Suchergebnisse

In the past ten years there has been a burst of theoretical and
empirical research on the topic of learning in international
relations. Russell J. Leng's new book is the latest addition to
this body of scholarship, and it builds on his past research on
learning and crisis bargaining. Leng examines the role of
learning in crisis bargaining strategies within ongoing, inter-
national rivalries. He asks a series of questions, including: Do
patterns of crisis behavior repeat from one crisis to the next?

Coercion through air power has been and continues to be an important tool of foreign policy. Multivariate probit analysis is used to test three hypotheses on all instances of air power coercion from 1917 to 1999: (1) air power coercion attempts are more likely to work if they exploit military rather than civilian vulnerabilities, (2) the regime type of the target affects the chances of success, and (3) success is less likely if the attacker demands that the target change its leadership. Results show that coercion is more likely to work if the target's military vulnerability is higher, but higher levels of civilian vulnerability have no effect on the chances of coercion success; that target regime type has no effect; and that success is less likely when the attacker demands the target change its leadership.

The connection between domestic politics and international cooperation, specifically the relationship between regime type and alliance behavior, is examined to test two central hypotheses: democracies are more likely to ally with each other, and states of any similar regime type are more likely to ally with each other. These hypotheses emerge from three theories: constructivism, economic interdependence, and credible commitments. The authors use a data set of all pairs of states from 1816 to 1992. Results show that states with similar regime type are more likely to ally with each other after 1945, although two democracies are not more likely to ally than two autocracies during this period, and distance, learning, threat, and common culture affect alliance behavior, but trade does not. Results indicate sharp limits to the connection between democracy and international cooperation.

Machine generated contents note: TABLES AND FIGURES ix -- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xi -- ONE -- Democracy's Fourth Virtue 1 -- TWO -- Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory 10 -- THREE -- Democracy and Battlefield Success 58 -- FOUR -- Balancers or Bystanders? The Lack of Fraternal -- Democratic Assistance during War 84 -- FIVE -- Winning Wars on Factory Floors? The Myth of the -- Democratic Arsenals of Victory 114 -- SIX -- Democracy, Consent, and the Path to War 144 -- SEVEN -- The Declining Advantages of Democracy: -- When Consent Erodes 164 -- EIGHT -- Why Democracies Win Wars 193 -- NoTEs 207 -- BIBLIOGRAPHY 243 -- INDEX 269

Why do democracies win wars? This is a critical question in the study of international relations, as a traditional view--expressed most famously by Alexis de Tocqueville--has been that democracies are inferior in crafting foreign policy and fighting wars. In Democracies at War, the first major study of its kind, Dan Reiter and Allan Stam come to a very different conclusion. Democracies tend to win the wars they fight--specifically, about eighty percent of the time.

A principal agent model is used to test the hypothesis that when proposed uses of force attract the support of the United Nations (UN) Security Council, the rally in support of the American president increases significantly. Regression analysis is applied to rallies during all militarized interstate disputes from 1945 to 2001. Results show that UN Security Council support significantly increases the rally behind the president (by as many as 9 points in presidential approval), even after including an array of control variables. This finding is generally robust across most model specifications. This effect is unique among international institutions because other actions by the UN or regional security organizations do not significantly affect rallies. These findings provide new insight into how international institutions can matter and influence the foreign policies of states by affecting public opinion.

Event history models have become a dominant method of analysis in the study of international relations. Conventional event history models, however, retain the assumption that the effects of the covariates remain proportional to each other throughout the duration of the subject's phase. Nonproportional hazard (NPH) models are used, which allow for the effects of covariates to vary over time. These models are then applied to three previously established data sets on the duration of postwar peace, civil wars, and alliances. Results show that NPH analysis is a useful method for testing new hypotheses, as well as removing possible sources of bias from existing analyses.