Suchergebnisse

Belgian policies & development aid for Sub-Saharan Africa are reviewed, examining the priority countries to which aid was allocated by the successive Belgian governments in the 1990s & differentiating between bilateral support agreements & contributions to the African aid fund of international institutions & nongovernmental organizations. The principles governing aid distribution to African countries are outlined, explaining the notions of macroconditionality, selectivity, & ownership. Belgian aid to a group of partner countries, concentrated in Central Africa & representing historical ties (colony or a trust territory), is placed in the context of other developed countries' involvement in the region. The shift in African policy & new modalities of aid elaborated by the current Belgian government of prime minister Guy Verhofstadt are critically assessed, discussing the administration, management, & control of aid, organizational dimensions (geographic localization, distribution channel, & sector division), the inefficiencies of excessive compartmentalization, & the threat of defederalization (shifting decision making from the federal to regional governments). 3 Tables, 1 Appendix, 18 References. Z. Dubiel

SUMMARYOfficial donors have over the past decade pledged to enhance aid effectiveness by improving donor harmonization. To this effect, the European Union (EU) launched initiatives on a division of labor among its Member States. At the same time, the EU encourages Europe's subnational authorities to engage in their own development cooperation. This however seems to undermine the same harmonization effort. Belgium, characterized by multiple levels of government, illustrates that these two approaches to aid effectiveness—collective division of labor at the national level and decentralized cooperation at lower levels—are only partially compatible. In partner countries where both the federal Belgian and regional Flemish governments are active donors, Belgium's composite aid is poorly harmonized. A principal–agent framework helps to explain such selfish positioning. This article argues that a higher degree of complementarity and harmonization among Belgium's various authorities is feasible, albeit in forms that are specific to recipient country and context. As both donors are not so much competing in aid supply policies but rather in terms of supply management, such technical arguments may assist in lessening the political pressure to selfishly emphasize diversity over unity. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

This paper grew out of our bewilderment with the insouciance with which some in the donor community seem ready to abandon accounting for the use of aid. If one listens to the rhetoric surrounding the new approach to aid, one gets the impression that most of the crucial accounting tasks must be swiftly abandoned by donors and left to recipient governments. This paper does not question the underlying rationale for shifting towards recipient-led priority setting and control over implementation of aid resources, but argues that donors cannot let themselves off the hook so easily with respect to the accountability part of the equation. We argue that in most low-income countries such trust in recipient systems may be dubbed as over-alignment, and that it is neither necessary nor useful. Our argument is however not that old style donor-managed monitoring and evaluation is the only or the best solution. For we are equally puzzled by the stubbornness with which some other donors stick to their old monitoring and evaluation (M&E) in ways that contradict the new insights in aid effectiveness and hamper the emergence of national M&E systems. Why are positions so polarized and why is hardly anyone arguing in favour of intermediate positions? This is what this paper sets out to do: we argue against a radical and rapid implementation of the new rhetoric in low-income countries, but also against a continuation of present accountability practices. Donors have a large and lasting responsibility in accounting for the use of aid funds, both towards the taxpayers in donor countries and towards the targeted beneficiaries in the at best pseudo-democratic and poorly governed lowincome recipient countries. They should find new ways to remain firmly involved in M&E, ways that allow, at the same time, embryonic national M&E systems in low-income recipient countries to grow and flourish. – aid ; modalities ; reform ; accountability ; feedback ; alignment ; diagnosis of monitoring and evaluation ; low-income recipient countries