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People have a tendency to disregard information that contradicts their partisan or ideological identity. This inclination can become especially striking when citizens reject notions that scientists would consider "facts" in the light of overwhelming scientific evidence and consensus. The resulting polarization over science has reached alarming levels in recent years. This theoretical review conceptualizes political polarization over science and argues that it is driven by two interrelated processes. Through psychological science rejection, people can implicitly disregard scientific facts that are inconsistent with their political identity. Alternatively, citizens can engage in ideological science rejection by adhering to a political ideology that explicitly contests science. This contestation can in turn be subdivided into four levels of generalization: An ideology can dispute either specific scientific claims, distinct research fields, science in general, or the entire political system and elite. By proposing this interdisciplinary framework, this article aims to integrate insights from various disciplines.

AbstractPolitical opponents are often divided not only in their attitudes (i.e., ideological polarization) and their feelings toward each other (i.e., affective polarization), but also in their factual perceptions of reality (i.e., factual belief polarization). This paper describes factual belief polarization in the Netherlands around three core issues. Furthermore, this paper examines who are most susceptible to this type of polarization. Analyses on the 2021 Dutch Parliamentary Election Study reveal that citizens hold different perceptions than their political opponents about income inequality, immigration, and climate change. This type of polarization is strongest among citizens who have hostile feelings toward their political opponents and, paradoxically, among those who are highly educated and interested in politics. Trust in epistemic authorities did not mitigate factual belief polarization, perhaps because this trust has itself become politicized. These findings underline that factual belief polarization constitutes a core pillar of political polarization, alongside ideological and affective polarization.

AbstractThis study examined if and for whom prosecution of politicians for hate speech undermines support for the legal system and democracy. Three research designs were combined to investigate the case of Dutch politician Geert Wilders, who was convicted for hate speech against minorities in 2016. First, an experiment showed that observing a guilty verdict decreased support among 'assimilationists' who oppose the multicultural society. This deterioration of support was found among the entire group of assimilationists, regardless of whether they voted for Wilders. Secondly, a quasi-experiment demonstrated that assimilationists who were interviewed after Wilders' conviction indicated less support than those who were interviewed before the verdict and compared to a pre-test. Thirdly, a nine-year panel study suggested that these effects accumulate into long-term discontent. This case therefore demonstrates that hate speech prosecution can damage the democratic system it is intended to defend.

AbstractThis study examines whether younger generations are more likely to associate their support for European unification with cultural, rather than economic issues. The EU has changed from an 'economic community' to a 'political union.' Because most citizens form relatively stable orientations during their 'impressionable years,' we expect recent generations to be more likely to view European unification through a cultural lens. An analysis of 12 waves of panel data from the Netherlands finds the strongest correlation between EU support and cultural attitudes among the newest generations. However, these generations are not less likely to associate EU support with economic attitudes. Moreover, between 2007 and 2019, Euroscepticism became increasingly associated with cultural attitudes among all generations and age groups. These findings indicate that EU support has become more strongly aligned along a cultural dimension and that this realignment will become more pronounced as newer generations replace earlier ones.

Although previous research has shown that deliberative discussions have consequences for intergroup attitudes, very little is known about this impact during the formative adolescent years. In addition, the mechanism explaining the mechanism through which discussions affect intergroup attitudes is not clear. This 3-wave study of Swedish adolescents (N = 892, 51.1% girls, MageT1 = 13.41, nested in 35 classrooms) examined the role of teacher-initiated political discussions in the classroom for the development of youth attitudes toward immigrants. The results of multilevel analysis showed that adolescents who perceived political discussions to be less frequent increased in anti-immigrant attitudes compared to youth with more frequent discussions. Similarly, classrooms with less deliberative atmosphere were more negative toward immigrants than classrooms with a higher frequency of discussions, and this effect remained two years after the students moved to new schools. Mediation analysis revealed that general political interest (but not news consumption) explained the effects of classroom discussions on attitudes: Youth who perceived that their teachers frequently initiate political discussions developed higher general political interest and, in turn, lower anti-immigrant attitudes than youth with less frequent discussions. The findings show an important role of classroom political discussions for the formation of intergroup attitudes in adolescence. The findings suggest that frequent discussions reduce the risk of prejudice development by stimulating youth general political interest.

AbstractAmerican political elites have increasingly polarized over the past decades, which has inspired much research into mass polarization. We study whether there is a generational component to mass polarization by disentangling period, age, and cohort differences while distinguishing two forms of mass polarization: partisan sorting and ideological divergence. Drawing from General Social Survey and American National Election Studies data, we find that partisan sorting has increased across long-standing and emerging issues, while ideological divergence has not. Contrary to expectations, over-time increases in sorting are clearly driven by changes within generations rather than by generational replacement. On several issues, newer generations turn out to be less sorted than those they replace. This tentatively suggests that, partially as a consequence of demographic changes, generational replacement will gradually lead to less polarization in American public opinion as it converges toward more liberal positions.