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The bargaining model of war envisions the initiation, prosecution, termination, and consequences of war as part of a single bargaining process. This article focuses on the most recent works on this topic, many of which employ formal techniques, and it applies the model to the different phases of war. It also discusses the state of empirical work on the bargaining model. Finally, the article considers how the bargaining model meshes with other theories of war and international relations, including cognitive psychology, organization theory, domestic politics, and constructivism.(Übernahme aus DE, SWP-Wdr)

In the past ten years there has been a burst of theoretical and
empirical research on the topic of learning in international
relations. Russell J. Leng's new book is the latest addition to
this body of scholarship, and it builds on his past research on
learning and crisis bargaining. Leng examines the role of
learning in crisis bargaining strategies within ongoing, inter-
national rivalries. He asks a series of questions, including: Do
patterns of crisis behavior repeat from one crisis to the next?

Liberal international relations theory proposes that peace fosters democracy. This research note tests this & a related hypothesis, that defeat in war makes an authoritarian state's transition to democracy more likely. It uses Weibull event history models to analyze both the transition to & survival of democracy for states from 1960 to 1992, using the MID, COW, & Pearson/Baumann intervention data sets to measure international conflict. Important control variables such as economic prosperity are also included. It finds that lower levels of participation in international conflict do not facilitate democratic transition or survival, with the limited exception that participation in an international war blocks democratic transition. Also, in most models examined defeat in war does not make democratic transition more likely. The implications for liberalism are mixed: peace in general does not cause democracy, but spreading democracy is likely to spread peace. 2 Tables, 40 References. Adapted from the source document.

Argues that NATO membership has not advanced democratization in Europe, based on the cases of Turkey, Spain, Portugal, and Greece, and will not do so in the case of Eastern Europe, and that costs and risks of further enlargement, including deterioration of relations with Russia, caution against pursuit of this policy.

Coercion through air power has been and continues to be an important tool of foreign policy. Multivariate probit analysis is used to test three hypotheses on all instances of air power coercion from 1917 to 1999: (1) air power coercion attempts are more likely to work if they exploit military rather than civilian vulnerabilities, (2) the regime type of the target affects the chances of success, and (3) success is less likely if the attacker demands that the target change its leadership. Results show that coercion is more likely to work if the target's military vulnerability is higher, but higher levels of civilian vulnerability have no effect on the chances of coercion success; that target regime type has no effect; and that success is less likely when the attacker demands the target change its leadership.

The connection between domestic politics and international cooperation, specifically the relationship between regime type and alliance behavior, is examined to test two central hypotheses: democracies are more likely to ally with each other, and states of any similar regime type are more likely to ally with each other. These hypotheses emerge from three theories: constructivism, economic interdependence, and credible commitments. The authors use a data set of all pairs of states from 1816 to 1992. Results show that states with similar regime type are more likely to ally with each other after 1945, although two democracies are not more likely to ally than two autocracies during this period, and distance, learning, threat, and common culture affect alliance behavior, but trade does not. Results indicate sharp limits to the connection between democracy and international cooperation.

Machine generated contents note: TABLES AND FIGURES ix -- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xi -- ONE -- Democracy's Fourth Virtue 1 -- TWO -- Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory 10 -- THREE -- Democracy and Battlefield Success 58 -- FOUR -- Balancers or Bystanders? The Lack of Fraternal -- Democratic Assistance during War 84 -- FIVE -- Winning Wars on Factory Floors? The Myth of the -- Democratic Arsenals of Victory 114 -- SIX -- Democracy, Consent, and the Path to War 144 -- SEVEN -- The Declining Advantages of Democracy: -- When Consent Erodes 164 -- EIGHT -- Why Democracies Win Wars 193 -- NoTEs 207 -- BIBLIOGRAPHY 243 -- INDEX 269