banking School -- Notes -- 2 Peel's Economic-Policy Regime Change in Britain During the Early Nineteenth Century -- 2.1 Peel's Policies -- 2.2 Opening up Trade -- 2.3 Currency -- 2.4 Interest Rates -- 2.5 Conclusion -- Notes -- 3 The Ideas and Policies of the Banking School -- 3.1 The Banking School as a Reaction Against Peel's Policies -- 3.2 The Banking School and Interest Rates -- 3.3 Testing the Banking School's Theories with Charts -- 3.4 Testing the Banking School's Theories with Econometrics -- 3.5 Summary of Conclusions -- Notes -- 4 The Crises of 1825 and 1837-1839 -- 4.1 1825: An Overview of the First Crisis of the Gold Standard Era -- 4.2 The Run-Up to the 1825 Crisis -- 4.3 The Bullion Drain of 1810 -- 4.4 The Drain of 1816-1818 -- 4.5 The Drain of 1825 -- 4.6 The Wider Consequences of the 1825 Crisis -- 4.7 The Crises of 1837-1839 -- 4.8 The Effect of the Slavery Abolition Act of 1833 -- 4.9 The Two Schools and the 1830s Crises -- 4.10 Consequences of the 1830s Crises -- Notes -- 5 The 1847 Crises -- 5.1 An Overview of the Crises -- 5.2 The First Phase of the Crisis -- 5.3 The Second Phase of the Crisis -- 5.4 The Consequences of the Crisis -- Notes -- 6 The 1857-1858 Crisis -- 6.1 The Currency School's and Banking School's Ideas in the 1850s -- 6.2 An Overview of the 1857-1858 Crisis -- 6.3 Bullion Flows to France and the Continent -- 6.4 Capital Flows and the United States -- 6.5 Capital Flows to Egypt, India and China -- 6.6 The Worst Period of the Crisis -- 6.7 The Consequences of the Crisis -- Notes.

Chapter 1. Introduction -- Chapter 2. Peel's economic-policy regime change in Britain during the early nineteenth century -- Chapter 3. The ideas and policies of the Banking School -- Chapter 4. The crises of 1825 and 1837 -- Chapter 5. The 1847 Crises -- Chapter 6. The 1857-58 crisis, etc.

This book exposes, for the first time in modern scholarship, the role that the rise of the Carry Trade played in British financial crises between 1825 and 1866, how in reaction the Bank of England improved its management of monetary policy after 1866 and how those lessons have been forgotten since the 1970s. Britain is one of the few major capitalist economies in the world to have avoided policy-induced systemic financial crises for more than 100 years of its historybetween 1866 and 1973. Beforehand, it suffered a series of serious banking panics, in 1825, 1837, 1847, 1857-58 and 1866. Since the 1970s banking instability has returned again, with the global financial crisis of 2007-09 hitting Britain hard. Economists and policymakers have asked what can be learnt from Britains experience of the disappearance and reappearance of crises to help efforts to prevent future ones. This book answers that question with a major reassessment of Britains financial history over the past two centuries. It does so by applying the long-neglected ideas of the British Banking School to explain how crises can occur because of the Carry Trade. This book is essential reading for economists and historians of modern Britain, practitioners and policymakers, as well as anyone who is affected by financial crises and their consequences. Charles Read is a British Academy Postdoctoral Fellow in History and an Affiliated Lecturer in Economics and History at the University of Cambridge. He is also a Fellow, Tutor, College Lecturer and Director of Studies at Corpus Christi College and a Research Associate at the Centre for Financial History at Darwin College. His previous research has won the Thirsk-Feinstein PhD Dissertation Prize, the T.S. Ashton Prize, and the New Researcher Prize of the Economic History Society and a prize from the International Economic History Association for the best doctoral dissertation completed in 2015, 2016 or 2017. He has also worked as a writer and editor at The Economist and as a research associate at an investment bank in London.

Scholars have long debated whether there was enough food in Ireland to feed the population during the Great Irish Famine; there has been less detailed examination of high-frequency data to understand how markets distributed food after the harvests failed. This article explores a hitherto unused weekly price and quantity data set from the Cork city markets to analyse how markets may have hindered the distribution of available food from 1846 to 1849. Although, historically, economists have long suspected that raw data on the market for potatoes during the Irish Famine behaved like that for a classical 'Giffen' good, there is little evidence for this among foodstuffs available throughout the crisis in Cork. But bacon pigs – a food that never reached a stable equilibrium but completely disappeared from the market in 1847 – exhibited some characteristics which do not appear to accord with the classical law of demand. Further analysis of this data suggests that middle-class purchasing power outbid the poorest people in Ireland at a time when there was a surplus of superior foods and a deficiency of inferior foods. These circumstances indicate that unusual market behaviour may have made the crop failure's redistributive consequences – as well as its mortality toll – much worse.

The decision in 1847 to cut Treasury spending on public relief efforts during the Irish famine is generally attributed by economic historians to the pervasive influence of 'laissez‐faire' ideas on the Whig government of Lord John Russell. This article draws on the papers of political leaders and contemporary financial information to argue that economic reasons were the trigger for the change in policy. Robert Peel and Charles Wood's macroeconomic policies of the 1840s, including the gold standard, the Bank Charter Act, and corn law repeal, left the Whigs unable to borrow to finance relief efforts in Ireland without panicking markets. The scaling back of public assistance programmes that resulted from this—and which increased mortality at the height of the Irish famine—was the unintended result of Peel and Wood's economic policies, in the context of the Whig government's parliamentary weakness.

"Dr. Read served as a flight surgeon aboard HMS Nabob, the first aircraft carrier crewed mainly by Canadians as part of the Royal Navy. We believe that this is the first memoir published that will focus on the experience of the crew. Most of the material written about the vessel has been based around the ship's specifications, rather than those who served. The book describes Dr. Read's determination to be a member of the crew as well as his perceptions on the crewmen and wartime England. The memoir concludes with the ship's participation in the attack on the Tirpitz, where it was torpedoed by U-354. Those fascinated in the naval history of the Second World War and Canadian naval history will be particularly interested by his account of the ship's torpedoing and recovery operations. His criticisms of the ship's Captain Nelson Lay are likely to cause a re-evaluation of the captain's actions."--

At head of title: Printed and circulated by the South Australian Town Planning and Housing Association. New Zealand Town Planning Conference and Exhibition, 1st, Wellington, 1919. ; Caption title. ; "Brief selected bibliography": p. 7. ; Mode of access: Internet.