Suchergebnisse

We use a unique question from the Irish Labour Force Survey that captures the reasons for workers being paid below the minimum wage. Compared to existing work, this allows us to more precisely identify sub-minimum wage workers. We find that 5.6 percent of minimum wage workers are paid below the minimum wage for reasons other than those permitted under legislation. This is considerably lower than estimates reported in the existing literature.

We use a unique question from the Irish Labour Force Survey that captures the reasons for workers being paid below the minimum wage. Compared to existing work, this allows us to more precisely identify sub-minimum wage workers. We find that 5.6 percent of minimum wage workers are paid below the minimum wage for reasons other than those permitted under legislation. This is considerably lower than estimates reported in the existing literature.

The term skill mismatch is very broad and can relate to many forms of labour market friction, including vertical mismatch, skill gaps, skill shortages, field of study (horizontal) mismatch and skill obsolescence. In this paper we provide a clear overview of each concept and discuss the measurement and inter-relatedness of different forms of mismatch. We present a comprehensive analysis of the current position of the literature on skills mismatch and highlight areas which are relatively underdeveloped and may warrant further research. Using data from the European Skills and Jobs Survey, we assess the incidence of various combinations of skills mismatch across the EU. Finally, we review the European Commission's country specific recommendations and find that skills mismatch, when referring to underutilised human capital in the form of overeducation and skills underutilisation, receives little policy attention. In cases where skills mismatch forms part of policy recommendations, the policy advice is either vague or addresses the areas of mismatch for which there is the least available evidence.

This article examines the extent to which electoral selection based on candidate quality alone can account for the pattern of re-election rates in the US Senate. In the absence of officeholder benefits, electoral selection is simulated using observed dropout rates from 1946 to 2010. This provides a benchmark for the re-election rate that would be generated by incumbent quality advantage alone. The simulation delivers a re-election rate that is almost identical to the observed rate prior to 1980, at around 78 per cent. In the later subsample, quality-based selection generates a re-election rate that is seven percentage points lower than observed. The divergence in the re-election rates in the later subsample is consistent with the findings of vote margin studies that indicate rising incumbency advantage due to officeholder benefits. In addition, it is found here that the quality-based selection first-term re-election rate is significantly lower than the observed first-term re-election rate. This result supports sophomore surge vote margin studies of officeholder benefits. Adapted from the source document.