Suchergebnisse

Contrary to the expectations of many, the break between Portugal and its former colonies in southern Africa was far from complete after decolonization. This article points to three major reasons. First, the impact on relations with Angola and Mozambique of the fragmentation of Portuguese state power and tense polarization in the Portuguese polity after the military coup of 24 April 1974 has been overstated and was far from entirely negative. Second, diplomatic relations were normalized between Portugal, Angola, and Mozambique during the Cold War in a way that has significant parallels with West Germany's Ostpolitik. Portugal's Südpolitik saw a cultural identity worth preserving despite geopolitical divisions and pushed for better relations and deepened ties with these states to help move them away from strict alignment with the Soviet bloc. Third, officers of the Armed Forces Movement that carried out the April 1974 coup exercised a fundamental, positive influence in Portuguese policies toward Angola and Mozambique during decolonization and for years afterward.

É Difusão, não é Proliferação de Drones! Um Impacto (Sobretudo) Positivo na Segurança do Sul Global O argumento central é que o conceito de proliferação de drones é um termo inadequado. Os drones estão a difundir-se rápida e globalmente, sendo errado qualificar a priori a sua exportação ou desenvolvimento (mesmo os armados) como algo de ilegal ou negativo para a segurança global. Os drones podem ser uma forma de abordar nacionalmente o problema das vastas áreas fronteiriças remotas e desgovernadas usadas por insurgentes e pelo crime organizado como refúgios seguros, contrariando a argumentação que legitima o uso ou mesmo o abuso de ataques com drones por parte dos EUA e outros países. Em qualquer caso, dada a natureza desta tecnologia de dupla utilização, os riscos do seu uso indevido não podem ser evitados. Seria muito melhor concentrar esforços não na limitação da difusão mas na criação de um regime global que definisse o emprego de drones militares por parte dos Estados, em desenvolver contramedidas contra seu uso indevido por atores não-estatais, bem como a proibição de máquinas de matar totalmente autónomas. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

The two books reviewed in this article offer testimonies by two South Africans with direct experience of the Portuguese Wars of Decolonization. Al Venter is the only foreign war correspondent with direct experience in the field in all three theaters of operations of the Portuguese late colonial wars. Brigadier General van der Waals was the Vice-Consul and de facto military attaché in Luanda from 1970 to 1974. Both books show that South Africa was the foreign power most directly involved in these conflicts and with most vital interests at stake. It has, consequently, every reason to pay the closest possible attention to them. Both books also show that, despite the close cooperation in the field between South Africa and Portugal, especially after 1968, the mainstream South African view of these counter-insurgencies was often very critical of the Portuguese war effort. ; Os dois livros analisados neste artigo oferecem testemunhos escritos por dois sul-africanos com experiência directa das guerras portuguesas de descolonização de 1961-1975. O texto de Al Venter representa o testemunho do único correspondente de guerra estrangeira com experiência directa no terreno dos três teatros de operações das guerras coloniais portuguesas. O outro é da autoria do general de brigada van der Waals, vice-cônsul e adido militar de facto da África do Sulem Luanda no período 1970-1974. Ambos os livros são reveladores do facto de que a África do Sul foi a potência estrangeira com a maior participação directa e mais interesses vitais em jogo nestes conflitos e tinha, consequentemente, todas as razões para lhes prestar a máxima atenção. Ambos os livros também mostram que, apesar da estreita cooperação no terreno entre África do Sul e Portugal, especialmente depois de 1968, o ponto de vista dominante entre os sul-africanos relativamente a estas guerras de contra-guerrilha foi muitas vezes muito crítico do esforço de guerra português. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

This article argues that the dominant paradigm in studies of British small wars positing a central role of minimum force in doctrinal guidelines for counterinsurgency needs to be even more fundamentally revised than has been argued in recent debates. More specifically, it argues that minimum force is nowhere to be found in British doctrine during the small wars of decolonisation. The need for revision also applies to the way British counterinsurgency is usually sharply contrasted with French counterinsurgency. British doctrine during this period is better understood when placed in its proper historical context. This means comparing it with the other two most significant examples of doctrinal development for small wars of decolonisation – those of France and Portugal. This comparison shows that British counterinsurgency was not uniquely population-centric, and this characteristic cannot, therefore, be the reason for its arguably superior if far from infallible performance. Evidence for these arguments comes primarily from doctrinal sources developed specifically to deal with counterinsurgency, complemented with insights from key military thinkers and archival sources of relevance practices. Some wider implications of this analysis for the relationship between combat experience and doctrinal development as well as for counterinsurgency are identified.

In this essay we look at the question from Waltz's point of view of the very topical issue of nuclear proliferation. Since the early 1980s until his recent death Waltz kept an active interest and a very specific position on this matter. He denied there was such a thing as nuclear proliferation and, moreover, refused that, in light of structural realism the spread of nuclear weapons, even to a theocracy like Iran, would be a problem. This paper will explain why and around this theme we will draw the intellectual profile of Waltz as a realist that values the role of the State in international security, but was often critical of the security policies of his own state, the United States. Adapted from the source document.

A decade after the 9/11 terrorist attacks there are some issues that could be examined in order to understand the transformations occurred. This article explores the origins of Al-Qaida and tries to understand whether Al-Qaida had represented a new form of terrorism or a reason to the international security changes and also explores the real Impact of Al-Qaida in the international security. Then it examines the 9/11 impact on the way to think International Relations discipline, and analyses the Al-Qaida in the international system and its future after bin Laden' s death. Adapted from the source document.

An interview with Kenneth Waltz about the structural theory of international politics is presented. Adapted from the source document.