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Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- 1. Fascism and Prosperity in Advanced Industrial States -- 2. West German Prosperity and British Poverty -- 3. At Home in a Foreign Land: Ford in Britain -- 4. The Wing and a Prayer: Ford on the German Periphery -- 5. The Core of German Industry: Volkswagen and the State -- 6. In the Absence of a Core: The Austin Motor Company -- 7. Fascism's Critical Divide -- 8. The Consequences of Fascism -- Index

Simon Reich presents an interpretation of the relationship between material (hard) and social (soft) power, with implications for the alternative ways these link and the impact of these linkages on the future of American policy. Global Norms offers a new way of understanding both theory and policy in the 21st Century

Simon Reich presents an interpretation of the relationship between material (hard) and social (soft) power, with implications for the alternative ways these link and the impact of these linkages on the future of American policy. Global Norms offers a new way of understanding both theory and policy in the 21st Century.

This paper constitutes a component of a larger research project. The larger project attempts to address two issues in international relations - one substantive and theoretical, the second epistemological and ontological. The first issue, which will be the focus of this paper, considers the puzzle of variance in the successful application of global norms. It seeks to explain the conditions under which global norms become part of the agenda of global governance and thus consequential to the actions of state and non-state actors alike. In that sense, the paper focuses on the critical factors that explain variance in the adoption of norms onto the agenda of global governance, their widespread acceptance as legitimate, and their enforcement. I outline three explanatory variables and, according to their configuration, eight possible combinations. The second aspect of this project attempts to apply some of the theoretical aspects of the project to the case of the development of the norm of preventative intervention in intrastate conflicts. In doing so I seek to understand both how, and the extent to which, the concept has evolved during the course of the last decade. Specifically, to what degree has the idea of preventative intervention become widely discussed and part of the policy agenda, and to what degree and how is it implemented?

International audience ; Prior to his appointment as Director of the CIA, William Burns wrote a short piece in which he laid out America's choices when it came to the Biden administration's foreign policy. He characterised three options: restoration, retrenchment or reinvention. Restoration entailed trying to buttress the major foundations of the multilateral Liberal international order, with the United States in a familiar role: the unquestioned "first among equals" as the leader of the "free world." Retrenchment entailed America's strategic military withdrawal along the lines first mooted by Barack Obama and then emphatically endorsed and pursued by Donald Trump. Burns, however, prescribed reinvention: America should completely rethink its strategic principles, priorities and forms of engagement in a rapidly evolving global environment.

International audience ; Prior to his appointment as Director of the CIA, William Burns wrote a short piece in which he laid out America's choices when it came to the Biden administration's foreign policy. He characterised three options: restoration, retrenchment or reinvention. Restoration entailed trying to buttress the major foundations of the multilateral Liberal international order, with the United States in a familiar role: the unquestioned "first among equals" as the leader of the "free world." Retrenchment entailed America's strategic military withdrawal along the lines first mooted by Barack Obama and then emphatically endorsed and pursued by Donald Trump. Burns, however, prescribed reinvention: America should completely rethink its strategic principles, priorities and forms of engagement in a rapidly evolving global environment.

International audience ; Prior to his appointment as Director of the CIA, William Burns wrote a short piece in which he laid out America's choices when it came to the Biden administration's foreign policy. He characterised three options: restoration, retrenchment or reinvention. Restoration entailed trying to buttress the major foundations of the multilateral Liberal international order, with the United States in a familiar role: the unquestioned "first among equals" as the leader of the "free world." Retrenchment entailed America's strategic military withdrawal along the lines first mooted by Barack Obama and then emphatically endorsed and pursued by Donald Trump. Burns, however, prescribed reinvention: America should completely rethink its strategic principles, priorities and forms of engagement in a rapidly evolving global environment.

For some time, international relations has trended in the direction of an American and Chinese dominated binary world order. While the Trump administration has been an accelerator not a cause of this trend between 2016 and 2020, not coincidentally the post 2016 era has also seen key EU figures move to develop a strategy of greater "strategic autonomy". This interest in strategic autonomy was, in no small part, a reflection of growing European distrust in the reliability of both China and, increasingly, the USA. The paper shows, in contrast to the Cold War era during which the EU was unambiguously aligned, how the EU now appears to have embarked on a hedging strategy, albeit implemented more by default than design. In its desire to defend its core interests the EU appears to lean to one side or the other on an issue by issue basis in at least seven key policy domains identified in the paper. This approach is seen to be the outcome of its dual desire to articulate the values of its much touted "Geopolitical Commission" at the same time as it tries to continue its traditional institutional commitment to multilateralism. The paper concludes that the ambiguity present in this endeavour to straddle the realist-liberal fence only serves to expose the limitations of the strategy.

For some time, international relations has trended in the direction of an American and Chinese dominated binary world order. While the Trump administration has been an accelerator not a cause of this trend between 2016 and 2020, not coincidentally the post 2016 era has also seen key EU figures move to develop a strategy of greater "strategic autonomy". This interest in strategic autonomy was, in no small part, a reflection of growing European distrust in the reliability of both China and, increasingly, the USA. The paper shows, in contrast to the Cold War era during which the EU was unambiguously aligned, how the EU now appears to have embarked on a hedging strategy, albeit implemented more by default than design. In its desire to defend its core interests the EU appears to lean to one side or the other on an issue by issue basis in at least seven key policy domains identified in the paper. This approach is seen to be the outcome of its dual desire to articulate the values of its much touted "Geopolitical Commission" at the same time as it tries to continue its traditional institutional commitment to multilateralism. The paper concludes that the ambiguity present in this endeavour to straddle the realist-liberal fence only serves to expose the limitations of the strategy.