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Grafting the Marxian idea that private property is coercive onto the liberal imperative of individual liberty, this new thesis from one of America's foremost intellectuals conceives a revised definition of justice that recognizes the harm inflicted by capitalism's hidden coercive structures. Maps a new frontier in moral philosophy and political theoryDistills a new concept of justice that recognizes the iniquities of capitalismSynthesis of elements of Marxism and Liberalism will interest readers in both campsDirect and jargon-free style opens.

In response to J. Thomson's argument (see SA0312/I1790) that we need not seek what is common to all rights in right to privacy claims, it is noted that there is a common & unique feature to claims of privacy rights, & this feature is of great value in moral reasoning. Linked with privacy rights are the notions of intimacy & personhood. It is necessary to recognize that privacy is a social practice that involves behaviors of restraint & exists for good reasons. The point of this very complicated social ritual is that it provides a means by which an individual's moral title to his existence is conferred. As such, privacy is a social process recognizing the value of intimacy in regard to the existence of the individual, which is a precondition of personhood. To be a person, an individual must recognize not just his actual capacity to shape his destiny by his choices; he must also recognize that he has an exclusive moral right to shape his destiny. The right to privacy is the right to the existence of a social practice which makes it possible for one to think of this existence as his. It protects an individual's interest in becoming, being, & remaining a person. Modified Author's Summary.