Suchergebnisse

"A multi-author undergraduate textbook on conflict studies in international politics. Chapters by leading scholars cover topics like gender, peacekeeping, terrorism, civil wars, nuclear weapons, environmental stresses and conflict, and public opinion. It takes quantitative and qualitative approaches, including case studies on the Ukraine conflict"--

The bargaining model of war envisions the initiation, prosecution, termination, and consequences of war as part of a single bargaining process. This article focuses on the most recent works on this topic, many of which employ formal techniques, and it applies the model to the different phases of war. It also discusses the state of empirical work on the bargaining model. Finally, the article considers how the bargaining model meshes with other theories of war and international relations, including cognitive psychology, organization theory, domestic politics, and constructivism.(Übernahme aus DE, SWP-Wdr)

Liberal international relations theory proposes that peace fosters democracy. This research note tests this & a related hypothesis, that defeat in war makes an authoritarian state's transition to democracy more likely. It uses Weibull event history models to analyze both the transition to & survival of democracy for states from 1960 to 1992, using the MID, COW, & Pearson/Baumann intervention data sets to measure international conflict. Important control variables such as economic prosperity are also included. It finds that lower levels of participation in international conflict do not facilitate democratic transition or survival, with the limited exception that participation in an international war blocks democratic transition. Also, in most models examined defeat in war does not make democratic transition more likely. The implications for liberalism are mixed: peace in general does not cause democracy, but spreading democracy is likely to spread peace. 2 Tables, 40 References. Adapted from the source document.

Argues that NATO membership has not advanced democratization in Europe, based on the cases of Turkey, Spain, Portugal, and Greece, and will not do so in the case of Eastern Europe, and that costs and risks of further enlargement, including deterioration of relations with Russia, caution against pursuit of this policy.

This article proposes that foreign-imposed regime changes (FIRCs) make civil war onset more likely when they damage state infrastructural power, as in the context of interstate war, and when they change the target's political institutions as well as leadership. Using rare events logit to analyse civil war onset from 1920 to 2004, it is found that interstate war and institutional change are virtually necessary (though not sufficient) conditions for an FIRC to cause a civil war. Many control variables are included. The results are robust to different research design specifications; nevertheless, they cannot confirm that occupation troops make an FIRC more likely to spark civil war. (British Journal of Political Science/ FUB)