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In this article, I consider the question of what punishment expresses and propose a way of approaching the question that overcomes problems in both psychosocial and philosophical expressivist traditions. The problem in both traditions is, I suggest, the need for an adequate moral – neither moralizing nor reductive – psychology, and I argue that Melanie Klein's work offers such a moral psychology. I offer a reconstruction of Klein's central claims and begin to sketch some of its potential implications for an expressive account of punishment. I outline a Kleinian interpretation of modern punishment's expression as of an essentially persecutory nature but also include depressive realizations that have generally proved too difficult for liberal modernity to work through successfully, and the recent 'persecutory turn' is a defence against such realizations. I conclude by considering the wider philosophical significance of a Kleinian account for the expressivist theory of punishment.

This paper attempts to show how Adorno's thought can illuminate our reflections on the future of work. It does so by situating Adorno's conception of genuine activity in relation to his negativist critical epistemology and his subtle account of the distinction between true and false needs. What emerges is an understanding of work that can guide our aspirations for the future of work, and one we illustrate via discussions of creative work and care work. These are types of work which cater to persistent human needs, albeit ones that are distorted under present social conditions. Adorno's thought helps us to understand why this is the case.