Suchergebnisse

Recent literature has documented failures of truthful preference reporting in the strategy-proof deferred acceptance algorithm. I consider the implications of these strategic mistakes for a common welfare consideration: the ability of the mechanism to sort the best students to the best schools. I find that these mistakes have the potential to significantly help or significantly hinder sorting. Through this channel, the presence of mistaken play may have widely varying welfare effects. I discuss related considerations in the welfare evaluation of mistaken play in the deferred acceptance algorithm and the implications for "nudges" that correct these mistakes.

We survey 561 students from US medical schools shortly after they submit choice rankings over residencies to the National Resident Matching Program. We elicit (i) these choice rankings, (ii) anticipated subjective well-being (SWB) rankings, and (iii) expected features of the residencies (such as prestige). We find substantial differences between choice and anticipated-SWB rankings in the implied trade-offs between residency features. In our data, evaluative SWB measures (life satisfaction and Cantril's Ladder) imply trade-offs closer to choice than does affective happiness (even time-integrated), and as close as do multimeasure SWB indices. We discuss implications for using SWB data in applied work. (JEL D12, I31)