Suchergebnisse

This research looks at redistricting in terms of the partisan competitiveness of U.S. House election districts by creating a measure of partisan competitiveness based on the 1988 presidential election results for the two major parties. Nationwide, regional, and state means of district partisan competitiveness are computed for pre‐ and post‐1990 congressional districts, and changes in those means are analyzed. This method holds constant all other factors besides redistricting. Post‐1990 districts are less competitive between the two major parties than pre‐1990 districts, despite predictions to the contrary. A regression model, predicting states' change in mean district partisan competitiveness, shows that states required to preclear their election districts under the Voting Rights Act and states gaining from reapportionment decline in mean district partisan competitiveness to a statistically significant degree. Surprisingly, one‐party control of redistricting is associated with increased competitiveness to a statistically significant degree.

The fact that retirements rather than election defeats are the primary source of turnover in the U.S. House of Representatives has led some to conclude that voters' preferences have little influence on the composition of the House. Jacobson and Kernell's theory of strategic retirement suggests that many members retire to avoid likely defeat, so that one would expect a party's retirement rate to increase during an election cycle expected to be unfavorable to it. The theory is tested by specifying and estimating a multivariate regression model of party retirement rate including variables representing strategic, nonstrategic, and mixed motivations for retirement; the database consists of both parties' retirement rates for the 55th through 104th Congresses. The results suggest that the president's party members are more likely to retire during a midterm year, but this effect depends on model specification. Other strategic variables show no significant effects on party retirement rate. Separating the data by political party, type of retirement and party alignment period yields little evidence of a strategic retirement pattern that might have been obscured in the overall analysis. Additional research on individual‐level forms of strategic retirement and alternative forms of strategic behavior is suggested.

Despite concern with turnover in the U.S. House of Representatives, few scholars have attempted to view turnover in historical perspective or in all its forms. Confusion over the basic facts has impeded attempts to explain and evaluate levels of turnover. We present a broad descriptive overview of turnover over the entire history of the U.S. House in terms of the levels of overall turnover, forms thereof, and patterns, particularly within party periods. The findings include that turnover has declined over the years but not in a continuous fashion and not evenly among the different forms, that general election defeat is not the primary form of turnover, that common methods of reporting turnover magnify the apparent importance of electorally based turnover, and that turnover varies systematically by party period. A research agenda is proposed for explanatory work on turnover including strategic retirement and the impact of partisan realignments on levels and forms of turnover.