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This study analyzes variations in the incidence of state involvement in investment treaty arbitration in Latin America and the Caribbean over the 1987–2014 period. Its main contributions are fourfold. First, by focusing on the balance of incentives and opportunities facing political leaders and foreign investors, the study establishes a new basis for understanding the reasons actors opt for the risks and uncertainties of international arbitration instead of resolving international investment disputes via alternative means. Second, by restricting the focus of research to the Latin American region, the study is able to move beyond the analysis of relatively time-invariant structural and institutional conditions and crude indicators to address the role played by the preferences of political actors. Third, by disaggregating disputes by sector of investment, the analysis documents the variable role of ideology and electoral incentives in investment treaty arbitration. Finally, by underlining the distinctiveness of the Latin American experience with investment treaty arbitration, the study offers new insights into the global backlash against investment treaty arbitration, which has gone farther in the region than anywhere else. Overall, the results underline the potential payoffs of breaking down the international experience with investment treaty arbitration into regional patterns to obtain a deeper and more granular understanding of the political economy of investor-state dispute settlement.

This study analyzes variations in the incidence of state involvement in investment treaty arbitration in Latin America and the Caribbean over the 1987–2014 period. Its main contributions are fourfold. First, by focusing on the balance of incentives and opportunities facing political leaders and foreign investors, the study establishes a new basis for understanding the reasons actors opt for the risks and uncertainties of international arbitration instead of resolving international investment disputes via alternative means. Second, by restricting the focus of research to the Latin American region, the study is able to move beyond the analysis of relatively time-invariant structural and institutional conditions and crude indicators to address the role played by the preferences of political actors. Third, by disaggregating disputes by sector of investment, the analysis documents the variable role of ideology and electoral incentives in investment treaty arbitration. Finally, by underlining the distinctiveness of the Latin American experience with investment treaty arbitration, the study offers new insights into the global backlash against investment treaty arbitration, which has gone farther in the region than anywhere else. Overall, the results underline the potential payoffs of breaking down the international experience with investment treaty arbitration into regional patterns to obtain a deeper and more granular understanding of the political economy of investor-state dispute settlement. ResumenEste estudio analiza las variaciones en la incidencia de la participación del Estado en el arbitraje de tratados de inversión en América Latina y el Caribe durante el período 1987–2014. Sus principales contribuciones son cuádruples. En primer lugar, al centrarse en el equilibrio de incentivos y oportunidades a los que se enfrentan los líderes políticos y los inversores extranjeros, el estudio establece una nueva base para entender las razones por las que los actores optan por los riesgos e incertidumbres del arbitraje internacional en lugar de resolver controversias internacionales en materia de inversiones por medios alternativos. En segundo lugar, al restringir el enfoque de la investigación a la región latinoamericana, el estudio es capaz de ir más allá del análisis de condiciones estructurales e institucionales relativamente invariables en el tiempo e indicadores burdos para abordar el papel desempeñado por las preferencias de actores políticos. En tercer lugar, al desagregar las disputas por sector de inversión, el análisis documenta el papel variable de la ideología y los incentivos electorales en el arbitraje de tratados de inversión. Por último, al subrayar el carácter distintivo de la experiencia latinoamericana con el arbitraje de tratados de inversión, el estudio ofrece nuevas perspectivas sobre la reacción global contra el arbitraje de tratados de inversión, que ha ido más lejos en la región que en cualquier otro lugar. En general, los resultados subrayan los posibles beneficios de descomponerse la experiencia internacional con el arbitraje de tratados de inversión en patrones regionales para obtener una comprensión más profunda y más granular de la economía política de la resolución de disputas entre inversionistas y estados.

This study attempts to contribute to the growing debate over democratic accountability by focusing on the electoral impact of natural disasters and economic crises in the Caribbean. Although largely ignored by political science, the polities in the region share a long history of democratic governance as well as extreme vulnerability to adverse weather conditions and global economic fluctuations. The Caribbean thus offers unusually fertile opportunities for research on the capacity of voters to make rational electoral decisions. Two key questions are addressed. First, to what extent do citizens of the Caribbean punish incumbents for exogenous economic and climatic shocks? Second, what factors, if any, help to insulate democratic leaders from blame for conditions largely outside their control? Contrary to recent research on natural disasters and economic downturns in other contexts, the analysis provides no evidence that voting in the Caribbean has been characterized by systematic attribution errors or electoral myopia. The pattern of citizen attribution of responsibility to policy makers, however, has varied significantly with national independence and political scale.

What accounts for the devastating Argentine crisis of 2001 that resulted in the largest sovereign debt default in world history? Claudia Kedar poses this question in the introduction to her study of the relationship between the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Argentina.

Over the past decade the contours of political party competition in Latin America have been dramatically altered by an upsurge of support for leftist-populist parties and the related weakening of established parties on the center and right end of the political spectrum. Drawing on both aggregate and individual-level evidence, this article explores the roots of this swing of the political pendulum. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, which attributes the rising "pink tide" to citizen dissatisfaction with market-oriented policies, economic performance, and/or social inequality, the analysis focuses on the role played by improving external economic conditions during the early 2000s, which relaxed the preexisting constraints on policy choice, enhanced the credibility of anti-status quo political actors, and created new opportunities for the pursuit of statist, nationalist, and redistributive political projects and associated challenges to U.S. hegemony. Consistent with this line of theoretical argument, the macro-level evidence indicates that the odds of electing a leftist-populist president in the region rose with improvements in the terms of trade. At the micro level, survey data also show that support for leftist-populist presidents in the region has been positively associated with citizen satisfaction with democracy and the state of the economy as well as with anti-Americanism. The results underline the potential significance of economic fluctuations for understanding electoral dynamics and party system change, particularly under conditions in which government policy choice is constrained by the operation of international markets. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]

Over the past decade the contours of political party competition in Latin America have been dramatically altered by an upsurge of support for leftist–populist parties and the related weakening of established parties on the center and right end of the political spectrum. Drawing on both aggregate and individual-level evidence, this article explores the roots of this swing of the political pendulum. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, which attributes the rising "pink tide" to citizen dissatisfaction with market-oriented policies, economic performance, and/or social inequality, the analysis focuses on the role played by improving external economic conditions during the early 2000s, which relaxed the preexisting constraints on policy choice, enhanced the credibility of anti–status quo political actors, and created new opportunities for the pursuit of statist, nationalist, and redistributive political projects and associated challenges to U.S. hegemony. Consistent with this line of theoretical argument, the macro-level evidence indicates that the odds of electing a leftist–populist president in the region rose with improvements in the terms of trade. At the micro level, survey data also show that support for leftist–populist presidents in the region has been positively associated with citizen satisfaction with democracy and the state of the economy as well as with anti-Americanism. The results underline the potential significance of economic fluctuations for understanding electoral dynamics and party system change, particularly under conditions in which government policy choice is constrained by the operation of international markets.

This article attempts to bring the politics of scale back into the study of comparative politics. Explicitly focusing on the question of electoral turnout in the less industrialized world, it explores the impact of variations in community size relative to other influences on citizen participation. The findings, which draw on both aggregate and individual-level data at the subnational level of analysis, offer considerable evidence that electoral participation declines with community size, but for reasons largely neglected by most prior literature on electoral turnout. The central theoretical conclusion is that future comparative research needs to address the role of political scale more directly and systematically. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]

This article attempts to bring the politics of scale back into the study of comparative politics. Explicitly focusing on the question of electoral turnout in the less industrialized world, it explores the impact of variations in community size relative to other influences on citizen participation. The findings, which draw on both aggregate and individual-level data at the subnational level of analysis, offer considerable evidence that electoral participation declines with community size, but for reasons largely neglected by most prior literature on electoral turnout. The central theoretical conclusion is that future comparative research needs to address the role of political scale more directly and systematically.

Building on the growing body of research on political institutions, this article explores the causes of electoral reform, with specific reference to Latin America. What factors account for the extensive array of electoral reforms adopted in the region since the return to democracy? How are shifting patterns of political representation related to institutional change? In addressing these questions, I develop an account of electoral reform that places shifting partisan political fortunes at the center of analysis and show that changes in the rules of the electoral game tend to reflect the political self-interest of dominant political parties as defined in relation to mounting electoral uncertainty. The evidence regarding the impact of electoral reforms on party system change is less consistent with the expectations derived from the comparative institutional literature. Over the past two decades, party system change in Latin America has generated institutional change more predictably than vice versa.