The Lab and the Field: Empirical and Experimental Economics
In: Handbook of Experimental Economic Methodology, S. 407-419
19 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: Handbook of Experimental Economic Methodology, S. 407-419
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 37, Heft 1, S. 195-211
ISSN: 1756-2171
I present experimental evidence on the effects of minimum bids in first‐price, sealed‐bid auctions. The auction experiments manipulated the minimum bids in a preexisting market on the Internet for collectible trading cards from the game Magic: the Gathering. I examine a number of outcomes, including the number of participating bidders, the probability of sale, the levels of individual bids, and the auctioneer's revenues. The benchmark theoretical model is one with symmetric, risk‐neutral bidders with independent private values. The results verify a number of the predictions concerning equilibrium bidding. Many bidders behave strategically, anticipating the effects of the reserve price on others' bids.
In: American economic review, Band 89, Heft 5, S. 1063-1080
ISSN: 1944-7981
William Vickrey's predicted equivalences between first-price sealed-bid and Dutch auctions, and between second-price sealed-bid and English auctions, are tested using field experiments that auctioned off collectible trading cards over the Internet. The results indicate that the Dutch auction produces 30-percent higher revenues than the first-price auction format, a violation of the theoretical prediction and a reversal of previous laboratory results, and that the English and second-price formats produce roughly equivalent revenues. (JEL C93, D44)
In: IZA Working Paper No. 3273
SSRN
In: Discussion paper series 3273
Field experiments occupy a middle ground between laboratory experiments and naturally occurring field data. The idea is to perform a controlled experiment that captures important characteristics of the real world. Relative to traditional empirical economics, field experiments provide an advantage by creating exogenous variation in the variables of interest, allowing us to establish causality rather than mere correlation. Relative to a laboratory experiment, a field experiment gives up some of the control that a laboratory experimenter may have over her environment in exchange for increased realism. -- Field experiments
In: The B.E. journal of economic analysis & policy, Band 6, Heft 2
ISSN: 1935-1682
Sellers in eBay auctions have the opportunity to choose both a public minimum bid amount and a secret reserve price. We ask, empirically, whether the seller is made better or worse off by setting a secret reserve above a low minimum bid, versus the option of making the reserve public by using it as the minimum bid level. In a field experiment, we auction 50 matched pairs of Pokémon cards on eBay, half with secret reserves and half with equivalently high public minimum bids. We find that secret reserve prices make us worse off as sellers, by reducing the probability of the auction resulting in a sale, deterring serious bidders from entering the auction and lowering the expected transaction price of the auction. We also present evidence that some sellers choose to use secret reserve prices for reasons other than increasing their expected auction prices.
In: Journal of political economy, Band 110, Heft 1, S. 215-233
ISSN: 1537-534X
In: American economic review, Band 90, Heft 4, S. 961-972
ISSN: 1944-7981
SSRN
In: Garrett A. Johnson, Randall A. Lewis, David H. Reiley (2017) "When Less is More: Data and Power in Advertising Experiments" Marketing Science, 36(1): 43-53.
SSRN
SSRN
SSRN
Working paper
In: NBER Working Paper No. w19520
SSRN
In: NBER Working Paper No. w15609
SSRN
Working paper
SSRN