Suchergebnisse

"Considerable debate rages about whether Federal Reserve policy was too lax in the early part of the 2000s, thereby fueling the home-price bubble that was the proximate cause of the global financial crisis. We present evidence that the view that modest alterations to monetary policy have vast consequences is inconsistent with theory and not supported by evidence. We take a close look at the responses of asset markets to changes in the short-term policy interest rate since the founding of the Fed in 1914. Changes in the federal funds rate have no systematic effect on either long-term interest rates or housing prices over nearly a century. Indeed, since the mid-1990s the policy rate had a negative relationship with long-term interest rates. This is consistent with a global view of capital markets where massive cross-border flows shape the availability of domestic credit and asset prices. The evidence casts doubts on arguments that a moderately different monetary policy path might have mattered"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site

Cover -- Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- Executive Summary -- Ch 1. A Decade of Debt -- I. Introduction -- II. Surges in Public Debt -- III. The Financial Crash-Sovereign Debt Crisis Sequence -- IV. Debt and Growth -- V. The Aftermath of High Debt: The 1930s and World War II -- VI. Conclusion -- Ch 2. Chartbook of Country Histories of Debt, Default, and Financial Crises -- I. Preamble -- II. Key to Figures and Methodology Notes -- III. Debt and Crises: Main Themes -- References -- About the Authors -- Index.

"We study economic growth and inflation at different levels of government and external debt. Our analysis is based on new data on forty-four countries spanning about two hundred years. The dataset incorporates over 3,700 annual observations covering a wide range of political systems, institutions, exchange rate arrangements, and historic circumstances. Our main findings are: First, the relationship between government debt and real GDP growth is weak for debt/GDP ratios below a threshold of 90 percent of GDP. Above 90 percent, median growth rates fall by one percent, and average growth falls considerably more. We find that the threshold for public debt is similar in advanced and emerging economies. Second, emerging markets face lower thresholds for external debt (public and private), which is usually denominated in a foreign currency. When external debt reaches 60 percent of GDP, annual growth declines by about two percent; for higher levels, growth rates are roughly cut in half. Third, there is no apparent contemporaneous link between inflation and public debt levels for the advanced countries as a group (some countries, such as the United States, have experienced higher inflation when debt/GDP is high.) The story is entirely different for emerging markets, where inflation rises sharply as debt increases"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site

We've been assured that the recession is over, but the country and the economy continue to feel the effects of the 2008 financial crisis, and people are still searching for answers about what caused it, what it has wrought, and how we can recover. This selection from the best-selling book This Time Is Different--the definitive history of financial crises, including the recent subprime meltdown--answers these questions and more. Princeton Shorts are brief selections excerpted from influential Princeton University Press publications produced exclusively in eBook format. They are selected with the firm belief that while the original work remains an important and enduring product, sometimes we can all benefit from a quick take on a topic worthy of a longer book. In a world where every second counts, how better to stay up-to speed on current events and digest the kernels of wisdom found in the great works of the past? Princeton Shorts enables you to be an instant expert in a world where information is everywhere but quality is at a premium. The Second Great Contraction does just that.

"Over the past decade, policymakers in many emerging market economies have opted to limit fluctuations of the value of their domestic currencies relative to the U.S. dollar. A simple interest-parity relationship is used to identify the potential sources of upward pressure on the value of a foreign exchange rate and to explain the policy options to damp them. The paper then documents the extent to which the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves has been sterilized and provides a comprehensive list of major policy initiatives related to stemming forces that would otherwise appreciate the exchange rate in over one hundred countries. This examination of policy efforts shows that a wide variety of tools are used in the attempt to stem the tide of capital flows"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site

"Is the 2007-2008 U.S. sub-prime mortgage financial crisis truly a new and different phenomena? Our examination of the longer historical record finds stunning qualitative and quantitative parallels to 18 earlier post-war banking crises in industrialized countries. Specifically, the run-up in U.S. equity and housing prices (which, for countries experiencing large capital inflows, stands out as the best leading indicator in the financial crisis literature) closely tracks the average of the earlier crises. Another important parallel is the inverted v-shape curve for output growth the U.S. experienced as its economy slowed in the eve of the crisis. Among other indicators, the run-up in U.S. public debt and is actually somewhat below the average of other episodes, and its pre-crisis inflation level is also lower. On the other hand, the United States current account deficit trajectory is worse than average. A critical question is whether the U.S. crisis will prove similar to the most severe industrialized-country crises, in which case growth may fall significantly below trend for an extended period. Or will it prove like one of the milder episodes, where the recovery is relatively fast? Much will depend on how large the shock to the financial system proves to be and, to a lesser extent, on the efficacy of the subsequent policy response"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site

"There is a rich scholarly literature on sovereign default on external debt. Comparatively little is known about sovereign defaults on domestic debt. Even today, cross-country data on domestic public debt remains curiously exotic, particularly prior to the 1980s. We have filled this gap in the literature by compiling a database on central government public debt (external and domestic). The data span 1914 to 2007 for most countries, reaching back into the nineteenth century for many. Our findings on debt sustainability, sovereign defaults, the temptation to inflate, and the hierarchy of creditors only scratch the surface of what the domestic public debt data can reveal. First, domestic debt is big -- for the 64 countries for which we have long time series, domestic debt accounts for almost two-thirds of total public debt. For most of the sample, this debt carries a market interest rate (except for the financial repression era between WWII and financial liberalization). Second, the data go a long ways toward explaining the puzzle of why countries so often default on their external debts at seemingly low debt thresholds. Third, domestic debt has largely been ignored in the vast empirical work on inflation. In fact, domestic debt (a significant portion of which is long term and non-indexed) is often much larger than the monetary base in the run-up to high inflation episodes. Last, the widely-held view that domestic residents are strictly junior to external creditors does not find broad support"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site

Some of the best-known papers of Carlos F. Díaz-Alejandro were about Latin
America's crises in the 1980s and 1930s. I show data, figures, and evidence about the
crises in the advanced economies thirty years later that fit the same narrative. His
unadulterated words aptly describe modern problems across geographical borders and, in
this case, income levels. This attests to his timeless insight and understanding.
Because some of the observations he made have general applicability to the study of
recurring patterns across crises, I have taken the liberty to label these lessons. These
are primarily lessons about what to avoid. JEL Classification: B26, E5, E6, F3,
G01

The Ds: Sharp economic downturns follow banking crises; with government revenues falling, fiscal deficits worsen; deficits lead to debt; as debts pile up rating downgrades follow. For the most fortunate countries it does not end in default.

Sovereign credit ratings play an important part in determining countries' access to international capital markets and the terms of that access. In principle, there is no reason to expect that sovereign credit ratings should systematically predict currency crises. In practice, in emerging market economies there is a strong link between currency crises and default. Hence if credit ratings are forward-looking and currency crises in emerging market economies are linked to defaults, it follows that downgrades in credit ratings should systematically precede currency crises. This article presents results suggesting that sovereign credit ratings systematically fail to predict currency crises but do considerably better in predicting defaults. Downgrades in credit ratings usually follow currency crises, possibly suggesting that currency instability increases the risk of default.