Suchergebnisse

Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- Preface and Acknowledgements -- 0 Introduction: Thinking Through Wittgenstein -- 1 The Philosopher and Temptation: Wittgenstein's Augustinian Opening Move -- 2 "It is as You Please": PI 16 as an Icon of Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Freedom -- 3 What is (Wittgenstein's Own Account of) Meaning?: PI 43 and its Critics -- 4 When Wittgenstein Speaks of ' Everyday' Language, he Means Simply Language: A Liberatory Reading of PI 95-124 -- 5 Objects of Comparison to the Real (Philosophical?) Discovery: PI 130-133 -- 6 Wittgenstein Dissolves the Know-how vs Knowledge-that Debate: PI 149-151 -- 7 Logical Existentialism?: An Approach to PI 186 -- 8 The Faux-Freedom of Nonsense: Kripke's Wittgenstein and Wittgenstein's Wittgenstein at PI 198-201 -- 9 Overcoming Over-Reliance on 'the Bedrock'?: On PI 217 -- 10 The Anti-'Private-Language' Considerations as a Fraternal and Freeing Ethic: Towards a Re-Reading of PI 284-309 -- 11 Conclusion: (A) Liberating Philosophy -- Bibliography -- Index.

Finlayson argues that 'post-truth' is nothing new. In this response, I motivate a more modest position: that it is something new, to some extent, albeit neither radically new nor brand new.
I motivate this position by examining the case of climate-change-denial, called by some post-truth before 'post-truth'.
I examine here the (over-determined) nature of climate-denial. What precisely are its attractions?; How do they manage to outweigh its glaring, potentially-catastrophic downsides? I argue that the most crucial of all attractions of climate-denial is that it involves the denier in a kind of fantasised power over reality itself: namely, over the nature of our planetary system, and thus of life itself. Climate-denial pretends to give the denier a power greater than that of nature, including in nature's 'rebellion' against humanity, what James Lovelock calls Gaia's incipient and coming 'fever'.
Climate-denial seems to give the denier freedom from truth itself, in the case of the most consequential truth at present bearing down upon humanity. The most crucial of all the attractions of climate-denial is then that it provides would-be libertarians an ultimate freedom. They reject the reality of human-triggered climate-change, in the end, because they are unwilling to be 'bound' by anything, not even truth itself.
Climate-denial has been around for a while, but not for more than 30-35 years or so. I thus suggest that Finlayson is right to be sceptical of the claim that post-truth is radically new and extremely recent, but I suggest that it is relativelynew and has been with us for only about a generation or at most two.
Keywords: climate-change, climate-denial, libertarianism, Nietzsche, Wittgenstein

There is a widespread (if rarely voiced) assumption, among those who dare to understand the futurewhich climate chaos is likely to yield, that civility will give way and a Hobbesian war of all against all will be unleashed. Thankfully, this assumption is highly questionable. The field of 'Disaster Studies', as shown in Rebecca Solnit's A Paradise Built in Hell, makes clear that it is at least as likely that, tested in the crucible of backto- back disasters, humanity will rise to the challenge, and we will find ourselves manifesting a truer humanity than we currently think ourselves to have. Thus the post-sustainability world will offer us a tremendous gift amidst the carnage. But how well we realise this gift depends on our preparing the way for it. In order to prepare, the fantasy of sustainable development needs to be jettisoned, along with the bargain-making mentality underpinning it. Instead, the inter-personal virtues of generosity, fraternity and care-taking need fostering. One role a philosophically informed deep reframing can play in this process of virtuous preparation for disaster is in helping people to understand that, in order to care for their children, they need to care for their children in turn, and so on, ad infinitum.

This short paper is a note offering provisional results of my current research in philosophical economics and the philosophy of economics. It is offered in the spirit of promoting discussion of an interesting topic worthy of further investigation.

The author argues that Fuller's book, with the single exception of its correct reinterpretation of Kuhn as no apostle of postmodernism—such that his "fans" and "foes" alike are boxing with (or cheering on) only a shadow Kuhn—is worse than worthless. For, in a disreputable and outright propagandistic fashion, it consists in a series of serious distortions of and outright falsehoods about Kuhn and recent philosophy of science, distortions and falsehoods which may well mislead the unwary reader. Nickles' s collection by contrast is a competent, useful, and workmanlike performance, although the author argues that the editor's focus on cognitive science uses of Kuhn (and of Wittgenstein) is unhelpful, in that these uses again distort the philosophy of Kuhn (as of Wittgenstein), who was on balance no apostle of cognitive science either.