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This paper aims to discover underlying, as yet theoretically and empirically unexplored, distinctions in citizens' views of transnational solidarity within the European Union (EU). Building on literature regarding national welfare states, the paper presents an original concept of transnational solidarity consisting of two latent, not directly measurable, dimensions: first, citizens' preferences for risk-sharing among EU states and, second, their preferences for intra-EU redistribution. The diverse types of transnational solidarity examined in previous research should be assignable to either one or the other dimension. Moreover, previous research is based on the idea that the concept of transnational solidarity is comparable across EU countries; however, this premise has not been empirically examined so far. To test both these assumptions, I analyze data collected in Austria, Germany, and Greece in 2019 or 2020. The study runs multi-group confirmatory factor analysis to test whether the presented concept of transnational solidarity (a) applies and (b) is comparable between these nations. The empirical analysis supports both these assumptions. The populations of the three countries share the same understanding of transnational solidarity even though the willingness to express cross-country risk-sharing and redistribution varies significantly between the states. The study contributes to current research in the fields of European integration, political sociology, and survey methodology.

This cumulative dissertation investigates transnational solidarity in times of crises in the context of the European Union (EU). In order to realize solidarity policies that are democratically legitimate, the EU requires the support of its population. To that end, the dissertation at hand takes an individual level approach. In three original articles, I empirically analyze transnational solidarity based on survey data and shed light on varying conceptual, state and stakeholder perspectives, which have remained unexplored in previous research. The first paper investigates a two-dimensional concept of transnational solidarity derived from the literature on national welfare states differentiating between risk-sharing and redistribution. Despite diverse levels of transnational solidarity in EU member states, citizens share a similar understanding of the overall concept. Therefore, it is feasible to compare transnational solidarity across borders. The following two papers build on this conceptual comparability and refer to the identified risk-sharing dimension during the European Sovereign Debt Crisis. The second paper examines the willingness of voters from a debt-ridden state to accept crisis bailout conditions, whereas the third paper studies politicians' perspectives on granting such monetary bailout. For both studies, I find that the individual's socio-economic attitudes as well as the EU attitudes matter. Moreover, the economic and information contexts individuals find themselves in play a direct and moderating role. These findings are in line with previous studies on support for EU-wide financial assistance in the broader EU population. Thus, voters and political elites from states in different crisis roles seem to base their preferences for transnational solidarity on similar considerations. This can be interpreted as a positive signal for further European integration and democratic representation alike. Following from that, the overall findings of my cumulative dissertation are manifold and make important contributions to hitherto unexplored gaps in the literature. Firstly, the insights gained contribute to a more sophisticated conceptualization of transnational solidarity and demonstrate that citizens' understanding of the concept indeed is comparable between the EU countries studied. Secondly, my work sheds light on understudied state and stakeholder perspectives taken during the European Sovereign Debt Crisis, thus contributing to a deeper knowledge of transnational solidarity and underlying motivations at that time. In terms of current political debates, the EU has to decide how to jointly tackle current and future EU crises. Turning from a mostly economic community to a union of enacted values requires a common understanding of transnational solidarity as well as comparable mindsets of individuals from diverse state and stakeholder perspectives. The present dissertation supports the existence of both these preconditions.

AbstractThe recent periods of multiple crises go hand in hand with calls for more national sovereignty. Drawing on data provided by the Manifesto Project, this contribution seeks to study empirically how widespread the wish to 'take back control' is reflected through political parties all over Europe. We show that although 'sovereignist' issues across EU member states were not among the political top priorities in the past, parties' issue emphasis has increased in the shadow of the last decade's multiple crises. On top of that, we argue that sovereignist aspirations have the potential to further increase alongside upcoming international challenges. In particular, events such as the Russian-Ukrainian war and the declared Zeitenwende may raise calls for more national sovereignty.

AbstractThis article analyses party positions on European Union (EU) solidarity in Germany in the run-up to the 2021 German federal elections. While previous studies have investigated whether and under which conditions individuals support or reject different types of EU solidarity, little is known about how political parties position themselves on the issue. The study draws on an original expert survey on German party positions, including various items on EU solidarity. First, we demonstrate that the GAL–TAN dimension strongly shapes party positionings on EU solidarity. Second, the support by political parties varies along the long- or short-term institutionalization of types of EU solidarity. Third, the findings have political implications for the current German government coalition, revealing potential problems for a joint political agenda on EU affairs.

Although polarisation risks breaking up the European family, such conflicts paired with transnational challenges can also raise awareness of the need for more European Union (EU) cohesion. In order to approach the hitherto underspecified concept, this article connects the recent literature on social cohesion with research on various facets of public EU support – integration preferences, identity, voting behaviour, and solidarity. Building on survey data from 10 EU countries taken at the end of 2020, a latent class analysis identifies two distinct groups of preferences for EU cohesion: its friends and its foes. EU cohesion can be achieved by highlighting personal advantages of European integration and by stressing joint approaches to crises, civic education, and democratic processes.

As a consequence of the European Economic Crisis, the European Union (EU) has implanted mechanisms to assist fellow member states facing economic difficulties. Despite an increasing academic interest in public preferences for such intra-EU solidarity measures, research has so far largely ignored individual characteristics that could possibly influence politicians' views. In this paper, we look at politicians' preferences for transnational solidarity and argue that these preferences depend on attitudes regarding socioeconomic issues as well as attitudes related to the EU. Moreover, we hypothesize that the relationship is moderated by responsibility attribution and the economic situation in a country. Using survey data of about 4000 politicians running for office in nine EU countries, we find that transnational solidarity is more common for socioeconomically left-wing and pro-EU politicians. Yet, attitudinal differences only cease to matter when the beneficiary state is perceived responsible for the crisis and economic problems at home are low.

As a consequence of the European Economic Crisis, the European Union (EU) has implanted mechanisms to assist fellow member states facing economic difficulties. Despite an increasing academic interest in public preferences for such intra-EU solidarity measures, research has so far largely ignored individual characteristics that could possibly influence politicians' views. In this paper, we look at politicians' preferences for transnational solidarity and argue that these preferences depend on attitudes regarding socioeconomic issues as well as attitudes related to the EU. Moreover, we hypothesize that the relationship is moderated by responsibility attribution and the economic situation in a country. Using survey data of about 4000 politicians running for office in nine EU countries, we find that transnational solidarity is more common for socioeconomically left-wing and pro-EU politicians. Yet, attitudinal differences only cease to matter when the beneficiary state is perceived responsible for the crisis and economic problems at home are low.

Populist parties in government show high levels of resilience despite their policy failures. The inevitable reality check and the lack of success in implementing proposed policies does not seem to harm populist parties electorally. In our paper Populists in Government: Voter Defection and Party Resilience published in the Journal of Representation in January 2020, we examine the case of crisis-ridden Greece. To be more precise, we study under which conditions former voters for the populist government continue their electoral support despite policy failures. To that end, we analyze data collected immediately after the Greek federal elections held in September 2015. ; Populistische Parteien in der Regierung zeigen trotz ihres politischen Versagens ein hohes Maß an Widerstandsfähigkeit. Die unvermeidliche Realitätsprüfung und der mangelnde Erfolg bei der Umsetzung der vorgeschlagenen Politik scheinen den populistischen Parteien bei den Wahlen nicht zu schaden. In unserem Paper Populists in Government: Voter Defection and Party Resilience, das im Januar 2020 im Journal of Representation veröffentlicht wurde, untersuchen wir den Fall des krisengeschüttelten Griechenlands. Genauer gesagt untersuchen wir, unter welchen Bedingungen ehemalige Wähler*innen bei den Wahlen ihre Unterstützung für die populistische Regierung trotz politischer Misserfolge fortsetzen. Zu diesem Zweck analysieren wir Daten, die unmittelbar nach den griechischen Parlamentswahlen vom September 2015 erhoben wurden.