Suchergebnisse

This paper reflects on the literature on courts and politics in Europe and the United States. US-American Political Science has dealt for over fifty years with the role of courts and judges as political actors, whereas this perspective has only recently emerged in Europe. The debates differ not only with regard to the number of articles written, but also with regard to their content. This paper discusses the different research perspectives that are being pursued on both sides of the Atlantic. While a major part of the US-American literature investigates the politics of judicial action and the politicization of the legal system, research on European courts confines itself to analyzing the effects of judicial action, often describing them in terms of juridification. Based on a review of the existing literature, this paper suggests that European scholars ought to take crucial assumptions of the US-American research tradition more seriously.

Gerichte treffen politische Entscheidungen. Folglich kann Rechtsprechung als politischer Prozess untersucht werden, in dem Interessen, Ideen und Machtressourcen eine Rolle spielen. Britta Rehder untersucht den Beitrag des Bundesarbeitsgerichts zur Entstehung und Entwicklung des deutschen Tarifrechts und illustriert, wie sich zentrale Rechtsnormen im historischen Zeitverlauf wandeln und mit welchen Mitteln dieser Wandel initiiert und durchgesetzt wird.

Gerichte treffen politische Entscheidungen. Folglich kann Rechtsprechung als politischer Prozess untersucht werden, in dem Interessen, Ideen und Machtressourcen eine Rolle spielen. Britta Rehder untersucht den Beitrag des Bundesarbeitsgerichts zur Entstehung und Entwicklung des deutschen Tarifrechts und illustriert, wie sich zentrale Rechtsnormen im historischen Zeitverlauf wandeln und mit welchen Mitteln dieser Wandel initiiert und durchgesetzt wird.

AbstractThe US has a distinctive legal style, which Robert Kagan has called "adversarial legalism." It is marked by a pattern of political decisionmaking and conflict resolution in which the courtrooms and the law are systematically exploited as political arenas for making and implementing political settlements and policy outlines. In this article it is argued that a "German way" of adversarial legalism is about to emerge in the German industrial relations system. Economic liberalization, the fragmentation and decentralization of lawmaking authority in the political sphere, and the common‐law‐like nature of German labor law have contributed to the appearance of a judicialized pattern of governance. Nonetheless, Germany is not converging on the "American way of law" and major differences are expected to persist in the years to come.