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In 2009-2010, The Squiggle Foundation, whose aim is to stimulate interest in the work of Donald Winnicott, organized a series of lectures on the theme of "the antisocial tendency". These lectures are offered here to the wider public much as they were originally given. The speakers, each one an established figure in child care policy or in the residential and therapeutic management of disaffected youngsters, reflect on society's changing attitudes towards antisocial behaviour and its manifestations over the past half century. They consider how altered childrearing practices, the greater incidence of family break-up, and the increasing part played by central government in the determination of child care policies, have contributed to a shift towards the more punitive attitudes towards "wayward youth" prevalent today. Brief, pointed, and accessible, these lectures address topics of contemporary social concern by identifying some of the underlying questions to be asked regarding the child, the family, and society in a mass-communication and mass-organized environment.

The article analyses the Polish government's recently published National Security Strategy in an attempt to discern the broad outlines of the strategic culture within Poland's strategic community. The article adopts a 'fourth generation' approach to the conception of strategic culture, which posits that there are often rival subcultures within strategic communities, which can often result in dramatic shifts in a state's security policies over time. There is a brief discussion of how conflicting subcultures can be identified in Poland's foreign policies in the past before the article discusses what Poland's current Strategy reveals about the strategic culture of today's decision-makers. It broadly argues that there are obvious continuities in Poland's security policies, notably in terms of how the Russian Federation is regarded as a hostile state and the degree to which NATO and the EU serve to strengthen Poland's security. It is also possible to see more minor shifts in Poland's security policies in recent years, such as a renewed emphasis on territorial defence and a willingness to align itself with several states which are relatively antagonistic towards the EU.

The Jagiellonian Idea and Poland's Eastern Policy: Historical Echoes in Today's Approach This paper analyses the extent to which the Jagiellonian idea still has a discernible influence over contemporary Polish foreign policy. More particularly, it addresses the question whether this tradition in some way still informs Poland's approach towards its eastern neighbours that possess territories that once belonged to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The paper argues that it is possible to discern the legacy (or afterlife) of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth when it comes to the way in which Poland manages its relations with its eastern neighbours. The civilizing mission that was once associated with the Jagiellonian idea can still be seen in Poland's efforts to promote democracy and liberal values in the East; this is most evident in the contribution that Poland has made to the European Union's Eastern Partnership. Nevertheless, differing collective memories among these states also continue to cause tensions between them.

In the period 1969‑1971, the Nixon administration had significant misgivings regarding the Eastern Policy (Ostpolitik) of the new West German government led by Willy Brandt. These mainly stemmed from a fear that it could create divisions within NATO and instability within the Federal Republic. Of particular concern was that Brandt had made ratification of the renunciation of force treaty he signed with the Soviet Union in August 1970 contingent upon a Four Power Berlin Agreement. Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, did not view the talks with any enthusiasm, believing that it would be extremely difficult to achieve a satisfactory agreement. Moreover, they feared that the Three Western Powers would be negotiating from a position of weakness. Accordingly, in 1969 and 1970 the White House did not view the Berlin negotiations as a priority. At the beginning of 1971, however, Kissinger and Nixon appeared to perform a volte‑face when they decided, using their secret backchannel with the Soviets, to actively work to bring the talks to a successful conclusion. It is argued that this change was partly prompted by their wider diplomatic strategy; in particular, Nixon's desire to obtain a summit meeting in Moscow with his Soviet counterpart. It is also suggested that political calculations, especially the pressing need for a foreign policy success before the 1972 presidential election, played a significant role. Nixon and Kissinger established a secret set of tripartite discussions in Bonn that ultimately resulted in the successful conclusion of a Four Power Berlin Agreement. In doing so, they effectively negotiated behind the backs of two of their chief allies in Western Europe, Britain and France, and officials in their own State Department.

The purpose of this article is to capture one of the key features of the political thought that developed in the United States of America. Assuming that the USA's political culture is indeed exceptional, the author attempts to find the common denominator that would reflect the singularity of the American political mind. The author states that such a feature is the radical anti-historicality of the American mode of thinking about politics. It is a phenomenon that is deeply-rooted in the political and spiritual past of the United States and seems to be crucial because it never developed to such an extent in other traditions. Furthermore, even today to a large extent it defines both the American left and right. It is also very much present in academic discussion as well as in ordinary political activities. By anti-historicality the author means the rejection of the thesis that politics within a given society depends on that society's past experience. The phenomenon defies simple normative assessments. On the one hand, it protects American politics from the perils of radical historicism; on the other hand, it hinders the USA's contacts with other political bodies. However, the author concludes that understanding American anti-historicality is crucial when entering into any relations with the USA. Celem artykułu jest porównanie i przeciwstawienie brytyjskiej polityki wobec kryzysu w Libii i w Syrii odpowiednio w 2011 i w 2013 roku. Szuka się w nim odpowiedzi na pytanie, dlaczego parlament brytyjski, który w 2011 roku tak zdecydowanie poparł użycie siły przeciwko Libii, wstrzymał swoje poparcie dla akcji militarnej w Syrii w sierpniu 2013 roku. Autor wskazuje, że perspektywa masakry w libańskim mieście Benghazi przekonała brytyjskiego premiera, że akcja międzynarodowa była pilną koniecznością. Rezolucja Rady Bezpieczeństwa ONZ pozwalająca na akcję militarną w celu ochrony libijskiej ludności cywilnej oraz fakt, iż interwencję poparło kilka rządów na Bliskim Wschodzie, również przyczyniły się do uznania jej przez rząd brytyjski za w pełni uprawnioną. Jednakże dwa lata później brytyjski parlament skutecznie zawetował udział Wielkiej Brytanii w atakach powietrznych przeciwko Syrii. Było to skutkiem, jak argumentuje autor, braku rezolucji ONZ w tej kwestii i wsparcia rządów w regionie dla Syrii oraz wątpliwości co do skuteczności akcji militarnej. W artykule podejmowane jest również pytanie, czy brak brytyjskiej interwencji w Syrii oznacza początek zwrotu w brytyjskiej polityce zagranicznej.