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Digital inequalities have been exacerbated for many marginalized populations during the COVID-19 pandemic. This is no different for one of the most marginalized populations in the United States, incarcerated people. Due to the pandemic, in-person visitations as well as educational and vocational programming were, and in many cases remain, suspended across numerous correctional facilities, leaving incarcerated people even more socially isolated than before the pandemic. Although an increasing number of facilities provide prison tablets for entertainment and communication purposes, high prices for electronic messages, video visitations, books, and entertainment content leave incarcerated people and their families unable to pay for these services. As best practice examples from California, Maine, New York City, and Pennsylvania demonstrate, connecting prisons to the internet and allowing incarcerated people secure access to the internet is possible, and long overdue. The pandemic has highlighted these issues and provides an opportunity to overhaul outdated ideas about prison communication.

Research into digital inequalities has shifted from a binary view of Internet use versus non-use to studying gradations in Internet use. However, this research has mostly compared categories of users only. In addition, the role of attitudes in digital inequalities has been largely overlooked. This article addresses these limitations by performing a systematic analysis of factors that distinguish low Internet users from non-users, regular users, and broad users. In addition to socio-demographic characteristics, we examine attitudinal variables. Results drawn from multinomial regressions indicate that attitudes play at least as large a role as socio-economic factors in determining the likelihood of belonging to specific (non-)user categories. This identifies positive attitudes toward technologies and the Internet as a crucial step toward Internet adoption. Hence, digital inequality research needs to consider factors other than traditional socio-economic ones to draw a complete picture.

Digital inequalities disproportionately affect vulnerable and marginalized populations, including formerly incarcerated persons (FIPs), who experience compound vulnerabilities, such as advanced aging, disability, low incomes and education, gender-based marginalization, and in the United States also race and ethnicity. Building on existing frameworks of digital skills and Reisdorf and Rikard's digital rehabilitation model, this article examines how FIPs navigate the digital society post-incarceration and provides support for the digital rehabilitation model. Examining data from focus groups with FIPs in the United States, we demonstrate that lack of access to ICTs and the Internet during incarceration deprives FIPs of necessary digital skills to navigate the various fields of everyday life (economic, social, cultural, personal, health) that are deeply embedded in digital technologies. Policies regarding digital rehabilitation need to increase limited Internet access during incarceration and provide comprehensive digital skills training tailored to FIPs to allow their full integration into the speed-of-light society.

Despite societal dependence on digital technologies and the Internet across the developed world, current prisoner rehabilitation, reentry models, and practices across most U.S. state correctional systems only target offline realms and issues while disregarding the digital realm. By integrating existing models of rehabilitation and reentry with recently developed and refined digital divide theories, this article develops a new model of digital rehabilitation, considering both the online and the offline realms. The proposed model fills a gap in the literature and allows for a more complete understanding of the problems that parolees encounter on release from prison. By conceptualizing corresponding fields and resources across three realms—prison, reentry, and digital—the digital rehabilitation and reentry model enables systematic research into the extent to which the digital realm can assist in a more successful reentry process.

Research into reasons for Internet non-use has been mostly based on one-off cohort studies and focused on single-country contexts. This article shows that motivations for being offline changed between 2005 and 2013 among non- and ex-users in two high-diffusion European countries. Analyses of Swedish and British data demonstrate that non-user populations have become more concentrated in vulnerable groups. While traditional digital divide reasons related to a lack of access and skills remain important, motivational reasons increased in importance over time. The ways in which these reasons gain importance for non- and ex-user groups vary, as do explanations for digital exclusion in the different countries. Effective interventions aimed at tackling digital exclusion need to take into consideration national contexts, changing non-user characteristics, and individual experience with the Internet. What worked a decade ago in a particular country might not work currently in a different or even the same country.

An important contribution of digital inequalities research has been the discussion of nuances in ways that people (dis)engage with information and communication technologies (ICTs). One such practice is proxy Internet use (PIU): indirect Internet access by asking others to do things online for them or on their behalf. Whereas there is a good amount of research on those who are on the receiving end of PIU, users-by-proxy, little is known about "proxy users" who provide PIU. Analyses of nationally representative survey data from Slovenia ( N = 1047) collected in 2018 show that 51% of Internet users reported to have acted as proxy users in the past 12 months. Multivariate analyses unveil that those Internet users who report a wider array of personal, economic, social Internet uses as well as those with higher levels of operational Internet skills are more likely to act as proxy users.

Research shows that digital divides and inequalities are related to lower socioeconomic status and detrimental to social and economic capital acquisition. Other studies show that use of information and communication technologies in the classroom can lead to worse academic performance. Nevertheless, many universities require that students own or buy a laptop, and many offer financial aid for students who cannot afford to buy one. As such, laptop ownership may be crucially tied to academic performance. Based on a large data set of incoming freshmen at a large public university in the United States, this article shows that not owning a laptop is negatively associated with overall college performance, even when controlling for socioeconomic background. Whereas we find that laptop ownership is not necessarily responsible for the higher performance of individuals in our broader sample, it could be beneficial to nonowners, which has implications for university policies seeking to provide institution-wide access to laptops and for universities' broader interactions with students who do not own a laptop.

This issue examines technology-driven economic developments during the global COVID-19 pandemic in Europe, Asia, and the Americas. Specifically, the articles cover the ways that gig work, the platform economy, and remote work have evolved during the course of the pandemic. The issue leads with articles that chart the interplay of the platform economy with various facets of the pandemic from the inequalities and risks faced by gig workers to market forces shaping the commercialization of hosting platforms. The following articles concentrate on the ways in which specific structural conditions—digital infrastructure as well as the structure of the economy—influence the unequal distribution of telework in Uruguay and the relationship between informality and remote work opportunities across Latin America. The last two articles explore remote work in Asia and North America. In the first of these two articles remote work in Japan is examined in order to investigate the cultural sources of resistance to the adoption of remote work. In the second and concluding article, the remote work preferences of U.S. adults are analyzed as a function of technology usage (videoconferencing versus instant messaging) as well as sociodemographic and occupational attributes.

The tsunami of change triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic has transformed society in a series of cascading crises. Unlike disasters that are more temporarily and spatially bounded, the pandemic has continued to expand across time and space for over a year, leaving an unusually broad range of second-order and third-order harms in its wake. Globally, the unusual conditions of the pandemic—unlike other crises—have impacted almost every facet of our lives. The pandemic has deepened existing inequalities and created new vulnerabilities related to social isolation, incarceration, involuntary exclusion from the labor market, diminished economic opportunity, life-and-death risk in the workplace, and a host of emergent digital, emotional, and economic divides. In tandem, many less advantaged individuals and groups have suffered disproportionate hardship related to the pandemic in the form of fear and anxiety, exposure to misinformation, and the effects of the politicization of the crisis. Many of these phenomena will have a long tail that we are only beginning to understand. Nonetheless, the research also offers evidence of resilience on several fronts including nimble organizational response, emergent communication practices, spontaneous solidarity, and the power of hope. While we do not know what the post COVID-19 world will look like, the scholarship here tells us that the virus has not exhausted society's adaptive potential. ; publishedVersion

The tsunami of change triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic has transformed society in a series of cascading crises. Unlike disasters that are more temporarily and spatially bounded, the pandemic has continued to expand across time and space for over a year, leaving an unusually broad range of second-order and third-order harms in its wake. Globally, the unusual conditions of the pandemic—unlike other crises—have impacted almost every facet of our lives. The pandemic has deepened existing inequalities and created new vulnerabilities related to social isolation, incarceration, involuntary exclusion from the labor market, diminished economic opportunity, life-and-death risk in the workplace, and a host of emergent digital, emotional, and economic divides. In tandem, many less advantaged individuals and groups have suffered disproportionate hardship related to the pandemic in the form of fear and anxiety, exposure to misinformation, and the effects of the politicization of the crisis. Many of these phenomena will have a long tail that we are only beginning to understand. Nonetheless, the research also offers evidence of resilience on several fronts including nimble organizational response, emergent communication practices, spontaneous solidarity, and the power of hope. While we do not know what the post COVID-19 world will look like, the scholarship here tells us that the virus has not exhausted society's adaptive potential.

The tsunami of change triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic has transformed society in a series of cascading crises. Unlike disasters that are more temporarily and spatially bounded, the pandemic has continued to expand across time and space for over a year, leaving an unusually broad range of second-order and third-order harms in its wake. Globally, the unusual conditions of the pandemic—unlike other crises—have impacted almost every facet of our lives. The pandemic has deepened existing inequalities and created new vulnerabilities related to social isolation, incarceration, involuntary exclusion from the labor market, diminished economic opportunity, life-and-death risk in the workplace, and a host of emergent digital, emotional, and economic divides. In tandem, many less advantaged individuals and groups have suffered disproportionate hardship related to the pandemic in the form of fear and anxiety, exposure to misinformation, and the effects of the politicization of the crisis. Many of these phenomena will have a long tail that we are only beginning to understand. Nonetheless, the research also offers evidence of resilience on several fronts including nimble organizational response, emergent communication practices, spontaneous solidarity, and the power of hope. While we do not know what the post COVID-19 world will look like, the scholarship here tells us that the virus has not exhausted society's adaptive potential.

The tsunami of change triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic has transformed society in a series of cascading crises. Unlike disasters that are more temporarily and spatially bounded, the pandemic has continued to expand across time and space for over a year, leaving an unusually broad range of second-order and third-order harms in its wake. Globally, the unusual conditions of the pandemic—unlike other crises—have impacted almost every facet of our lives. The pandemic has deepened existing inequalities and created new vulnerabilities related to social isolation, incarceration, involuntary exclusion from the labor market, diminished economic opportunity, life-and-death risk in the workplace, and a host of emergent digital, emotional, and economic divides. In tandem, many less advantaged individuals and groups have suffered disproportionate hardship related to the pandemic in the form of fear and anxiety, exposure to misinformation, and the effects of the politicization of the crisis. Many of these phenomena will have a long tail that we are only beginning to understand. Nonetheless, the research also offers evidence of resilience on several fronts including nimble organizational response, emergent communication practices, spontaneous solidarity, and the power of hope. While we do not know what the post COVID-19 world will look like, the scholarship here tells us that the virus has not exhausted society's adaptive potential.

The tsunami of change triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic has transformed society in a series of cascading crises. Unlike disasters that are more temporarily and spatially bounded, the pandemic has continued to expand across time and space for over a year, leaving an unusually broad range of second-order and third-order harms in its wake. Globally, the unusual conditions of the pandemic—unlike other crises—have impacted almost every facet of our lives. The pandemic has deepened existing inequalities and created new vulnerabilities related to social isolation, incarceration, involuntary exclusion from the labor market, diminished economic opportunity, life-and-death risk in the workplace, and a host of emergent digital, emotional, and economic divides. In tandem, many less advantaged individuals and groups have suffered disproportionate hardship related to the pandemic in the form of fear and anxiety, exposure to misinformation, and the effects of the politicization of the crisis. Many of these phenomena will have a long tail that we are only beginning to understand. Nonetheless, the research also offers evidence of resilience on several fronts including nimble organizational response, emergent communication practices, spontaneous solidarity, and the power of hope. While we do not know what the post COVID-19 world will look like, the scholarship here tells us that the virus has not exhausted society's adaptive potential.

We now live in a pre-crime society, in which information technology strategies and techniques such as predictive policing, actuarial justice and surveillance penology are used to achieve hyper-securitization. However, such securitization comes at a cost – the criminalization of everyday life is guaranteed, justice functions as an algorithmic industry and punishment is administered through dataveillance regimes. This pioneering book explores relevant theories, developing technologies and institutional practices and explains how the pre-crime society operates in the 'ultramodern' age of digital reality construction. Reviewing pre-crime's cultural and political effects, the authors propose new directions in crime control policy